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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents a series of cross-cultural experiments, which investigate the 
role of self-awareness on self-disclosure in computer-mediated communication 
(CMC).  The thesis is split into two parts, detailing the results of four separate 
experiments.  In Part 1, the two experiments focus specifically on British 
participants who are considered to be from an individualistic culture. Experiment 
1 investigates how private and public self-awareness affects their breadth, depth 
and accuracy of self-disclosure in CMC.   Experiment 2 then attempts to simplify 
Experiment 1 to try and focus more specifically on personal motivations of self-
disclosure.  The results of the first two experiments clearly illustrate the 
importance of both private and public self-awareness in intimate self-disclosure in 
CMC.  More specifically, they indicate that increasing private self-awareness 
increases depth of self-disclosure, whilst increasing public self-awareness reduces 
the accuracy of the self-disclosure.    
 
In Part 2 of the thesis Experiments 1 and 2 are replicated on Singaporean 
participants, who are considered to be from a collectivist culture.  Members of 
collectivist cultures are consistently reported to self-disclose less than members of 
individualistic cultures.  It is however found in Experiment 3 that in a typical 
‘real-time’ interaction the Singaporeans report themselves to self-disclose to a 
greater depth than the British participants.  Cultural differences are also found in 
the participants’ reactions to certain manipulations of self-awareness.  More 
specifically, a manipulation that increases public self-awareness greatly reduces 
the British participants’ self-disclosure.  Whilst the Singaporeans are more 
affected by a manipulation that increases their private self-awareness, which 
greatly increases their depth of self-disclosure.  It is concluded that there are 
cultural differences in the way that people react to manipulations of self-
awareness in CMC and this raises philosophical discussion about how culture 
drives self-disclosure which, in turn, drives the pursuit of self-knowledge, and 
ultimately the construction of the cultural self.  Finally it is concluded that CMC 
may allow an exploration of the self outside of cultural norms, and that this could 
potentially change the boundaries of the private and public self in the future. 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction to Part 1 
 
The Self 
 
Throughout history, the self as a topic of research has intrigued psychologists, and 
attempts to define the self inevitably lead to philosophical debate.  Although, the 
self is often thought of as just being the physical body, it also refers to the 
psychological, a place where thoughts, feelings and emotions reside (Baumeister, 
1999).  The self is also often thought as having a large hidden component, which 
may be unknown to others, until it is revealed, or it is self-disclosed. However, 
part of the self, may also be hidden from the individual, and the individual may 
struggle to come to know that part of the self (Baumeister, 1999).  Barnlund 
(1975) in his cultural studies of the self, differentiated between a public and 
private self, which is a distinction based on the Johari window tool (Luft & 
Ingham, 1955).  In this approach, the private self is described as only accessible 
by the owner and is therefore unknown to others, whilst the public self is 
described as being accessible to the self, but is also accessible to others. Barnlund 
(1975; Asai & Barnlund, 1998) successfully uses this distinction to produce 
scholarly and thought provoking work, which focuses upon culture, and the 
present thesis begins with this simple distinction of the self. Throughout this 
thesis, other representations of the self also emerge, such as a true self or real self 
(Jung, 1933; Rogers, 1951), the individual, relational and collective selves 
(Sedikides & Brewer, 2001), and the ideal, actual and ought to selves (Higgins, 
1987), and these will be discussed in turn, as they arise.  
 
A second major perspective adopted in this thesis, is that the self is socially 
shaped, and the self can therefore be considered to be a product of socialisation 
and culture (Barnlund, 1975; Asai & Barnlund, 1998). In particular, this thesis 
focuses upon the role of communication in the development, construction and 
management of the self.  Given this, when the self is discussed in this thesis, it is 
in terms of how the individual gathers information about the self through 
communication, in order to build and develop a self-concept.  The self-concept is 
therefore considered to be the accumulation of self-knowledge that the individual 
gathers (Wilson & Dunn, 2004).  In the context of communication, it is also 
argued that self-knowledge has a reciprocal relationship with self-disclosure (Asai 
& Barnlund, 1998).  The relationship is considered reciprocal because self-
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disclosure is viewed as a tool to gain self-knowledge, and it is argued that the 
information that is self-disclosed has to come from the individual’s body of self-
knowledge (Asai & Barnlund, 1998).  It is also argued, in the present thesis that 
the decision of what type of information the individual will self-disclose is 
dependent on how aware they are of their private or public self at the time.  Self-
disclosure is therefore intrinsically linked to self-awareness and these are central 
themes within this thesis.  
 
As a research topic, the self is problematic (Baumeister, 1999). Indeed, already 
within this introductory section, a tension has arisen between what was described 
as the hidden aspects of the self, or the true self, and the adopting of a social 
constructionist perspective of the self. If the self is constructed through gathering 
self-knowledge and it is the accumulation of self-knowledge that forms the self-
concept (Wilson & Dunn, 2004), it then seems contradictory to suggest that there 
is part of the self which is hidden.  Rogers (1951) theorised that in therapy the 
client could feel that they were not their real self, and part of Roger’s therapy was 
to aid the client in discovering their true self, which Roger’s reported would bring 
them satisfaction.  Roger’s therefore believed that the true self did exist, but was 
not expressed in everyday life.  This true self, which appears to be a hidden part of 
the self, does imply that there is part of the self waiting to be discovered, which 
contradicts the notion that it is constructed.   Accordingly, this tension will be 
raised and discussed within this thesis where a social constructionist perspective is 
adopted, yet the existence of a true self is explored.  As the thesis unfolds, 
questions will be raised as to how the true self can be defined, whether there is a 
true self waiting to be discovered, and whether the true self is a culturally 
constructed phenomenon. 
 
To achieve these fairly ambitious aims the following research will be placed 
within the context of computer-mediated communication (CMC).  The Internet 
has been described as a playground for experimenting with the self (Turkle, 
1984), and Bargh, McKenna, and Fitzsimons (2002) argue that the Internet 
provides, ‘a unique opportunity for self-expression…..[and] would expect a 
person to use it…to express those aspects of the self that he or she has the 
strongest need to express – namely, the true self’.   Moreover, the popularity of 
CMC has led to a renaissance in research on self-disclosure (Kiesler & Sproull, 
1986; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004). This interest being incited 
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by the observation that self-disclosure appears to be increased in CMC (Kiesler & 
Sproull, 1986; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004). Researching self-
disclosure within a CMC context provides new opportunities to re-examine self-
disclosure theory, which could add clarity to what became a confused and 
complex subject area in the seventies (Cozby, 1973).  Furthermore, CMC provides 
various tools and endless possible manipulations to investigate the self, and in 
particular the relationship between self-disclosure and self-awareness. 
 
It  will be argued in the present thesis that CMC leads to a unique experience of 
self-awareness, that  allows different parts of the self to be explored and 
presented, than are possible in face-to-face (FTF) communication.  It is then 
further argued that these different experiences of self-awareness within CMC 
affect the motivations for self-disclosure in CMC, and ultimately the type of self-
knowledge that is gathered.  Of particular interest, in this thesis, is how CMC may 
allow an insight into what could be considered the hidden aspects of the self.  It is 
argued in the present thesis that these hidden aspects of the self are driven into 
hiding by social and cultural pressures, and that changes in self-awareness in the 
CMC environment allow them to emerge.  CMC is therefore not just an 
interesting context in which to study self-disclosure and self-awareness, but a 
unique platform from which to explore differences in the way people manage and 
construct their cultural self.  What will therefore be presented in this thesis is a 
cross-cultural investigation of self-awareness and self-disclosure in CMC. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
It became apparent during the course of this present study that the relevant 
literature base for the self, culture and CMC is huge. Consequently what is 
selected for discussion within each of these independent themes is limited to 
several pertinent topics.  Consideration of the relevant literature also indicates 
that, although the literature base is huge within each of these themes, the amount 
of literature that actually combines these three themes is scare.  Significantly, 
there is no research that uses CMC to examine cross-cultural differences in self-
disclosure, self-awareness or self-knowledge. Moreover, even when the theme of 
culture is removed from the equation, the broad self-disclosure literature is 
muddled, and there are few studies which empirically examine the relationship 
between self-awareness and self-disclosure in CMC. Due to these factors an 
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unusual structure has been adopted for the following thesis, which allows the story 
to unfold in a way that is deemed to be ultimately kinder to the reader.  This thesis 
will therefore be a story of two parts, the first of self-awareness and self-
disclosure in CMC, and the second of culture.   
 
More specifically, in the first part of the thesis, the focus will be on trying to 
provide some clarity with regard to the past self-disclosure literature.  This will 
involve reviewing the literature on self-disclosure and CMC, then clarifying some 
motivations of self-disclosure in terms of self-awareness and the gathering of self-
knowledge.  Two experiments will then be described in Part 1 (Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2), which will examine the role of self-awareness in both personally 
motivated and socially motivated self-disclosure.  These two experiments focus 
upon British participants only, and the results will therefore inform an 
understanding of only the British self.  The second part of the thesis will begin 
with another literature review, which this time explores culture.  In particular, this 
review will consider how culture may drive self-disclosure, self-awareness and 
self-knowledge, which will ultimately mould the self. The results of Experiments 
1 and 2, and the nature of the British self, will then be explored in light of the 
literature on culture.  Next, the experiments will be replicated upon Singaporean 
participants, and the results will be used to discuss how self-disclosure, self-
awareness and self-knowledge are driven by culture (Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 4).  These findings will lead to discussions of how the self is 
culturally constructed, how CMC may affect the way in which information is 
gathered about the self, and how CMC could potentially change the boundaries of 
the cultural self in the future. 
 
Technology and Communication 
 
CMC is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide range of computer-based 
communications, each of which gives rise to a different social experience. Of the 
different forms of CMC, the most commonly used is email, which allows people 
to communicate asynchronously via text. In addition, photos and documents can 
be attached to these messages, and the messages can be sent to individuals or 
groups.  Chat (or instant messaging) is also a medium, which provides text-based 
communication, but in ‘real-time’, or synchronously, and again interactions take 
place with an individual or a group.  CMC also affords the possibility of using 
 10 
webcams, and microphones, to conduct video and voice communication. Within 
these types of communications a video of the communicant is streamed, again 
either to an individual or to a group.  The user can decide whether to stream their 
voice with the image, or use text to communicate.  There are even multi-user-
domains (MUDS), which are social spaces where people can take on different 
roles, such as presenting the self as an avatar, and again communicating by text, or 
voice (Turkle, 1984).  Finally, the Internet also allows for the self to be 
communicated and presented in public domains, such as Facebook, which is a 
social networking website (Walther, Heide, Kim, Westerman, & Tong, 2008).  
These different possibilities for communicating the self have proved extremely 
popular, and CMC continues to grow (Rice & Markey, 2009).  In the UK 75 % of 
7-16-year olds are Internet users, and have been branded as the ‘Net Generation’ 
and ‘Cyberkids’ (Mackay, Thurlow, & Zimmerman, 2005).  It is therefore of great 
importance to understand the behaviour that is occurring on the Internet, and the 
changes it may be exerting upon the self. 
 
The self is, ‘a profound, cultural product… shaped and defined through 
communication with other people in society’ (Asai and Barnlund, 1998, p 431).  
As technology advances, and the way in which people communicate changes, this 
inevitably has a profound effect upon the way the self is shaped. CMC does, for 
example, allow people to widen their social sphere, resulting in greater possibility 
for social comparison, and allows interaction between a greater diversity of people 
(Jones, 1996).  It also enables different presentations of the self through different 
media, which allows different sides or aspects of the self to be experienced (Miller 
& Arnold, 2001).  The self, or self-concept, is considered to be the sum of the 
person’s self-knowledge (Wilson & Dunn, 2004), and CMC allows more avenues 
for gathering self-knowledge.  The Internet transcends physical boundaries and as 
communication takes place across this medium self-knowledge is gathered from 
more diverse sources, and the self is then shaped and influenced by these sources. 
It is yet to be fully understood how communicating in this way affects the nature 
of the communication, or how it will ultimately affect the nature of the self.  The 
experiments presented in this thesis will however lead to discussions of how 
communicating via the Internet will affect the construction, management and 
consolidation of the self. 
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Communication by telephone 
 
Throughout the history of technology, as concomitant communication media have 
developed, profound changes have taken place in the way the self is experienced 
and presented through communication (Ong, 1982).  Similarities and differences 
can therefore be explored between CMC and the communication media that 
precede it.  Useful parallels can, for example, be drawn between CMC and the 
telephone.  When Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876, it 
allowed individuals to communicate in ‘real-time’ using their voice to speak to 
others who were geographically distant.  Prior to this, communication took place 
either by posting a letter, which could take some time to arrive, and then some 
time to be replied to, or by telegraph which allowed a quicker, but limited 
message to be transmitted at a distance.  Both letters and telegrams had their 
limitations in conveying a detailed message quickly, which could be achieved by 
the telephone.  But the telephone did not hold the richness of visual cues that are 
available in FTF communications.  Lacking in telephone contact was eye contact, 
gestures and facial expressions, all of which could be considered to add an 
important social and meaningful element to conversation (Berger & Gudykunst, 
1991).    This led to initial fears that the telephone would lead to a type of phony 
and impersonal superficial civility (Berger & Gudykunst, 1991). 
 
With these fears in mind, a communication study group was formed in order to 
explore what was gained and what was lost in telephone communication (Short, 
Williams, & Christie, 1976). The group ran a series of experiments to examine the 
impact that the lack of visual cues in telephone communication had upon group 
discussion and conflict resolution.  In one experiment, the participants were asked 
to argue from a particular viewpoint and either interacted in FTF communication, 
through an audio channel, or used two-way television screens, allowing them to 
see each other.  The results showed no differences across the media in the 
accuracy of people’s judgments, but FTF participants were more confident in their 
judgments.  Williams and Wechsler (1972) also found that in their experiments if 
the participants could both see and hear their partners, they would evaluate their 
partner more favourably.  These results led Short et al. to develop Social-Presence 
Theory, which suggested that only low-level, task-oriented material could be 
transmitted via the verbal channel, and that interpersonal attitudes were conveyed 
mainly by visual cues.  These findings had great implications for the use of the 
telephone.  According to their theory, the telephone had the objective quality of 
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being low in social presence, in that it lacked facial expression, gaze, posture and 
the non-verbal cues that FTF communication provided.  These assertions were 
further supported by Short et al.’s discovery that when participants were asked to 
rate various media along the dimensions of impersonal/personal, 
unsociable/sociable and cold/warm, the latter dimension in each pair indicating 
high social presence.  FTF communication was voted the highest in social 
presence, then the video, then the telephone and finally the business letter.  From 
this Short et al. claimed that social presence and intimacy were linked, and that 
through the telephone it would not be possible to communicate intimacy due to its 
decreased social presence. 
 
Despite Short et al.’s (1976) observations, they had underestimated the incredible 
desire and ability of individuals to exploit the social aspects of technology.   
Particularly notable were reports that even telegram workers had fallen in love 
through the bleeps of telegraphic communication (Standage, 1999).  By telephone 
the message can be conveyed quicker, the voice is used, and rich communication 
can ensue, which is perhaps why the social use of the telephone was initially 
discouraged, due to concern that it was being used unnecessarily for ‘idle gossip’ 
(Fischer, 1992).  However, there was no stopping the surge of interest in using this 
technology for socialising and in 1920 the telephone companies starting actively 
encouraging it (Joinson, 2002). Indeed, the telephone companies even began an 
advertising campaign which stated that the telephone was more intimate than 
letter writing, as a way of keeping in touch. The telephone became hugely 
popular, and today it still continues to be a major form of communication.   
Presently, individuals speak regularly on the telephone; there are chatlines which 
enable romances and friendships to develop; and there are helplines, such as The 
Samaritians, where individuals can seek help for problems.  The use of mobile 
phones has also allowed telephone conversations to be conducted from any 
location.  Moreover, the use of mobile phones has led to the rise of the Short 
Messaging System (SMS), enabling mobile users to send short text messages to 
each other fairly rapidly, the popularity of which initially surprised the telephone 
companies (Taylor & Vincent, 2005).  The Mobile Trades Body Report (2009), 
which contains statistics aggregated from each of the UK’s Mobile Network 
Operators, reports that in 2009 a daily average of 265 million texts are sent. This 
type of short, quick, text-based communication is therefore extremely popular. 
Now telephone users have the choice of talking to one another, texting, and even 
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using video to communicate.  These different ways of communicating present new 
challengers to the user. The user has to quickly learn how to best use these 
technologies, to present themselves and their message (Taylor & Vincent, 2005). 
They also receive replies within this new format, which they must also learn to 
interpret.  These media not only widen social spheres for many (Taylor & 
Vincent, 2005), but it is argued here that it provides new experiences for the user 
to present and understand the self  
Computer-mediated communication 
 
This gain and loss approach adopted by Short et al. (1976) is a useful way of 
understanding CMC, and inevitably initial studies in CMC used Short et al.’s 
theory of social presence as a starting point for understanding Internet 
communication.  The form of CMC these early researchers focused upon was text 
based, which was considered low in social presence and was originally predicted 
to be impoverished and suitable only for impersonal and task-orientated 
communications (Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986), and those low in 
socio-economical content (Rice & Love, 1987).  Researchers also predicted that 
due to the lack of availability of static cues, deriving from the environment or the 
person’s appearance, and dynamic cues, associated with non-verbal 
communication, that social standards would be less important, more impersonal 
and freer, than in FTF communication (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986).  They also 
believed that the lack of norms available for these types of communications would 
mean that the communicator’s attention would be directed towards the message, 
and away from the other, and this would increase feelings of anonymity (Sproull 
& Kiesler, 1986). This anonymity they predicted, would lead to self-centered and 
unregulated behaviour (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). This was then supported by a 
series of further studies, which indicated that hostile and insulting interaction, or 
flaming, was increased and group decisions were more polarised when groups 
used CMC for discussions (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). Sproull and Kiesler argued 
that users were becoming deindividuated, which led to changes in the perception 
of the self and others, and ultimately the release of normally restrained behaviour. 
 
This negative view of CMC echoes those initial negative reactions to telephone 
communication, though similarly these negative views were soon usurped with 
emerging reports of positive relations being made on line.  It emerged that CMC 
was perfectly capable of transmitting social information but, due to the reduced 
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social cues, the process occurred at a slower pace (Walther, 2002).  Walther, in his 
Social Information-Processing model, explained that it was the time constraints in 
early studies of CMC, which led to the conclusions that it was only useful for 
task-orientated and low-level tasks, as this constraint did not allow social and 
relational cues to be transmitted.  Walther, Anderson and Park (1994) found 
support for this in a meta-analysis of 21 experiments. This analysis found 
evidence for greater levels of social information transmitted in interactions, which 
had no time restriction, and also less difference for socio-emotional 
communication between CMC and FTF for tasks when there was no time 
restriction.  Walther et al. went on to suggest that it takes time to type, but it also 
takes time to learn the nuances of textual-based communication, such as 
emoticons (e.g. ☺ to indicate a smiley face). This was supported by subsequent 
research that found that the longer individuals had been using CMC, the more 
paralanguage, such as emoticons they used, and the more relationships they 
formed (Walther et al., 1994). 
 
Walther et al. (1994) were starting to realise that CMC could reproduce some of 
the social features of FTF communication. The extent to which this was true did, 
however, come as quite a surprise when, in a subsequent study, FTF and CMC 
groups discussing three topics were compared (Walther, 1996).  The surprise 
came when it was the CMC groups who were rated higher for affection, for how 
similar the group members seemed, and how composed and relaxed they were 
during the task. Furthermore, they were also voted to be less task-orientated and 
more socially-oriented.  It was therefore apparent that Walther et al. and other 
early CMC psychologists had grossly underestimated the positive aspects of 
CMC.  Indeed, cyberspace was emerging as a place to make friends, to find love 
(Lea & Spears, 1995) and to seek psychological help (Morsund, 1997).  
Moreover, at the centre of these rich relationships, the observation soon appeared 
that CMC seemed to be encouraging high levels of self-disclosure (Kiesler & 
Sproull, 1986; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Mckenna & Bargh, 2000; Joinson, 2001; 
Goh, 2004; Mckenna, Green, & Gleason, 2002) 
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Self-Disclosure in CMC 
 
Contrary to early expectation from Social-Presence Theory (Short et al., 1976), a 
proliferation of meaningful relationships, rich in self-disclosure, are apparent on 
the Internet (Morsund, 1997; Mckenna and Bargh, 2000; Mckenna, et al., 2002).  
The extent to which individuals will self-disclose in CMC is particularly evident 
in the self-help community, where individuals who would otherwise be too 
embarrassed or ashamed to discuss their problems have been observed to feel 
comfortable disclosing. An analysis of notes and messages on a MUD for sexual-
abuse survivors, for example, reported interactions taking place where individuals 
revealed and shared experiences, and disclosed personal information to one 
another (Morsund, 1997).  High levels of trust, mutual support and empathy also 
occur in samples of self-help groups, with interpersonal understanding developing 
faster on-line than in comparable FTF groups (Salem, Bogat, & Reid, 1998).  
Greist, Klein and VanCura (1973) also reported suicidal patients preferred to self-
disclose in a computer interview as opposed to a FTF interview.  However, self-
disclosure through CMC is not merely associated with on-line help seeking, as 
heightened CMC self-disclosure has also contributed to an increase in on-line 
relationships (McKenna & Bargh, 2000) and the now commonplace phenomenon 
of on-line dating (Lea & Spears, l995). In essence, the Internet is now an 
environment which is rich in self-disclosure. 
 
Evidence of higher levels of self-disclosure in CMC, than in FTF interaction, are 
also evident in empirical work (Keisler & Sproull 1986; Lautenschlager & 
Flahertey, 1990; Locke & Gilbert, 1995; Moon, 2000; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004).  
For example, comparisons of forms completed by CMC, FTF, or by pen, revealed 
highest levels of disclosure in CMC (Locke &Gilbert, 1995; Lautenschlager & 
Flahertey, 1990).  Similarly, a meta-analysis of 39 studies demonstrated an 
increased likelihood of self-disclosure in tasks that were completed by CMC 
(Weisband & Keisler, 1996).    All these studies have led to the conclusion that 
self-disclosure is increased in CMC.  On closer examination it is however 
apparent that CMC is an umbrella terms which refers to e-mail, chat, MUDs, and 
even forms filled in using a computer.  Whilst all of these forms of 
communication do utilise some form of CMC, they arguably each provide a very 
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different experience.  Moreover, there is a lack of clarity in what type of self-
disclosure is increased in these different forms of communication, and whether 
different types of CMC encourage different types of self-disclosure. To address 
some of these difficulties, a first question is poised in this thesis, as to whether 
there are certain properties of CMC, which may be present in several or all of the 
different types of CMC that subsequently leads to the observed increased self-
disclosure.  Further questions are then asked as to how these properties within 
CMC may encourage different goals of self-disclosure, and ultimately how they 
may lead to certain types of self-disclosure taking place.  In the following 
sections, these questions will be discussed in turn. First, focus falls upon on how 
the different types of self-disclosure can be defined and measured. Next, a 
consideration is given to how the goals and motivation of self-disclosure could be 
important in understanding the heightened self-disclosure in CMC.  Finally, 
literature will be discussed that examines how the anonymity, and differing levels 
of self-awareness in CMC, could affect self-disclosure in CMC. 
Measuring and defining self-disclosure 
 
The statement that self-disclosure is heightened in CMC appears on the surface to 
be fairly reasonable. However, self-disclosure is notoriously difficult to define 
(Cozby, 1973), and it is unclear what type of self-disclosure is heightened and in 
what type of CMC.  In research, self-disclosure is often described in terms of 
three dimensions (Omarzu, 2000). These include depth of self-disclosure, which 
may range from a shallow revelation such as self-disclosing one’s name, favourite 
colour, or hobby, to an intimate and deep revelation, such as self-disclosing a 
guilty secret (Altman & Taylor, 1973). Depth is usually measured by listing topics 
of varying intimacy and measuring how likely the participants would be to discuss 
them, or by measuring the extent to which the participants actually discuss them 
(cf. Omarzu, 2000). Breadth of self-disclosure forms the second considered 
dimension, which measures how broadly or widely the participants discuss 
themselves (Altman & Taylor, 1973).  Breadth may be measured by looking at the 
number of topics the participant would be willing to discuss, or the number of 
topics they actually discuss in a research exercise.  Finally, the third utilised 
dimension of self-disclosure is duration, which relates to the amount or quantity of 
the self-disclosure.  The duration may be measured by the time spent self-
disclosing or through a word count (Omarzu, 2000).  On closer inspection of the 
CMC literature, it becomes clear that some studies measure breadth (Joinson, 
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2001), some only depth (Kiesler, Siegel & McGuire, 1984) or duration (Joinson, 
2001), whilst others measure a combination of these (Goh, 2004).  Each of these 
measures of self-disclosure measure very different concepts, and do therefore 
describe very different behaviours occurring within CMC.  It is important 
therefore to look at the type of self-disclosure that is taking place on-line and try 
to be specific in the definition and operationalisation of it within empirical work 
 
In addition to there being different defined dimensions of self-disclosure (breadth, 
depth and duration), research is further complicated by the different ways these 
different dimensions of self-disclosure can be measured.  Previously in early self-
disclosure research, there were reports of there being no correlation between self-
reported, independent and behavioural measures of self-disclosure (Cozby, 1973; 
Goh, 2004).  How a person perceives their self-disclosure may be very different to 
how the recipient of the self-disclosure perceives their self-disclosure, which may 
also differ to behavioural, or independent measures. These different measurements 
complicate self-disclosure research, and this has led, in the past, to suggestions 
that self-disclosure can only be defined by the way in which it is measured 
(Cozby, 1973). Great care must therefore be taken to interpret breadth, depth and 
duration of self-disclosure separately, and as distinct concepts, and also with 
consideration to how they were each measured. Each of the different dimensions 
and measures of self-disclosure, tell only one side of a rather complex story, and 
there is a danger that a lack of clarity in the measurement and definitions of self-
disclosure in CMC will also result in the literature becoming muddled.  Notably, 
issues with the definitions and the operationalisation of self-disclosure, in the past, 
led to the self-disclosure literature becoming so convoluted that there were calls 
for self-disclosure as a research topic to be abandoned (Cozby, 1973).   CMC 
provides a new opportunity to provide some clarity to the self-disclosure 
literature.  Unfortunately, it could be argued that there are already signs that the 
measurement and definition of self-disclosure are not receiving the respect they 
deserve within recent work within CMC. These issues will be picked up in the 
anonymity and self-awareness sections later in this introduction. 
Goals and motivations of self-disclosure 
 
When trying to be more specific about the type of self-disclosure that is being 
exhibited on-line, it is useful to consider the goals and motivations of the self-
disclosure that is being exhibited.  In particular, it is useful to consider whether 
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CMC seems to be encouraging particular goals or motivations of self-disclosure to 
be pursued.  It has been reported that the goal of self-disclosure will vary 
according to the disposition of the self-discloser, but also, due to the context of the 
self-disclosure (Miller & Read, 1987).  This therefore raises questions of whether 
the context of CMC encourages particular goals of self-disclosure to be achieved 
that are less accessible in other forms of communication. Shaffer and Tomarelli 
(1989) conveniently summarised some of the goals of self-disclosure found in the 
functional analysis of self-disclosure as: self-expression; clarification of self-
concept; impression management; and the promotion of intimacy.  It is possible, 
that whilst CMC may be encouraging some of these goals, it may also be 
inhibiting others. It would be useful, therefore, when trying to understand 
increased self-disclosure in CMC, to explore what type of goals appear to be 
being pursued.  
 
In this thesis a distinction is made between personally motivated and socially 
motivated goals, to try to gain some clarity on the motivations behind the 
increased self-disclosure in CMC.  These goals of self-disclosure are however not 
clear cut and it is likely that in an interaction, the individual will most likely flit 
from one to the other, and there may also be a combination of goals (Omarzu, 
2000).  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, a social goal of self-disclosure 
is defined as a goal which is motivated by another person or persons. A socially 
motivated goal of self-disclosure could therefore represent a desire to form and 
maintain a relationship with another person (cf. Jourard, 1961; Walther & 
Tidwell, 1995; Joinson, 2001), or to keep the closeness within a relationship 
(Altman & Taylor, 1973).  These relationships may start with a need and a want to 
convey information about the self, in order to form an impression upon a recipient 
(Derlega & Berg, 1987), and the main goal may therefore be impression 
management (cf. Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989).  The individuals’ motivations, in 
these instances, are focused upon another person, or persons, and are therefore 
considered here to be social motivations.   
 
The goals can, however, also be personal within a relationship, or a combination 
of personal of social goals. The self-discloser may, for example, want to peruse 
the goal of promoting intimacy with their partner (Laurenceau, Barett, & 
Pietromonaco, 1998) which according to Social-Penetration Theory (Altman & 
Taylor, 1973) occurs through a gradual process of both breadth and depth of self-
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disclosure.  The partners may then enter into mutual self-disclosure where 
reciprocity becomes central to the relationship (Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989). 
Reciprocity is reported to be the best predictor of the acquaintanceship (Chaikin & 
Derlega, 1974), and is particularly important in early relationships to promote 
trust (Altman & Taylor, 1973).  As the relationship develops Derlega and Chaikin 
(1977) suggest that the partners form a ‘dyadic boundary,’ that ensures that 
information is kept between the partners, and is not leaked out.  Of the goals 
identified by Shaffer and Tomarelli, it could be argued that; self-expression, and 
the clarification of the self concept are more personally motivated goals, and that 
these become more achievable as closeness in the relationship develops  It has 
been reported, for example, that people are highly motivated to ensure that what 
they consider to be their true self, or their ‘inner core,’ is acknowledged by others, 
and validated as an authentic part of the self (Baumeister, 1999; Swann, 1990), 
and that this can prevent them from feeling alone in the world (Veltman, 2005).  
In this instance, it could be argued that the goals move from being more socially 
driven to being more personally driven.   
 
Another personal motivation, which illustrates a situation where the relationship 
may be less important than the self-disclosure itself, is the stranger on the train 
phenomenon (Rubin, 1975).  In this situation, the individual self-discloses in 
depth to a stranger, perhaps, on a train. According to Social-Penetration Theory 
(Altman & Taylor, 1973) self-disclosing deeply to a stranger is very unusual. 
Altman and Taylor make an interesting analogy between partners coming to know 
one another, and peeling an onion. In this analogy, they describe how partners 
peel away each other’s layers, until they arrive at the tightly wrapped vulnerable 
core of deep emotions.  They suggest that peeling away these layers and reaching 
this core increases the closeness between the partners (Altman & Taylor, 1973).  
Once this core has been reached, it is also suggested that reciprocity is less 
important (Altman & Taylor, 1973) and it could be argued that the goals of self-
disclosure could become more personally motivated.  In the stranger on the train 
phenomenon deep self-disclosure occurs without this closeness developing. 
However, the situation occurs because of a personal need in the self-discloser to 
‘get something off their chest,’ and the outcome can be cathartic for the self-
discloser (cf. Rubin, 1975; Bargh et al., 2002).The motivations of self-disclosure 
in this situation are likely to be more personally motivated than socially 
motivated.  Who the recipient is, may be unimportant, and rather than the 
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relationship being reciprocal, the recipient may act more like a sounding board. In 
this situation, it is the personal goals of self-disclosure that come to the 
foreground.  It is argued in the present thesis that what is particularly interesting 
about CMC, is that it encourages the pursuit of more personally motivated self-
disclosure. 
 
If this is the case, and CMC does encourage the pursuit of more personally 
motivate self-disclosure, then this has important implications.  What is notable 
about these more personal motives of self-disclosure, and particularly those that 
are associated with ‘getting something off one’s chest,’ is their association with 
the health benefits of self-disclosure. Self-disclosure is generally defined as 
revealing some aspect of the self to another (Foubert & Sholley, 1996), and there 
are now 1000s of research papers examining self-disclosure (Omarzu, 2000).   
Much of this interest has been generated by the observation that self-disclosure is 
linked to good health (Jourard, 1961; Pennebaker, 1989; 1995) and that failure to 
self-disclose can have a have a negative effect upon health (Pennebaker, 1989; 
1995).  Self-disclosure is, for example, thought to have a cathartic effect, and it 
has been demonstrated that people can develop physical and psychological 
problems if they suppress and conceal their negative thoughts and emotions 
(Carpenter, 1987; Cooper & Leda, 1997). Self-disclosure and worry have been 
described as two sides of the same coin (Borkovec, Roemer, & Kinyon, 1995), 
with open expression of thoughts and feelings helping to overcome anxiety 
(Jourard, 1961).  Although self-disclosure is often considered to be conducted 
verbally, even writing about negative experiences has been seen to improve 
mental-health problems (Graybeal, Sexton, & Pennebaker, 2002), improve 
immune function; lead to drops in physician visits; and also result in better 
performance at school, or in the workplace (Esterling, Antoni, Kumar, & 
Scheiderman, 1990; 1993). It is argued in the present thesis, that it is personally 
motivated self-disclosure that is mainly associated with the health benefits of self-
disclosure. Given this, studying instances in which this type of self-disclosure is 
raised has important implications. It is therefore of great interest that personally 
motivated goals of self-disclosure may be raised in CMC. 
 
Within CMC, relationships have been seen to develop at accelerated rates (Lea & 
Spears, 1995; McKenna et al., 2002), there is a proliferation of self-help groups 
with members sharing shameful secrets for the first time (Morsund, 1997; Salem, 
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et al., 1998), and the stranger on the train phenomenon is being replicated all over 
cyberspace (Bargh et al., 2002).  It is therefore argued in the present thesis that 
CMC allows a distinct and different set of goals to be achieved, than can be 
achieved in FTF, or telephone communication.  Moreover, these goals seem to be 
more personally motivated and characterised by deep and open self-disclosure.  
Unfortunately, there is no past research in CMC that has discussed the different 
goals of self-disclosure and few studies have empirically examined deep self-
disclosure in CMC.  The experiments within this thesis do therefore focus upon 
deep and intimate self-disclosure in CMC, with a particular interest in whether 
CMC allows for more personal goals of self-disclosure to be pursued and 
achieved.   It does also appear that what is particularly interesting about CMC is 
that it seems to encourage personally motivated deep self-disclosure, and 
questions still remain as to why CMC may encourage this type of behaviour.  
Most explanations of heightened self-disclosure in CMC seem to hinge on either 
changes in self-awareness, or more commonly the anonymity provided within a 
CMC interaction (Kiesler et al., 1984; Spears & Lea, 1994, Walther, 1996; 
Mckenna & Bargh, 2000; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004).  In the following sections, 
the possible effects of anonymity upon self-disclosure are considered, which leads 
into a discussion of whether anonymity in CMC also encourages authentic self-
disclosure in CMC.  In the final section of this introduction the literature 
investigating how changes in self-awareness could affect deep, authentic and 
personally motivated self-disclosure in CMC is examined. 
 
Anonymity in CMC 
 
Many explanations of why self-disclosure is increased in CMC tend to focus upon 
visual anonymity (Kiesler et al., 1984; Spears & Lea, 1994; Walther, 1996; 
Mckenna & Bargh, 2000; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004). When anonymous in a CMC 
interaction, those interacting do not see one another, they do not have access to 
the usual visual cues present in FTF interaction, and they are also not in each 
other’s physical presence.   Several theories have therefore emerged to explain 
heightened self-disclosure in CMC.  It is, for instance, suggested that the lack of 
cues and physical presence, that are part of visual anonymity, make the user 
become less aware of the other, and more absorbed in their self (Kiesler & 
Sproull, 1986), which results in the individual self-disclosing more than they 
realise (Kiesler et al., 1984) Furthermore, a lack of identifiability, has been said to 
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mask individual differences, such as race and age, which may inhibit FTF 
interactions, and discourage the formation of stereotypes and pre-judgments 
(Gackenbach, 2007).  The anonymity in CMC has also led to Hyperpersonality 
Theory (Walther, 1996), where Walther reports that the anonymity in CMC allows 
participants to construct a more idealised, positive image of their self, and this 
leads to inflated impressions and greater perceived similarity.  In this instance, 
self-disclosure may increase as the participant tries to confirm these idealised 
images of them self.  Whilst anonymity as an explanation of increased self-
disclosure in CMC has attracted much research interest, the research has also 
identified that there are several different features involved in anonymity.  It is 
therefore important to recognise that anonymity is not a monolithic concept and it 
is important to understand what aspects of anonymity (lack of identifiability, lack 
of visual cues, lack of physical presence) or combinations of these factors 
encourage, or even inhibit, self-disclosure in CMC.   
 
Fortunately, there are a few experiments which examine anonymity and self-
disclosure in CMC (Kiesler et al., 1984; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004), which allow 
some firmer conclusions to be drawn.  For example, in a series of experiments to 
examine anonymity and heightened self-disclosure in CMC, Joinson (2001) set 
out to first establish experimentally that self-disclosure is indeed heightened in 
CMC. Using an ice-breaker task, and by measuring instances of spontaneous self-
disclosure, the hypothesis that dyads discussing a dilemma using CMC will 
spontaneously disclose to a greater degree than dyads completing the task FTF 
was tested. Support was found for this hypothesis and it was confirmed that CMC 
heightens the likelihood of self-disclosure in CMC.  In a second experiment what 
aspect of CMC encourages participants to self-disclose more in CMC than in FTF 
communication was examined, and the role of visual anonymity was isolated 
(Joinson, 2001).  In this experiment, two conditions were constructed, a visually 
anonymous condition (where the partners did not see an image of the other) and a 
visibility condition (where a live image of the communicant was projected onto 
their partner’s screen).  The participants all communicated using textual-based 
conferencing and partook in the same ice-breaker task used in Joinson’s (2001) 
first experiment.   The results confirmed that participants who are visually 
anonymous spontaneously disclose to a greater degree than participants who are 
visible to one another  
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Although Joinson’s (2001) experiment did present one of the first empirical 
attempts to isolate anonymity, it has certain limitations.  The motivations in 
Joinson’s study were low and he reports that very little self-disclosure took place 
within the study.  No attempt was made to try and encourage self-disclosure, and 
in this sense, the participants in the study barely penetrated the surface layers of 
Altman & Taylor’s (1973) ‘onion’ analogy.  In other words, they went no where 
near exploring each other’s inner core.  It is argued in the present thesis that what 
is particularly interesting in CMC is the occurrence of deep, open, personally 
motivated self-disclosure and Joinson’s) results do not allow an insight into this 
type of self-disclosure. Moreover, Joinson’s experiment relied on the 
measurement of spontaneous self-disclosure in the ice-breaker task.  This measure 
only describes a low-level form of duration of self-disclosure, which was only 
measured by a count of the number of spontaneous self-disclosures (although 
Joinson describes it as breadth of self-disclosure).  This is particularly problematic 
when, for example, a participant declaring ‘I am gay’ for the first time, scores 
lower than a participant disclosing their music tastes on several occasions. By 
studying duration, or breadth, of self-disclosure, the conclusions are therefore very 
limited, and go no way towards acknowledging the complexities of self-
disclosure, nor give any consideration to the more intimate self-disclosure that is 
evident in CMC.   
In terms of unraveling what exactly it is about the CMC environment, or more 
specifically what aspect of anonymity it is that encourages self-disclosure, the 
results of Joinson’s (2001) experiment are also limited. For instance, the 
experiment compares a video condition to an anonymous condition. However, the 
video condition not only renders the communicant identifiable, but the live video 
link also provides cues throughout the interaction, which could potentially distract 
the participant. Furthermore, in the non-visually anonymous condition the 
participant may be benefiting not just from a lack of identifiability, but instead a 
lack of cues. Moreover, the reduced social presence in the interaction may also 
allow the participants to immerse themselves in the task and become aware of 
their audience (Kiesler et al., 1984). Although, Joinson, does claim that visual 
anonymity increased self-disclosure in CMC, it is clearly necessary to break, or 
deconstruct anonymity, down into its various properties and observe the effects 
that they each have upon self-disclosure, to gain a deeper understanding of what 
part of anonymity is attributable to this heightened self-disclosure 
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Fortunately, this was achieved by Goh (2004; Manstead, Lea, & Goh, 2011), who 
progressively deconstructed anonymity into identifiability, visual cues and social 
presence, and measured their effects upon breadth and depth of self-disclosure, 
and a number of other interpersonal factors.  In her experiments Goh (2004), 
working on the basis that self-disclosure begets self-disclosure (Berg & Derlega, 
1987), used a high self-disclosing confederate to encourage intimate self-
disclosure. The self-disclosure that was gained in the experiment was therefore 
much more characteristic of the intimate, open, self-disclosure in CMC that is of 
interest in the present thesis.  In Goh’s experiment the confederate and the 
participant took turns asking each other questions of varying intimacy, the 
confederate secretly inviting the participant to disclose to a greater degree by 
gradually moving down a list of questions of varying intimacy to those of greater 
intimacy value.  In the first, of four conditions, the anonymous condition, the 
participants never met and had no access to a visual image during the interaction 
(which was akin to Joinson’s (2001) visually anonymous condition). In the second 
condition, the identifiable condition, the participants saw each other before the 
experiment, but did not have access to a visual image during the interaction.  In 
the third condition, the visual-cues condition (which was akin to Joinson’s 
visibility condition) the participants had access to a visual image during the 
interaction.  Finally, in a fourth condition, the physical-presence condition, the 
participants faced one another but still interacted using CMC, which added 
physical presence to the interaction.  The conditions did therefore progressively 
deconstruct anonymity into lack of identifiability; lack of visual-cues; and lack of 
physical-presence.   
The results of Goh’s (2004) experiment are intriguing. Whilst some support was 
found for Joinson’s (2001) conclusion that self-disclosure is increased by visual 
anonymity, the results were not straightforward (cf. Goh, 2004; Manstead et al., 
2011).  When the different facets of anonymity were isolated and manipulated, the 
lack of identifiability was seen to increase breadth of self-disclosure, and the 
removal of visual cues further increased breadth of self-disclosure.  However, 
opposing effects were discovered for depth of self-disclosure as it was found that 
participants who were anonymous and participants who had access to visual cues 
self-disclosed to a similar depth.  Participants in the identifiability condition, were 
however observed to have reduced breadth and depth of self-disclosure.  In Goh’s 
study, further results suggested that whilst identifiability reduced enjoyment and 
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therapeutic value, visibility increased rapport and enjoyment, with the former 
having a negative effect upon depth of self-disclosure, whilst the latter had a 
positive effect upon depth of self-disclosure. The participants in the visual-cues 
condition also reported the greatest similarity, and rapport, with their partners and 
enjoyment was at its highest levels.   
Goh’s (2004) study did therefore confirm that anonymity is not a monolithic 
concept, but is one that is made up of various properties, each of which have 
different effects upon breadth and depth of self-disclosure.  Moreover, it was also 
observed that some of the properties could even have opposing effects.  In 
addition, this work also presented the only study in CMC that differentiated 
between breadth and depth of self-disclosure.  This is particularly important as it 
was clearly illustrated that breadth and depth describe quite different 
manifestations of self-disclosure (Goh, 2004), and this should be acknowledged 
both in the execution and interpretation of future research. This comprehensive 
study of intimate self-disclosure in CMC, is also important, as although rich, 
intimate and deep self-disclosure is consistently reported in the literature, very 
few experimental studies use a method, which encourage this type of self-
disclosure (with exception of Kiesler et al., 1984).  Again it is reiterated that this 
is particularly important as it is arguably the presence of deep and intimate self-
disclosure that is particularly remarkable in the CMC environment.   
Whilst Goh’s (2004) experiment broke anonymity down into its properties and 
provided a comprehensive account of how these properties affected depth of self-
disclosure, it also acknowledged the importance of understanding the goal of self-
disclosure. In her conclusion, Goh distinguished between social motivations and 
personal motivations of self-disclosure.  She reported that in the experiment visual 
cues enhanced the rapport in the interaction, which in turn encouraged the 
participants to deeply self-disclose.  The motivation was therefore reported to be 
primarily social, as the participants enjoyed deep mutual self-disclosure in order 
to form a relationship.  In the anonymous condition, however, the motivations 
were thought to be more personal.  In particular, the lack of identifiability 
encouraged the participant to self-disclose deeply, whilst reporting reduced 
rapport.  This anonymity condition in Goh’s study illustrates the type of 
personally motivated self-disclosure that is particularly interesting in CMC, and 
which is also of particular interest to the present study.  What is particularly 
significant is that even on the telephone, although communicants may not meet, 
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they could still be identified by their voice (Goh, 2004), but in CMC the cues to 
identifiability are greatly reduced, and this is reported to be providing a type of 
stranger on the train phenomenon via CMC (Bargh et al., 2002).   
Anonymity and the true self  
 
Goh’s (2004) study indicated that there may be advantages, within the anonymous 
CMC situation, for personally motivated, deep and open self-disclosure.  
Moreover, it indicated that the lack of identifiability could be particularly 
important for this type of self-disclosure to arise.  One of the reasons given for 
why the lack of anonymity may have this effect in CMC is that the anonymity, or 
particularly the lack of identifiability, may remove some of the pressure the 
individual feels to conform to avoid social disproval, which may exist in their FTF 
social groups (Bargh et al., 2002).  The anonymous participant in the CMC 
situation is also free from the usual expectations and constraints of the groups and 
people that are usually around them (Bargh et al., 2002). This lack of 
identifiability is therefore suggested to provide ‘a protective cloak,’ under which 
the individuals ‘can express the way they truly feel and think’ (Mckenna & Bargh, 
2000, p.62), with little, if not any, personal risk. Bargh et al. argue that it is the 
lack of identifiability in this situation that frees the participant from their usual 
social constraints, creating a stranger on the train type situation, and they argue 
that this appeals widely and generally in CMC (Bargh et al., 2002).  Bargh et al. 
(2002) use this to suggest that the lack of identifiability in CMC increases the 
users’ access to their true self.  More specifically they argue that in FTF 
interaction, an individual will present their public persona or actual self (Higgins, 
1987). However, the lack of identifiability in CMC also allows the ‘identity-
important yet usually unexpressed aspects of oneself,’ to be revealed (Mckenna et 
al., 2002, p12).  
Bargh et al. (2002) set out to therefore find empirical support for the prediction 
that an individual will have greater access to their true self-concept, than their 
actual self-concept during an Internet exchange, and the reverse in a FTF 
interaction.  In their study participants were asked to list traits that they believed 
they possessed and expressed to others in a social setting (the actual self) and also 
to list traits they believed they possessed, but which they were not usually able to 
express (the true self).  The participants then either took part in a FTF or Internet-
based interaction.  Then using the classic ‘Me/Not-Me’ response task (Markhus, 
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1977), they measured participants reaction times to their own actual and true 
traits.  As predicted, after the Internet exchanges, the true self was more accessible 
than after the FTF task.  Bargh et al. found support for their hypothesis, and 
concluded that participants of CMC had greater access to their true self.  
Moreover, Mckenna et al. (2002) further reported from surveys of Internet users 
that CMC allowed for greater expression of the true self, which accelerated the 
rate at which close relationships were formed, and that these relationships did 
endure after time.  These studies are important as they clearly illustrate that what 
may be particularly important about the increased self-disclosure in CMC is not 
just the depth, but also the authenticity of the self-disclosure. 
 
These findings that participants of CMC have greater access to their true self, 
which accelerates close relationships and leads to enduring friendships (Mckenna 
et al., 2002) are also important when trying to understand how CMC may be 
affecting the self.  Bargh et al. (2002) suggest that CMC allows for the true self to 
be revealed, and Self-Verification Theory (Swann, 1990) also suggests that the 
individual desires for this self to be validated. If in everyday life there are less 
opportunities for expressing this true self (Bargh et al., 2002) this could lead to 
the individual holding conflicting beliefs about the self.  Self-Discrepancy Theory 
further proposes that self congruency is highly desired, and there is a motivation 
for the self-concept to match personally relevant self-guides, and failure to do so 
will result in discomfort (Higgins, 1987).  Various examples of the type of 
discomfort an individual may feel are given by Higgins. An individual may self-
disclose from their ideal self (made up of ideal traits to possess), instead of their 
actual self (the self that is currently constituted), which could for instance 
perpetuate feelings of failure that will result in sadness and shame (Higgins, 
1987). They could also self-disclose from their ought to self (of traits one has a 
moral obligation to possess), rather than their actual self, which results in feelings 
of failure to meet expectations, and ultimately in fear and guilt (Higgins, 1987).  
Moreover, returning to the advantages of self-disclosure for health, it is reasonable 
to suggest that dissolving worry, catharticism, and the content of 
psychotherapeutic relationship are all dependent upon the presentation of the true 
self. If particular features of CMC allow for the true self to emerge, and for 
authentic self-disclosure to be expressed, then this could therefore have positive 
implications for the self.  Given this, it is not just the depth of self-disclosure that 
is important to investigate in CMC, but also the authenticity of the self-disclosure.   
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Authenticity has been defined as, ‘the unobstructed operation of one’s true, or 
core, self in one’s daily enterprise’ (Kernis, 2003, p1). From Bargh et al.’s (2002) 
and Mckenna et al.’s (2002) studies it would be fair to suggest that what is being 
witnessed is the operation of the true, or core, self in CMC. In Kernis’s study, a 
conceptualisation was made of what is termed ‘optimal self-esteem’, which is 
defined as genuine, true, stable and congruent self-esteem.  Authenticity in self-
disclosure could similarly be termed as ‘optimal self-disclosure’, which could 
describe honest, true and stable self-disclosure.   It is important to note, however, 
that although an increase in optimal self-disclosure from one’s true, or core, self, 
is possibly what is being exhibiting in CMC, it is not quite equivocal to what is 
being measured in the work of Bargh et al. (2002).  Bargh et al. describe the true 
self in relation to the actual self, where the actual self is normally exhibited and 
consists of the traits the individual possesses and expresses to others in a social 
setting.  In this context, the true self consists of traits the individual believes they 
possess, but are not usually able to express (Bargh et al., 2002).  Optimal self-
disclosure could therefore consist of both self-disclosures from the actual self, and 
the true self.   Optimal self-disclosure is therefore self-disclosure that is accurate, 
but could consist of both hidden and non-hidden components.  It is argued in the 
present thesis that using CMC increases the likelihood of optimal self-disclosure, 
and accuracy of self-disclosure will therefore be measured in the experiments 
reported within this thesis.   
 
Surprisingly, authenticity in self-disclosure, or optimal self-disclosure, is not 
explicitly considered in any previous experiments on self-disclosure, even though 
it is clearly an important factor.  Bargh et al. (2002) illustrated that relationships 
happen at an accelerated rate within CMC, because the ‘inner core’, that is 
described as essential in close relations (Altman & Taylor, 1973), is revealed 
more rapidly. The presentation of the true self is also important in social 
situations, where the individual desires that the true self is known and validated 
(Baumeister, 1999; Swann, 1990), to stop them feeling alone in the world 
(Veltman, 2005).  Bargh et al. (2002) successfully showed that CMC gives the 
individual the potential to explore the true self; they did not however explicitly 
link this to self-disclosure in an experimental situation. The experiments presented 
in this thesis will therefore be the first to try and illustrate that what is remarkable 
about the self-disclosure observed within CMC, is that it is intimate and optimal.  
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Moreover, it is argued in the present thesis, that anonymity only plays a small part 
in explaining the intimate and optimal self-disclosure in CMC, and that to truly 
understand optimal and intimate self-disclosure in CMC also requires an 
understanding of private and public self-awareness. 
 
Self-awareness 
 
Before embarking upon a discussion of how self-awareness invokes intimate and 
optimal self-disclosure in CMC, there are various concepts that overlap with self-
awareness that should be considered and clarified.  There is, for example, a 
difference between self-awareness, which could be considered a situational factor, 
and also self-monitoring and self-consciousness, which could be considered 
dispositional factors. Snyder (1979) describes low self-monitoring individuals as 
people who will rely on internal dispositions to drive self-presentation, and who 
also use social-situational cues less, to guide impression management, than high 
self-monitoring individuals. Another interesting experiment was run by Shaffer, 
Smith and Tomarelli (1982) whereby pre-defined high and low self-monitoring 
individuals confided to a same-sex confederate on four very intimate topics.  The 
confederate disclosed first, and either self-disclosed highly intimate, or non-
intimate information about themselves.  Shaffer et al. (1982) found that high self-
monitoring individuals were more attentive to social-situational cues and matched 
the self-disclosure of the confederate. They were more intimate and emotionally 
invested when communicating with an intimate confederate, and less with a non-
intimate confederate.  In contrast, the low self-monitoring individuals did not 
match the confederate’s self-disclosure, to such an extent.  
 
Self-monitoring also conceptually overlaps with the concept of self-consciousness 
which has been described as the tendency to focus attention upon the self 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).   The Self-Consciousness Scale was 
developed to measure how habitually an individual focuses upon the public and 
private aspects of the self (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  Self-consciousness does, 
however, differ from self-monitoring, in that private and public self-consciousness 
are considered to be independent constructs, whereas the concepts of high and low 
self-monitoring are considered to be inversely related (Snyder, 1979). This was 
illustrated experimentally by Shaffer and Tomarelli (1989) who observed that it is 
possible to be high or low in both private and public self-consciousness at the 
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same time.  Of particular interest to present discussion of optimal and intimate 
self-disclosure, Shaffer and Tomarelli also found that being high or low in both 
private and public self-consciousness, at the same time, was not conducive to self-
disclosure.  Shaffer and Tomarelli explained this by suggesting that a person finds 
it more difficult to self-disclose when they have their attention divided by being 
high or low in both private and public self-consciousness.   They also suggest that 
when an individual is high or low in either private or public self-consciousness 
that the act of self-disclosure may have different motivations. In their study, 
Shaffer and Tomarelli reported that participants who were high in public self-
consciousness and low in private self-consciousness, were focused upon creating a 
good impression and this would encourage their self-disclosure.  They also found 
that participants who were high in private self-consciousness and low in public 
self-consciousness, whose attention was therefore internal, would self-disclose 
based upon internal beliefs and standards 
 
Shaffer and Tomarelli (1989) are not alone in their finding of advantages in high 
levels of private self-consciousness for self-disclosure. Similar findings have also 
been reported by Franzoi and Davis (1985) who found adolescents, who were high 
in private self-consciousness, were more likely to self-disclose than adolescents 
who were low in private self-consciousness.  They also confirmed these results in 
a later study, but found that this increased self-disclosure did not, in turn, lead to 
increased private self-consciousness (Davis & Franzoi, 1986). There are also 
various other studies that report self-aware participants to report greater accuracy 
(Pryot, Gibbons, Smith, Fazio, & Hood, 1977), and greater reliability of self-
reports of individuals who are high in private self-consciousness (Hjelle & 
Bernard, 1994; Nasby, 1989). Although these results clearly indicate many 
advantages of heightened private self-consciousness for self-disclosure, they are 
based upon the habitual tendency to focus upon the self. In general, someone 
could be described as a high self-monitoring individual, or an individual 
particularly high in private self-consciousness.  However, a person high in private 
self-consciousness, or self-monitoring, can also be lead into a temporary state of 
being high or low in private or public self-awareness.  Discussions of public and 
private self-awareness are particularly relevant when considering increased self-
disclosure in CMC.   
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CMC and self-awareness 
 
Two basic states of self-awareness were identified in early research.  Objective 
self-awareness is described as the ability an individual has to look inward at any 
given moment (Duval & Wicklund, 1972).  The ability to look outward is 
similarly described as a state of subjective self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund, 
1972). When looking inward the individual has access to hidden thoughts, feelings 
and memories accessible only to themselves.  When attending outward to the 
environment they may be drawn away from attending inward and notice others 
and the environment.  When a person is described as being high in private self-
awareness they are ‘more attentive to [their] perceptions, thoughts, moods and 
feelings…[and they are] in better touch with [their] self (Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 
1978, p134).  In contrast, an individual who is high in public self-awareness is 
concerned with how others see them and the impression they are making on their 
audience (Scheier et al., 1978).   
 
Early studies investigating self-awareness in CMC tended to converge in 
suggesting that during a CMC interaction the participants were not self-aware 
(Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegel et al. 1986). Deindividuation was used to explain this 
phenomenon (Siegel et al., 1986), where deindividuation describes the state where 
either, or possibly both, states of private and/or public self-awareness are lost 
(Ickes, Laydon, & Barnes, 1978; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982).  However, 
subsequent studies in CMC did not find support for these initial findings.  For 
example, Matheson and Zanna (1988) set out to distinguish exactly how self-
awareness is changed in CMC, in an experiment where participants interacted, 
either FTF or by using a computer. In this study the CMC participants reported 
greater private self-awareness and marginally lower public self-awareness, in a 
four question questionnaire, than FTF participants. Matheson and Zanna took this 
as evidence that participants were not experiencing deindividuation in CMC, as 
had been argued in the earlier work. They argued that the increased levels of 
private self-awareness meant that participants were more aware of themselves as 
an individual, and were therefore highly self-aware.  More evidence of increased 
private self-awareness in CMC is also given in studies where CMC is reported to 
increase self-absorption (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986), where participants over-
estimate their contributions to CMC discussions (Weisband & Atwater, 1999), 
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and also exhibit accelerated feelings of importance in CMC (Booth-Kewely & 
Rosenfield, 1992).   
 
Private self-awareness does therefore seem to be increased in certain types of 
CMC activity and this could have important implications for the type of self-
disclosure that is being heightened in CMC.  According to Miller and Read 
(1987), being high in private self-awareness activates internal goals. The 
heightened private self-awareness in CMC may therefore increase internal goals 
of self-disclosure, such as self-expression, or the clarification of self-concept, or 
to dissolve worry and work through problems. Participants high in private self-
awareness have also been reported to be more connected to their emotions and 
feelings (Carver & Scheier, 1987), and it could be argued that this could lead to an 
increase in intimate self-disclosure in CMC. Moreover, heightened private self-
awareness has also been linked to an increased self-awareness of self-
discrepancies within the self (Carver & Scheier, 1981).  In their ‘process’ model 
of self-focus Carver and Scheier (1981) describe how an individual self-regulates 
by comparing their internal standards with their behaviour, and will ideally adjust 
their behaviour and standards to match. This approach adopted by Carver and 
Scheier (1981) has its origins in the seminal work of Powers (1973a; 1973b) who 
first adopted a hierarchal structure to try and understand perception and control in 
living systems.  These structured approaches to self-awareness are very useful in 
trying to understand how attentional focus could affect self-disclosure 
 
In CMC the increased private self-awareness could lead to clearer access to the 
true self, and an increased awareness of how this self differs from other 
representations of the self.  Returning to the work by Bargh et al. (2002), who 
suggested that it was the lack of identifiability that increases access to the true self 
in CMC, the finding that private self-awareness is increased in CMC, could also 
be used to explain this access to the true self. It may not just be the lack of 
identfiability, but also the heightened private self-awareness that contributes to 
this access to the true self. The experiments presented in the following thesis, will 
therefore also explore whether increased levels of private self-awareness 
encourage optimal self-disclosure.  
 
Whilst CMC is thought to increase levels of private self-awareness, thus making 
participants more aware of themselves, CMC is further suggested to reduce public 
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awareness.  It has been reported, for example, that CMC leads to an interaction 
where participants can lose the sense of who is looking (Weisband & Reinig, 
1995), which can in turn lower self-presentation concerns (Matheson & Zanna, 
1988). In many CMC interactions the communicant is acting at a distance from 
their partner and the participant can be physically alone during the interaction. In 
this type of situation, the participants have been reported to be naïve to the risks of 
disclosure, be inattentive to the existence of an audience, and they can therefore 
become immersed in the task with an illusion of privacy (Weisband & Keisler, 
1996).  This occurs because the presence of the communicant does not loom over 
the participant, there is no pressure to formulate the exchange quickly, and the 
participant is given the time and space to construct their exchange with the 
opportunity of editing (Weisband & Keisler, 1996).  Matheson and Zanna also 
found marginally lower levels of public self-awareness in CMC, but as they 
compared FTF participants to participants using a computer, they could not 
confirm exactly what it was about the CMC environment that encouraged this. 
They also did not link these findings to whether the participants’ self-disclosure 
was greater in the CMC condition, or whether CMC encouraged optimal and 
intimate self-disclosure.  
 
It is also possible that as Miller and Read (1987) suggest that increased public 
self-awareness will encourage more social goals, and CMC is thought to be low in 
public self-awareness, that social goals may be less salient in CMC.  Returning to 
Goh (2004), it was reported that in the control condition, where the participants 
interacted anonymously in a traditional real-time chat discussion, that more 
personal goals were salient.   Whilst Goh discussed this in terms of anonymity, 
this could also have been encouraged by high levels of private self-awareness, and 
low levels of public self-awareness. In contrast, in Goh’s visual-cues condition, 
where a video image of their participant was added, the participants’ public self-
awareness may well have increased, thus making the social goals more salient.  
The results of previous studies (Kiesler et al., 1984; Bargh et al., 2002; Goh, 
2004) which focused upon anonymity could therefore be reinterpreted within a 
self-awareness context.  Moreover, a decrease in public self-awareness could also 
have clear implications for the execution of self-disclosure from the true self.  It 
has been reported that when individuals are more attentive to their public self they 
adjust their behaviour according to the social situation (Carver & Scheier, 1987), 
and past research has shown, that participants with high levels of public self-
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awareness are more likely to change their behaviour to be consistent with 
important reference groups (Froming, Walker, & Lopya, 1982). If the reduced 
public self-awareness in CMC leads to a lack of awareness about the audience 
(Weisband & Reining, 1995), and this also reduces the interpersonal pressure 
within the situation, it could be argued therefore that the heightened private self-
awareness in CMC activates personal goals, and access to inner thoughts and 
feelings, and that the reduced public self-awareness allows for self-disclosure to 
take place with no fear of interpersonal reproach.  More research is required to 
confirm these links, but the present discussions do highlight the importance of not 
just considering anonymity as an explanation of increased self-disclosure in CMC, 
but the combination of anonymity and self-awareness. 
 
There is, however, some research that has identified the combination of 
anonymity and public self-awareness is an important ingredient of what is 
happening with groups mediated with CMC.  In particular, there has been much 
work conducted that has investigated the salience of personal and group identities 
(Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990, Lea, Spears, & De Groot, 2001).  These theories draw 
on Social-Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to understand behaviour in 
CMC, which suggests that identities are made up of both a social identity, which 
encompasses the groups an individual belongs to (both real life groups such as 
football team, and more social categories  such as a father) and personal identities.  
Social-Identity Theory suggests that, when the social identity is salient, 
individuals compare themselves to the group and thus identify themselves as part 
of the group. When an individual is immersed in a group and visually anonymous, 
the intragroup differences will therefore be lessened and the intergroup difference 
maximised, although isolating members who are visually anonymous would 
remove the group boundaries and reduce the salience of the social identity 
(Riecher, 1984).  
 
In a landmark experiment by Spears et al. (1990), groups of three students 
discussed various topics using a computer-conferencing system and both visual 
anonymity and group membership were manipulated.  The results clearly showed 
that visual anonymity increased the salience of the group, and the participants as a 
consequence moved their own opinions towards the groups’ norms (Spears et al., 
1990). However, increasing the salience reduced this move toward a group norm 
(Spears et al., 1990).  In a later study Lea et al. (2001) also found further support 
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for the this approach to CMC, by revealing that participants who were visually 
anonymous when discussing three issues, reported that visual anonymity was 
associated with categorising oneself in a group, which was further associated with 
attraction to the group.  They also found that when visually anonymous the 
participants’ concerns about how the others viewed them was heightened 
(heightened evaluation concern).   
 
Lea et al.’s (2001) study was important as it illustrated the importance of 
stereotyping in group situations, and in particular that anonymity coupled with 
heightened public self-awareness leads participants to move their opinion towards 
a group norm.  It was also important as it recognised the significance of not just 
anonymity, but also of its combined affects with self-awareness in CMC.  Despite 
this, the research that has been conducted so far on self-disclosure in CMC, tends 
to focus on either self-awareness (Matheson & Zanna, 1998; Joinson, 2001), or 
identifiability (Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004), rather than looking at the two together.  
Furthermore, Lea et al.’s work was also important as it distinguished between 
personal and social identities, and recognised the ultimate effect they would have 
on behaviour.  However, Lea et al.’s study was particularly focused upon groups, 
whereas much of the self-disclosure that is taking place on-line, particularly in 
relationship formation, involves just a dyad. In contrast, the experiments that will 
be presented in this thesis will examine how anonymity, combined with self-
awareness affects personally motivated, intimate and optimal self-disclosure 
within dyads.  The results, whilst allowing an insight into what may be occurring 
on-line, will also be used to understand how this type of self-disclosure may be 
being used to gain self-knowledge to add to the self-concept.   
 
Earlier in the introduction, it was proposed that the self-concept is constructed 
from self-knowledge (Wilson and Dunn, 2004), much of which may be gained 
through the process of self-disclosure (Asai and Barnlund, 1998).  However, 
whether this process takes place in a group or a dyad, could affect different 
representations of the self.  Sedikides and Brewer (2001), for example, distinguish 
between three different representations within the self-concept.  They describe the 
individual self as the self that is achieved by differentiating the self from others, 
and also by recognising one’s unique traits and attributes, in comparison with 
others.  The development of the individual self is also linked to the protection and 
enhancement of the self psychologically (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).  The 
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relational self is described as the self that is formed in dyadic relations (Sedikides 
& Brewer, 2001), and this representation of the self is associated with the persons 
place in relationships, whilst the motives are linked to the enhancing the other, 
and maintaining the relationship (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).  Finally, the 
collective self is formed within groups, and is achieved by comparing the in-group 
to the out-group (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). The motives of the collective self 
are, therefore, associated with protecting and enhancing the groups (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996).  Significantly, in Lea et al.’s (2001) work, if the participants are 
gathering information about the self in relation to the group, this is associated with 
the collective self, whereas forming relations in dyads is associated with the 
relational self.  An aim of thesis is to examine how self-disclosure and self-
knowledge are used to form the self-concept, it is therefore interesting to consider 
what self is being presented in CMC (for instance the true self), and where the 
information that is gained from self-disclosure will be placed within the given 
representations of the self (the individual, relational, or collective self).   
 
There are therefore many questions emerging from past research in terms of what 
type of self-disclosure is being observed in CMC.  It is clear from observations in 
CMC that deep, and possibly optimal self-disclosure is occurring on-line (Greist 
et al., 1973; Morsund, 1997; Salem et al., 1998), and the experiments within this 
thesis will assess the validity of this. It is also unclear whether CMC encourages 
particular representations of the self to be presented such as the true self (Bargh et 
al., 2002), or the individual self or relational self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001), and 
how these representations affect self-disclosure.  In the experimental sections of 
this thesis this will also be considered. It is also unclear what role the combination 
of anonymity and self-awareness has within the optimal and intimate self-
disclosure that appears to be being presented in CMC. The following experiments 
will therefore attempt to manipulate self-awareness and then test the effects on 
optimal and intimate self-disclosure in CMC.  However, before the experiments 
are discussed, a review of the manipulations that have been used in CMC research 
is presented.  
Manipulations of self-awareness in CMC 
 
Although many of the studies that examine self-awareness in CMC (Matheson & 
Zanna, 1988; 1990; Lea et al., 1995), ask the participant to rate how self-aware 
they are, and then use this to back up claims about how self-aware the participant 
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is in the experiment, another approach to self-awareness is to use private or public 
self-awareness as an independent variable, and attempt to manipulate it.  Duval 
and Wicklund (1972), prior to the advent of CMC, made many attempts to induce 
objective self-awareness in the laboratory. They suggested that any situational 
cues available to an individual, that literally reminds them of themselves, could 
heighten self-awareness.  They then experimented with the presence of mirrors, 
television, cameras and tape recordings of participants’ voices to try and induce 
objective self-awareness, but these experiments did not yield consistent results. 
Later, however, a distinction was made between the public and private self, which 
resolved the inconsistency in the results.  It appeared that cues such as a small 
mirror, where just the head and shoulders could be viewed, focused the 
participants’ attention on the more personal aspects of the self (Buss, 1980; Carver 
& Scheier, 1981; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Webb, Marsh, Schneidernam, & 
Davis, 1989), and caused the participants to be more aware of previously held 
beliefs (Scheier & Carver, 1980).  Furthermore, this state was reported to induce 
increased private self-awareness (Govern & Marsch, 1997).  The mirror was also 
reported to lead participants to be more likely to answer the question of ‘who am 
I’ from personal rather than abstract social categories (Ickes et al., 1978), and to 
direct a participant’s attention towards their private self, heightening private self-
awareness, and causing the participant to be more aware of hidden inner feelings, 
thoughts and memories (Archer, Hormuth, & Berg, 1982).  In contrast, cues such 
as a camera, or an audience, were reported to direct participants’ self-focus 
towards the public self and the public self-aspects (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Other 
ways in which public self-awareness has been increased in experimental work 
include making the participant identifiable and also accountable (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981). Moreover, these increases in public self-awareness have been 
reported to lead people into acting in ways they feel they should act, rather than 
ways they would perhaps like to act (Carver & Scheier, 1981).   
 
These types of manipulations, which manipulate levels of public and private self-
awareness, have been modified fairly recently in CMC research. In particular, 
there are two studies within CMC research that have employed manipulations of 
self-awareness (Joinson, 2001; Yao & Flanagin, 2006). In both these experiments, 
a modification of the traditional method of heightening private self-awareness by 
placing a mirror near a participant (Scheier & Carver, 1980; Buss, 1980; Baldwin 
& Holmes, 1987; Webb et al., 1989) was used.  This mirror manipulation was 
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modified by projecting a real-time image of the participant on the corner of the 
screen (Joinson, 2001; Yao & Flanagin, 2006).  Like the mirror, the projected 
image was predicted to act as constant reminder of the self to the participant, thus 
increasing private self-awareness (Joinson, 2001).  In one of the two CMC 
experiments that manipulated self-awareness, Yao & Flanagin used the projected-
mirror condition to heighten private self-awareness, and also used a separate 
manipulation to try and heighten public self-awareness.  The manipulation Yao & 
Flanagin used to heighten public self-awareness was a web-cam, which they 
found had similar effects to a video camera in heightening public self-awareness 
above that of a control condition, where no camera was used. Yao & Flanagin 
thus set out to try and use these two self-awareness manipulations to find support 
for deindividuaiton and hyperpersonal explanations of behaviour in CMC.  In this 
study, Yao & Flanagin used same-sex dyads in an anonymous and time restricted 
and synchronous CMC environment, and they were given 20 minutes to discuss a 
‘Wilderness survival problem,’ with their partner. Once this task was completed 
the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that measured their private 
and public self-awareness, and assessed their intimacy, task vs social orientation, 
formality and politeness and attraction.  Yao used four experimental conditions 2 
(un-heightened vs. heightened private self-awareness) x 2 (un-heightened x 
heightened public self-awareness).   
 
The results of the private and public self-awareness scores, which were taken from 
a modified version of Buss’s (2001) self-consciousness scale, were used to check 
the manipulations.  It was found that participants who saw their own image during 
the study did report higher levels of private self-awareness than those who did not.  
Also those participants who received the higher level of public self-awareness 
manipulation reported higher levels of public self-awareness than participants that 
did not. Yao & Flanagin’s (2006) work produced some interesting findings that 
could indicate how increased levels of private self-awareness and decreased levels 
of public self-awareness could affect the motivations and goals of self-disclosure 
in CMC  Linking Yao & Flanagin’s findings to Miller and Read’s (1987) 
observations, Yao & Flanagin also found support for the notion that heightened 
private self-awareness may activate more personal goals (and strategies), and that 
social goals, and strategies, may be more salient when public self-awareness is 
heightened.  Yao & Flanagin further suggested that the heightened private self-
awareness (projected-mirror image) primed the individuals’ to focus on self-
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presentation strategies that defined them as a unique individual, which then 
bolstered their attractiveness to their partner.  It was possible, therefore, that this 
focus on the self as a unique individual made the individual self more salient and, 
in turn, encouraged more personally motivated self-disclosure. 
 
Yao & Flanagin (2006) also reported that being high in public self-awareness did 
not increase group identification, nor did it increase private self-awareness, or 
decrease group identification.  Yao & therefore suggested that being aware of the 
social aspects of oneself was not the same as having a salient group identity, and 
that self-awareness did not affect social identity, but affected the way in which an 
individual sought information about others. Yao & Flanagin therefore concluded 
that in this dyadic situation no support was found for deindividuation theories.  
These findings do have certain implications for the present study, as they suggest 
that increased public self-awareness, increases social aspects of oneself, and that 
this could affect the way the individual seeks information about others.  It could 
also then affect the way the individual self-discloses to gain information about the 
other, and about their self. However, Yao & Flanagin also reported that 
participants in the heightened private self-awareness condition scored their partner 
higher for social attraction and were themselves voted more attractive (especially 
when paired with low levels of public self-awareness). Politeness also decreased 
under conditions of heightened public self-awareness, and this was viewed as 
support for hypersonality theory (Walther, 1996) 
 
Yao & Flanagin’s (2006) work does therefore find support for the argument that 
different goals are obtainable in CMC. When private self-awareness is high during 
CMC, it does indicate that more personal goals of self-disclosure are obtainable, 
and that the self-disclosure may be more individuated (Ickes et al., 1978). It is 
also possible that other illustrated benefits of increased private self-awareness, 
such as an awareness of the discrepancies within the self and an increased sense of 
feelings and emotions (cf. Carver & Schieier, 1980), may also be accessed in 
CMC.  In this sense, Yao & Flanagin’s work does give some indication as to how 
private self-awareness may affect the goals of self-disclosure.  However, Yao & 
Flanagin did not actually measure self-disclosure.  Moreover, even if the 
participant’s personal motivations are activated, and they are aware of their self as 
an individual in CMC interaction, it is a step further to then reveal this 
information to someone else.  Although Yao & Flanagin’s study does contribute 
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to the understanding of self-awareness in CMC, it did not actually measure self-
disclosure. 
 
In the second of the experiments that used manipulations of self-awareness in 
CMC, Joinson (2001) examined the effects of manipulations self-awareness upon 
self-disclosure.  Unfortunately this study was fairly ambitious and rather than just 
testing the effects of just heightened private or public self-awareness, or reduced 
private or public self-awareness on self-disclosure, it attempted to test Shaffer and 
Tomarelli’s (1989) finding that being high in either private or public self-
consciousness was not conducive to self-disclosure.   Joinson predicted, based 
upon Schaffer and Tomarelli’s work, that participants communicating in CMC 
would show high levels of self-disclosure when private self-awareness was raised 
and public self-awareness was reduced, whilst participants high or low on both 
would spontaneously self-disclose significantly less. To test this assertion Joinson 
manipulated private and public self-awareness and measured instances of 
spontaneous self-disclosure in an ice-breaker task. An increase in private self-
awareness was achieved by projecting a video image of the participant on to his, 
or her, screen. This was again a modification of the traditional mirror 
manipulation that had been used in the past (Scheier & Carver, 1980; Buss, 1980; 
Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Webb et al., 1989), and which was also used by Yao & 
Flanagin (2006). Private self-focus, was reduced by showing participants’ 
episodes of The Simpsons during the experiment, which was claimed to distract 
the participant’s attention from their self (Joinson, 2001). Public self-focus was 
heightened by the participants arriving in a well-lit corridor with video cameras 
pointing at them, and participants were informed that their discussion would be 
automatically transcribed, and that they would meet their partner after the 
experiment. Finally, a reduction in public self-focus was achieved by the 
participants arriving in a darkened corridor which led to a cubicle with blackened 
windows.   
 
The results indicated no significant main effects for private self-awareness or 
public self-awareness. There was, however, a significant interaction between the 
level of private self-awareness and public awareness. Further analysis and post-
hoc tests led to the conclusions that heightened private self-awareness and reduced 
public awareness resulted in significantly higher levels of self-disclosure, and the 
level of self-disclosure in the high private/low public self-awareness condition 
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were greater than in the reduced private/high public self-awareness condition.  
Joinson (2001) interpreted these results as evidence that it was not the effect of 
de-individuation that leads to higher self-disclosure, but rather an interaction 
between anonymity, which Joinson claims was shown by reduced public self-
awareness scores, and heightened private awareness.  These results are useful as 
they do provide solid empirical evidence that heightened private self-awareness 
and reduced public self-awareness, leads to heightened self-disclosure.  However, 
there are many issues that arise from this study.  For example, Joinson only 
measured duration/breadth of self-disclosure and therefore the scope of the 
findings are extremely limited, and not particularly useful when trying to 
understand the optimal and intimate self-disclosure that is apparent in CMC, and 
which is of interest in the present thesis.   
 
Other issues that compound the finding of Joinson’s (2001) study surround the 
private and public self-awareness manipulations. Joinson’s conclusions seem to 
suggest, for instance, that private and public self-awareness react independently in 
the experiment. However a relationship between public self-awareness and private 
self-awareness can not be ruled out.  The conclusions that can be drawn from the 
manipulations of self-awareness are further limited by the comparisons that are 
made between the manipulations of self-awareness within the experiment. 
Joinson) also used the projected-mirror manipulation to represent heightened 
private self-awareness. However this manipulation was deemed to be high in 
private self-awareness when compared to the condition which was considered to 
be low in private self-awareness (where participants are shown episodes of The 
Simpsons). In the absence of any type of control condition for private self-
awareness, the validity of the heightened private self-awareness score for the 
projected-mirror condition is questionable.  If it was tested against a control, the 
participants could score the projected-mirror manipulation lower than the control 
condition (for example one which does not have The Simpsons playing, and was 
more of a traditional anonymous CMC condition) for private self-awareness.  This 
projected-mirror manipulation does therefore require more rigorous testing, with 
comparisons made with a control condition.   
 
The projected-mirror manipulation 
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The modification of the mirror manipulation was considered successful in both 
Joinson's (2001) and Yao and Flanagin’s (2006) studies and it may become a 
standard, validated method that will be used in future research.  However, the 
mirror as a manipulation of just private self-awareness is called in to question by 
various studies, which are also pertinent to understanding the CMC manipulation. 
There is, for example, evidence to suggest that whilst a small mirror increases 
private self-awareness, thus reflecting private and internal parts of the self 
(Scheier & Carver, 1977; Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979; Baldwin & 
Holmes, 1987). Larger mirrors simulate the effect of anticipated discussion with 
others, and engage elements of the public self (Snyder & Monson, 1975; Webb et 
al., 1989).  There is also some evidence that a standard sized mirror increases both 
private and public self-awareness (Wiekens & Stapel, 2008). The projected-mirror 
manipulation in CMC may therefore increase public self-awareness. Moreover, 
this could be further intensified in the CMC projected-mirror manipulation, as the 
projection is caught by a camera, and a camera is reported in past research, to 
direct participants’ self-focus towards the public self and appropriateness of 
behaviour, thus increasing public self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund, 1972).  In 
Yao & Flanagin’s study levels of public self-awareness were not measured in the 
CMC projected-mirror condition, and in Joinson’s experiment the heightened 
private self-awareness condition was compared to a reduced private self-
awareness condition, with no control.  More research is therefore required 
therefore to examine the possible effects that the manipulation could have upon 
public self-awareness. In the experiments that will be reported in the present 
thesis, the projected-mirror manipulation will be used to try and heighten private 
self-awareness, which in turn should increase deep personally motivated self-
disclosure.  In the present study, a detailed examination of this manipulation will 
be undertaken in terms of public and private self-awareness, and the condition will 
be compared to a control condition.   
 
The door-ajar manipulation  
 
Whilst a mirror is reported to increase private self-awareness and increase self-
disclosure, it is also suggested that anything that distracts a participants’ attention 
away from their innermost thoughts and feelings and, out to the external, will 
reduce private self-awareness, and will thus inhibit self-disclosure (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972).  Loud music (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982) and rotating 
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turntables (Webb et al., 1989) are examples of manipulations that have been used 
to reduce private self-awareness within past experiments.  In a similar vein, and in 
the only study which attempts to reduce private self-awareness experimentally in 
CMC, Joinson (2001) played episodes of The Simpsons to participants during a 
task, to reduce the participant’s private self-awareness.  Unsurprisingly, the 
participants in this condition did report lower levels of private self-awareness and 
fewer instance of spontaneous self-disclosure during the task (Joinson, 2001).  
However, even Joinson criticised this condition as being too cognitively 
demanding, which he also suggested may have confounded the results.  Joinson 
went on to suggest that  playing The Simpsons to the participants during the task 
made too many concurrent demands upon the participant’s attention, and 
expressed concerns that this may have led to the reduced self-disclosure (Joinson, 
2001).  Although this manipulation illustrated that if a participant is distracted 
during a task they will self-disclose less, it is certainly not appropriate for 
studying the more intimate or deep type of self-disclosure, which is of interest in 
the present thesis. It would be extremely difficult and distracting for a participant 
to even attempt deep and optimal self-disclosure whilst watching The Simpsons.  
More methods of reducing self-disclosure are therefore required to allow further 
understanding of the link between self-awareness and self-disclosure in CMC.   
 
A slightly different perspective is therefore adopted in the present study, where 
the question is poised of; how subtle could a distraction be to draw the participant 
away from their private self, and still reduce self-disclosure?   It is noted that if the 
manipulation is too strong it is likely that the participant will not self-disclose 
deeply at all, and this would defeat the aim of the experiment.  When high in 
private self-awareness participants are highly aware of their thoughts and feelings 
(Scheier, et al., 1978), and this is also beneficial to the participants expressing the 
type of deep and optimal self-disclosure that is of interest in this thesis. The 
distraction does therefore need to be quite subtle. It is therefore suggested that as 
the ultimate aim of the manipulation is to reduce self-disclosure, that it would also 
make sense to look at a subtle manipulation that could heighten public self-
awareness.  In Joinson’s (2001) study an audience was used to heighten public 
self-awareness, and this has also been successfully used in the past (Froming et 
al., 1982), and is considered a valid manipulation which can increase public self-
awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1987).  Again, however, an audience is a very 
strong manipulation to use when the aim of the present thesis is to try and elicit 
 44 
optimal and deep self-disclosure. As Franzoi and Brewer (1984) did report that the 
presence of other people can also focus an individual’s attention on the public 
aspects of the self, it would therefore be interesting if a subtle manipulation could 
be devised, in the present experiments, that increased public-self-awareness just 
enough to distract the participants from their private self, yet still elicited high 
levels of self-disclosure.  This finding would be more interesting than a 
manipulation that had the participant reject the task and not engage in any, or very 
low levels of self-disclosure.  It would also potentially increase the social 
motivations within the interaction, and also give some insight into the relationship 
between public and private self-awareness. 
 
This idea of increasing public self-awareness by increasing the presence of the 
other is something which fits in well with CMC research.  Joinson (2001), in the 
conclusion of his experiments, made the suggestion that it could be due to the 
participants being physically alone in a CMC interaction, that leads to a feeling of 
being alone, which ultimately increased private and reduced public self-
awareness.  Indeed, CMC has been suggested to give a feeling of privacy 
(Joinson, Reips, Buchanan, & Schofield, 2008), and a feeling that no one is 
looking (Weisband & Reining 1995).  The manipulation to be employed in the 
following experiments was therefore designed to try and tap into these types of 
feelings that are reported to be induced in CMC. Jourard (1971) conducted much 
work on the Distance-Equilibrium Hypothesis which postulated that as distance 
decreased between the participant and the experimenter, the level of intimacy also 
decreased. Various subsequent studies also reported that the greater the distance 
between the experimenter and the participant, the greater the self-disclosure that 
would occur (Jourard, 1961; Johnson & Dabbs, 1976).  It was almost as if adding 
space between the experimenter and the participant allowed the participant’s 
boundaries of privacy to expand, thus freeing the participant to access their private 
thoughts and feel safer to self-disclose (cf. Johnson & Dabbs, 1976). 
 
It could therefore be argued that if the participant is anonymous and alone, with 
no one around, the psychological/social and physical distance between the 
participant and the communicant is great, thus are the feelings of privacy (Goh, 
2004; Manstead et al., 2011). However the presence of someone, not necessarily 
connected to their task, could also reduce this privacy. The present study therefore 
tests the extent to which this is possible. It is proposed, in the present study, that if 
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the participant’s cubicle door is left ajar (door-ajar manipulation) that this will 
reduce their private self-awareness, whilst increasing public self-awareness.  It is 
clear throughout the literature that self-disclosure is a very sensitive process, and 
the slightest change can dramatically affect the person’s motivation of self-
disclosure, their perception of risk and therefore their output of self-disclosure.  
Although this manipulation is subtle it is predicted that it will have a fairly 
dramatic effect.  It is predicted that the manipulation will have a negative effect 
upon optimal and intimate self-disclosure.  It is also suggested that although this 
manipulation is not technically a manipulation of CMC, it taps into a factor which 
is essential to the CMC experience.  This factor being that when someone is 
communicating by CMC it is usually just them alone with their computer.  
Moreover, this experience may increase private and reduce public self-awareness, 
as they become absorbed in the experience.  The experiments in this thesis will 
therefore employ these two manipulations; the first, the projected-mirror 
manipulation will be used to try and encourage self-disclosure, and the second, the 
door-ajar manipulation, will be used to try and inhibit self-disclosure.  It is further 
predicted that these manipulations will alter the levels of private and public self-
awareness that are experienced during the experiments, and will allow an insight 
into how self-awareness affects personally motivated, intimate and optimal self-
disclosure in CMC. 
The decision to self-disclose 
 
It is argued in the present thesis that predicting a participant’s self-disclosure is 
extremely difficult and dependent upon several factors and decisions made by the 
individual. In order to self-disclose, it is argued here, that the participants go 
through several processes which involve them checking their internal standards 
with outside reference points to decide on their behaviour (cf. Powers (1973a; 
1973b; Carver & Scheier, 1981).  It is therefore argued that attentional focus is 
key to understanding breadth, depth and accuracy of self-disclosure in CMC, in 
addition to understanding the goals of self-disclosure, and also which aspect of the 
self the self-disclosure is from. More specifically, it is argued that increased 
private self-awareness and reduced public self-awareness will encourage the 
revealing of intimate and optimal self-disclosure. In the following two 
experiments two manipulations, projected-mirror and door-ajar, are used to try 
and both enhance and inhibit self-disclosure.  In the experiments, both private and 
public self-awareness will be measured, alongside breadth, depth and accuracy of 
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self-disclosure, and various other interpersonal factors.  This will allow a detailed 
investigation of the links between self-disclosure and self-awareness.  It is 
envisaged that the results will illustrate some of the complex factors that are 
involved in the self-disclosure decision. 
 
This decision process that the individual goes through when self-disclosing has 
been structured in the Disclosure-Decision Model (DDM) (Omarzu, 2000), which 
views self-disclosure from the individual’s perspective.  This model presents a 
fairly structured way of understanding self-disclosure and provides quite a useful 
perspective in which to frame the experiments that are to follow (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1:   The Disclosure-Decision Model (DDM) (taken from Omarzu, 2000) 
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As is clear from Figure 1.1, the DDM begins with the motivation, or goal, the 
importance of which has been constantly emphasised throughout this introduction. 
It is argued here that the goal of self-disclosure, and particularly whether the goal 
is personal or social, will greatly affect the output of self-disclosure, and the main 
focus in the following experiments is personally motivated self-disclosure.  The 
DDM also predicts that if there is no salient goal that there will be no self-
disclosure, and this will depend on whether there is an appropriate target, 
appropriate strategy, and the weighing up of subjective risk and subjective utility. 
The subjective utility (reward) involves the consideration of how important the 
achievement of the goal is, and this is reported to be affected by three elements: 
individual differences; situational cues; and target characteristics (Omarzu, 2000). 
The subjective perceived risk identifies the risk of factors such as social rejection, 
betrayal and discomfort for the listener (Omarzu, 2000). It is suggested here, that 
the manipulations that will be used in the present experiment, fit into the 
situational cues dimension of the DDM, and will lead to the participant having 
different weights of subjective risk and utility to consider.  Although the DDM 
does not consider attentional focus, it is argued that the participants’ levels of 
private and public self-awareness are also essential in their decision to self-
disclose.  The decision to self-disclose is weighed up, consciously or sub-
consciously, and parallels can be drawn between this process, and the internal and 
external checking and referencing that is involved in theories of self-regulation 
(cf. Powers, 1973a; 1973b; Carver & Scheier, 1981).  For example, in the 
following experiments, the task is engineered to try and encourage the pursuit of 
deep and personally motivated goals of self-disclosure.  The participant has 
therefore the opportunity to explore the private self. However, if public self-
awareness is raised, a discrepancy could appear between what the participants 
would like to achieve and what they feel they can achieve.  In this situation it is 
argued that the participant will change the goal, or reduce the discrepancy, by not 
engaging in deep and optimal self-disclosure.  
 
It is, therefore, argued that the manipulations, which will affect the attentional 
focus of the participant, will create different weights of subjective utility and 
subjective risk, which will ultimately result in different self-disclosure behaviours. 
The DDM (Omarzu, 2000) gives no consideration to accuracy of self-disclosure, 
but it is argued in the present thesis that this often overlooked aspect of self-
disclosure is essential to explore.  The DDM predicts that the depth dimension is 
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most at risk in the self-disclosure decision. However, it is argued here that the 
accuracy dimension is equally at risk. The DDM also suggests that as the 
subjective utility increases, or as the possible rewards increase, the breadth of the 
self-disclosure will drop to allow more focus on the topic related to achieving the 
desired goal.  The experiments that follow, will give some insight into how these 
different dimensions of self-disclosure are affected by public and private self-
awareness.  In the following chapters, four experiments are reported which present 
an in-depth investigation into the role of self-awareness on self-disclosure in 
CMC.  Due to the detail in which self-disclosure is considered within the 
experiments, and due to the large number of dependent variables that are 
measured, a discussion-style results section has been adopted.  It was deemed that 
this style of reporting would aid clarity and would also allow the results to be 
related back to the theory in a more systematic fashion.  
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CHAPTER 2: Experiment 1 
An experiment investigating the effect of 
manipulations of self-awareness on dyadic self-
disclosure in computer-mediated communication 
 
Introduction  
 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to elicit deep self-disclosure in a dyadic interaction, 
and then to examine the effects of manipulations of private and public self-
awareness upon the deep self-disclosure.  The manipulations utilised in 
Experiment 1 consisted of the projected-mirror manipulation and the door-ajar 
manipulation. Significantly, no prior experiment had considered the role of self-
awareness in deep self-disclosure within CMC, and no study had examined the 
role of self-awareness in optimal self-disclosure.  Moreover, no study (with 
exception of Goh, 2004) had considered how the goals within the interaction may 
affect the output of self-disclosure. In the absence of any past studies investigating 
depth of self-disclosure the outcome was therefore fairly uncertain.  It was 
possible that the manipulations of self-awareness would not alter the level of 
depth of self-disclosure. The manipulations could, for example, be ignored, as was 
evidenced in Goh, where the desire to socialise was seen to override any negative 
effects of manipulations. In contrast, it could be that the projected-mirror 
manipulation would have a similar effect to a small mirror, that was previously 
reported to focus the participant’s attention on the personal aspects of the self 
(Buss, 1980; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Scheier & Carver, 1980; Webb et al., 
1989), and which was also reported to raise private self-awareness (Govern & 
Marsch, 1997; Joinson, 2001; Yao & Flanagin, 2006), which could, in turn, 
increase self-disclosure.  It had also been suggested that the mirror could act as a 
reminder to the participant of how others see them (Yao & Flanagin, 2006), which 
could, as was seen in mirror manipulations using a large mirror, produce effects 
similar to anticipated future discussion (Webb et al., 2006; Snyder & Monson, 
1975).  If this was the case then the depth of self-disclosure would drop. The 
hypothesis pertaining to self-awareness and self-disclosure in Experiment 1 was 
however based on Joinson’s empirically validated projected-mirror condition, 
which was used to examine breadth of self-disclosure.  That is, the projected-
mirror condition would increase private self-awareness and would as a result 
increase self-disclosure (H1 and H2).  
 50 
 
It was also predicted, that if the projected-mirror manipulation was successful in 
heightening private self-awareness, that it would increase the personal motivations 
in the interaction (cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and would also increase the 
participants’ awareness of their self-discrepancies (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981), 
and in particular of the true self.  It was suggested, that this situation would be 
ideal for pursuing personal motivations of self-disclosure, as subjective utility 
would be high in this situation. Bargh et al., (2002) had reported previously that 
participants in this type of anonymous CMC situation do have greater access to 
their true self, and although Bargh et al. attributed this to the lack of identifiability 
rather than the heightened private self-awareness, this was examined in 
Experiment 1.  Although private self-awareness may be important for the access 
to the true self, for this to translate into deep and optimal self-disclosure it is 
argued here that public self-awareness must also be low. This would also be 
predicted in the DDM where for self-disclosure to be deep, subjective risk must be 
low.  Therefore, it was predicted that when the participant weighs up the high 
subjective utility with the low subjective risk of the projected-mirror condition, 
they would self-disclose deeply, and they would also self-disclose accurately 
(H2). 
 
In contrast, it was predicted that the door-ajar condition would increase 
participants’ public self-awareness and possibly decrease their private self-
awareness, and that this would adversely affect their willingness to self-disclose 
deeply and broadly or to engage in optimal self-disclosure (H3, H4, H5). In the 
following experiment the distraction of the door being ajar was expected to 
disturb the participants’ sense that they were alone and it was predicted that this 
would prevent them becoming absorbed in intimate and optimal self-disclosure. 
Psychological distance and space had been reported previously to be an important 
factor in CMC (Manstead et al., 2011) and it was predicted that the door-ajar 
manipulation would also disturb the participants’ privacy (Joinson et al., 2008).  
Reducing the distance between the experimenter and the self-discloser had also 
been reported to have a negative effect upon intimate self-disclosure in past 
studies (Jourard, 1971), and it was expected that this would occur in the CMC 
situation of the present experiment.  It was also predicted that the door-ajar 
condition would make the participants more aware of other people being around, 
because the presence of others has been seen to increase public self-awareness in 
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the past (Froming et al., 1982; Franzoi, & Brewer, 1984).  Although this 
manipulation is less obvious than Joinson’s (2001), it was predicted that it would 
also reduce psychological distance between the experimenter and the participant, 
which has also been seen in the past to greatly reduce self-disclosure (Jourard, 
1961; Johnson & Dabbs, 1976).  In this instance, it was predicted that the 
participant would not feel ‘safe’ to reveal the true self and consequently optimal 
and deep self-disclosure would not be engaged in.  In terms of the DDM (Omarzu, 
2000), in this condition it was predicted that the subjective risk was high, as the 
door-ajar manipulation is a risk to the private self, and this would in turn affect the 
goal and the strategy of self-disclosure.  It was predicted that it would greatly 
affect the possibility of achieving personally motivated goals of self-disclosure, 
and that in this situation the self-disclosure could be broad, but it would not be 
deep, nor would it be authentic.  Finally, it was predicted that increasing private 
self-awareness would increase self-disclosure (H7), and that increasing public 
self-awareness would decrease accuracy of self-disclosure (H8). 
 
H1:  Participants in the projected-mirror condition will score higher on the 
private self-awareness scale than participants in a control condition  
 
H2:  Participants in the projected-mirror condition will score lower on the 
public self-awareness scale than participants in a control condition  
 
H3:  Participants in the projected-mirror condition will score significantly 
higher for breadth, depth and accuracy of self-disclosure, than participants 
in a control condition  
 
H4:  Participants in the door-ajar condition will score lower on the private 
self-awareness scale than participants in a control condition  
 
H5:  Participants in the door-ajar condition will score higher on the public 
self-awareness scale than participant in a control condition 
 
H6:  Participants in the door-ajar condition will self-report themselves to 
self-disclose significantly less breadth, depth and accuracy of self-disclosure 
than participants in a control condition 
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H7:  There will be a positive correlation between breadth, depth and 
accuracy of self-disclosure and private self-awareness 
 
H8:  There will be a negative correlation between breadth, depth and 
accuracy of self-disclosure and public self-awareness 
 
Method 
  
Overview and design 
 
During the experiment the participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions; control, projected-mirror and door-ajar conditions.  The experiment 
therefore compared two conditions (control vs. projected-mirror) and (control vs. 
door-ajar), with self-awareness manipulated as an independent factor.  Participants 
interacted individually with a trained female confederate, whom they believed was 
another student using a text-based computer conferencing system in a semi-
structured discussion designed to elicit self-disclosure. Dependent measures were 
obtained after the experiment through an on-line questionnaire, which explored 
private and public self-awareness, self-disclosure and several other interpersonal 
variables. The experiment was approved by the University Ethics committee and 
ethical consideration was shown at all stages of the experiment 
Equipment 
 
The participant and the confederate were located in separate cubicles and used 
desktop PCs, which were connected via a LAN to a server that hosted the 
O’Reilly WebBoard conferencing system.  The video-conferencing hardware that 
was used was VCON Escort desktop video-conferencing hardware.  The images 
for the video were captured using a fixed-focus video camera, which displayed the 
images on a 17” XVGA monitor.  The text conferencing was synchronous and on 
each PC the participants could type up to 256 characters into a small input 
window. When they pressed the Return key these characters would then appear on 
a scrollable text-conferencing window.  The characters that they had typed would 
appear almost instantaneously in this scrollable window, preceded by ‘Participant 
X’. The scrollable conferencing window could be viewed on both the participant’s 
and confederate’s screen.  In the projected-mirror condition, text-based interaction 
was supplemented by silent video-mediated communication using a fixed-focus 
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camera attached to a PCI card installed in the participant's computers. The camera 
was positioned directly above the monitor and captured the head and shoulders of 
the participant in 25 fps near-broadcast quality video which was transmitted at 
1.5Mbps for display in a 15cm. square window in the bottom right-hand corner of 
the participant’s screen. A third PC hosted an O’Reilly WebBoard text-
conferencing server and archived the text of the interactions using MIRC 
software.  
The questions of varying intimacy and the semi-structured 
discussion 
 
In Goh (2004) 18 questions relating to different personal topics varying in 
intimacy were prepared from an initial list of 40 items used by Jourard (1971) 
(Appendix 1). The 40 items were presented in random order in a questionnaire to 
100 undergraduate students who were asked to rate the intimacy of each question 
on a nine-point scale anchored at the extremes by one (low intimacy) and nine 
(high intimacy).  The mean intimacy value of each question was calculated and 18 
questions representing six low intimacy topics (M = 2.03; SD = 0.39), six medium 
intimacy (M = 3.88; SD = 0.86) and six high intimacy (M = 6.10; SD = 0.91) 
topics were selected. Example items include 'What are the aspects of your daily 
work that satisfy and bother you?' (2.55); 'What are your usual ways of dealing 
with depression, anxiety and anger?' (4.30); 'What are the sources of strain and 
dissatisfaction in your sexual relationships?' (7.24). The 18 questions were 
assembled in two lists: randomly ordered for use by the participant; and rank 
ordered by intimacy value for use by the confederate.  The list of questions of 
varying intimacy that were prepared by Goh (2004) (Appendix 1) are used 
throughout all the experiments presented in this thesis. 
 
In the semi-structured discussion, the participant followed paper instructions that 
asked them to ask the confederate the practice question.  The confederate would 
reply, and then ask the participant the question back.  After the confederate 
practiced asking the practice question, the participant was asked (in the paper 
instructions Appendix 2) to choose a question from the list of varying intimacy, to 
ask the confederate.  This meant that the participant set the intimacy level for the 
interaction. The confederate was then instructed, when it was their turn to ask a 
question, to move down the list of questions of varying intimacy and always ask 
the participant the question which was next on the list of increasing intimacy.  
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This ensured that the confederate would encourage the intimacy of the interaction, 
whilst matching the level chosen by the participant. The participant and the 
confederate then took turns, asking each other questions of varying intimacy.  In 
the participants’ instruction, they were informed that they should listen to their 
partner’s replies, and could briefly respond, but they were not allowed to ask 
further questions.  This was to ensure that the interaction did not sway too much 
from the task.  The confederate had a script (Appendix 3) where they were only 
permitted to respond with certain answers, and had to stick exactly to the pre-
prepared questions.  The script was based on the confederate answers used in Goh 
(2004). In Goh (2004) the confederate prepared, in advance of the experiments, 
honest, open and high disclosing answers to each of the questions.  The answers 
were printed out for the confederate in the present experiment to read and type 
during the interactions.  These confederate answers had already been tested and 
used in Goh (2004), where they had been seen to be effective in encouraging self-
disclosure.  
Experimental manipulations 
 
Control  
In this condition the door of the participant’s computer cubicle was pulled shut by 
the experimenter.  The computer the participant used to type their email was 
standard with no webcam attached to it.  No image of the participant was captured 
during the session. 
 
Projected –mirror condition  
This condition was exactly the same as the control except a video-conferencing 
camera was positioned on top of the computer screen. VCON software was used 
to capture the participant’s head and shoulders in an image that was projected in a 
window at the bottom right hand corner of the screen.  The image was in view but 
fairly small so did not disturb the chat window.  The participant was asked to read 
the information about the camera and their permission was gained for using their 
image.  The participant was reassured that the image was not being saved. They 
were informed that only they would see this image of themselves.  The door was 
closed by the experimenter and remained shut throughout the task.  
 
Door-ajar condition 
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This condition was exactly the same as the control condition except the 
experimenter left the door 30cm. ajar for the duration of the task.  During the task, 
the experimenter was sat out of immediate view of the door. However if the 
participant leaned back they could view the experimenter five metres away.  The 
experimenter could not possibly read the participant’s disclosures nor see the 
screen or the participant.  There was no webcam on the participant’s computer, 
and no image was projected on their screen during the interaction. 
Procedure 
 
Forty-five, British undergraduate psychology students, aged 18-24 (M=20) took 
part in the experiment in return for credits that they had to collect on their 
undergraduate course, or a five pound monetary reward.  It was made clear to the 
participants at the beginning of the experiment that they would be interacting with 
another British student. They were told that they were going to spend some time 
answering and asking various personal questions with each other using CMC. The 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions; control; 
projected-mirror; and door-ajar.  In all of the conditions the participants were met 
and shown to a computer cubicle where the experiment would begin. On entering 
the computer cubicle the participants were asked to read the instructions and list 
of questions of varying intimacy.  The instructions explained that they were going 
to spend 25 minutes taking turns asking and answering the questions of varying 
intimacy with a partner.  They were also told that they were completely 
anonymous in the interaction and that their answers would only be seen by the 
participant, and then would not be accessed till six months later for analysis.  It 
was emphasised that their answers could not be traced back to them.  The 
participants were then asked to wait for their partner to say ‘hello,’ and following 
this greeting were asked to ask their partner the practice question.  The semi-
structured discussion would then begin. This process continued for 25 minutes.  
After 25 minutes an alarm sounded and the participants were asked to fill in a 
post-interaction questionnaire 
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Dependent Measures 
 
Post-interaction questionnaire 
 
In the post-test questionnaire 14 scales were investigated, and the questionnaire 
items and their inter-item reliability are shown in Appendix 4.  The process of 
constructing the 14 scales is outlined below and resulted in 25 items: 
 
Private and public self-awareness 
Matheson and Zanna (1988; 1990) adapted Prentice-Dunn and Rogers’s (1982) 
scale to measure private and public self-awareness, for use after CMC interactions 
(private self-awareness Cronbach =0.56; public self-awareness Cronbach = 0.62).  
This scale was also used by Joinson (2001), and consists of four items which 
Joinson (2001) used with slight rewording.  Unfortunately there is no reliability 
data available for Joinson’s study.  In the scale, which was also slightly reworded 
here to suit the task, the participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed 
or disagreed with four descriptions describing their self-focus.  For private self-
awareness, the descriptions were, ‘I’ve generally been very aware of myself, my 
own perspective and attitudes,’ and reversely scored, ‘Rather than thinking about 
myself in this interaction, I have been distracted by what is going on around me,’  
For public self-awareness, the descriptions were,  ‘I have wondered about the way 
I have responded and presented myself in comparison to others, who are the same 
type of orientation to me,’ and ‘I have thought about how my partner might be 
responding to my answers as they read them.’ 
 
Breadth, depth and accuracy  
In Goh (2004) a description was given of breadth and depth of self-disclosure, and 
the participants were then asked to rate how broadly or deeply they self-disclosed 
during the interaction.  This measure was seen to be a simple yet reliable measure 
of breadth and depth of self-disclosure in Goh (2004).  It was therefore used again 
in the experiments in this thesis, where the participants were asked to rate on a 
scale of 1-9 how broad and how deep their self-disclosure was during the 
interaction.  This technique was also used to measure accuracy of self-disclosure 
in the experiments in this thesis 
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 Learning, sociable, enjoyment, self-presentation, trust, intimacy, 
accountability, embarrassment and isolations 
In Goh (2004) extensive piloting was undertaken to produce items for various 
scales.  A task was given to 100 students that asked them to imagine they were in 
the experiment.  The experiment was described and the participants were even 
asked to interact with an imaginary partner by answering questions of varying 
intimacy. The scales on the questionnaire were tested by Goh (2004) for reliability 
and any items that did not have an inter-rate reliability of 0.8 were discarded. 
Eighteen of these items were used in the experiments in this thesis.  Each scale 
consists of two items and the Cronbach’s alpha consistency values are given in 
Appendix 4.  An example of one of the items in each scale, are as follows; 
learning (‘I felt I learnt something about myself in the interaction’), sociable (‘My 
partner is a sociable person’, enjoyment (‘I enjoyed the interaction’, self-
presentation (‘I presented a more positive image of myself in the interaction’), 
trust (‘my partner and I built up a trusting relationship’), intimacy (‘The 
interaction was intimate at points’), accountable (‘I felt in this experiment that I 
could say anything and not feel accountable for it’), embarrassment (‘I felt 
embarrassed during the interaction’ and isolation (‘I found the experience 
isolating’). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
A MANOVA was used to investigate the differences between the participants 
self-disclosure in the conditions.  Self-awareness was compared as an independent 
factor with three conditions (control x projected-mirror x door-ajar), and the 
participants self-disclosure, self-awareness and a number of other interpersonal 
factors were compared. There was a significant multivariate effect of condition 
(Lambda=0.089 F(42,44) = 2.460 p<0.01), and the significant main effects, means 
and standard deviations are summarised in Table 2.1. 
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Condition 
Item 
Control Projected-
mirror 
Door-
ajar 
F value Sig 
4.13
 
2.53
 
4.27
 
Public self-awareness 
(2.26) (1.60) (2.05) 
3.52 p<0.05 
5.27
 
6.00
 
5.47 Private self-awareness 
(2.49) (1.93) (0.99) 
0.59 p=0.56 
5.13a 6.73b 5.33a Breadth  
 (1.19) (1.28) (1.05) 
8.26 p<0.005 
3.93a 6.33b 4.60a Depth 
 (1.75) (1.72) (1.18) 
9.31 p<0.001 
7.40a 8.33a 5.93b Accuracy 
 (1.40) (0.62) (1.8) 
11.84 p<0.001 
3.93a 5.93b 4.47 Learning 
 (2.19) (2.05) (2.17) 
3.53 p<0.05 
3.87
 
5.07
 
4.27
 
2.39 p<0.05 Trust 
(1.81) (2.05) 1.79   
3.87
 
3.93
 
3.27
 
0.66 p=0.65 Intimacy 
(2.13) (1.83) (2.12)   
3.93
 
3.87
 
4.40
 
0.64 p=0.67 Accountability 
(1.22) (1.77) (2.03)   
1.73
 
2.33
 
2.40
 
0.81 p=0.55 Embarrassment 
(0.88) (0.97) 0.99   
1.93
 
2.13
 
2.27
 
2.09 p=0.75 Isolation 
(1.16) (1.96) 1.39   
7.60a 6.20b 7.40a Sociable 
 (1.05) (1.52) (1.40) 
5.68 p<0.01 
7.33
 
7.40
 
6.67
 
Enjoyment 
(1.05) (1.40) (1.29) 
1.56 p=0.22 
4.33
 
5.47
 
4.40
 
Self-presentation 
(2.38) (1.85) (1.64) 
1.55 p=0.234 
1.08a 0.46b 0.80 Ratio of private to public self-
awareness 
 
(0.81) (0.26) (0.44) 
4.70 p<0.05 
Table 2.1:  A Summary of the means and (standard deviations) across the conditions and the 
resulting significance from the univariate effects. Different subscripts indicate significant 
differences (Tukey p<0.05)  
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Projected-mirror condition  
 
Private and pubic self-awareness 
No significant difference was found for private self-awareness and the participants 
in the projected-mirror condition (M=6.00, SD=1.93) reported similar levels of 
private self-awareness to those in the control condition (M=5.27, SD=2.49, 
p=0.56 (Table 2.1).  Although participants in the control condition (M=4.13, 
SD=2.26) seemed to report higher levels of public self-awareness than participants 
in the projected-mirror condition (M=2.53, SD=1.60, p=0.08), this result was not 
significant.  When the differences in the levels of private and public self-
awareness were however viewed (Figure 2.1), there were clear differences 
between the levels of private and public self-awareness in the control and the 
projected-mirror condition.  What is particularly notable in Figure 2.1 is the 
difference between the private and public self-awareness scores in the control and 
projected-mirror condition.   
 
Although self-consciousness scales consider the private and public dimensions to 
be independent, Joinson (2001) did comment that it could not be ruled out that 
private and public self-focus were associated.  Another statistic was therefore 
calculated for the present comparisons, the ratio of public self-awareness to 
private self-awareness score. This score was calculated by creating an individual 
ratio of public to private self-awareness score for each participant and then using 
this as a dependent variable. There was a significant difference in the ratio of 
private to public self-awareness between the control (M=1.08, SD=0.81) and 
projected-mirror condition (M=0.46, SD=0.26, p<0.05).  Participants in the 
projected-mirror condition were more aware of their inner thoughts and less aware 
of the audience, than participants in the control condition.  The projected-mirror 
condition did therefore appear to reduce public self-awareness, whilst increasing 
private self-awareness, which was indicated by the ratios. These results did 
therefore find some support for Joinson, and Yao and Flanagin (2006), and 
supported past research that suggests that a small mirror increases self-focus 
(Buss, 1980; Scheier & Carver, 1980; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Webb, et al. 
1989).  The projected-mirror condition did not seem to mimic the effects of a 
larger mirror as it had in past studies (cf. Webb et al., 1989; Wiekens & Stapel, 
2008). The projected-mirror condition did increase private self-awareness, whilst 
reducing public self-awareness.  H1 and H2 were therefore accepted. 
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Figure 2.1:  The differences between private and public self-awareness across condition 
 
Breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
Next, attention turned to whether this heightened private and reduced public self-
awareness translated into greater breadth and depth of self-disclosure. A 
significant effect was found for breadth of self-disclosure with the post-hoc 
analysis finding that participants in the projected-mirror condition (M=6.73, 
SD=1.28) self-reported significantly higher levels of breadth of self-disclosure 
than participants in the control condition (M=5.13, SD=1.19, p<0.005).  Similarly, 
the projected-mirror condition (M=6.33, SD=1.72) encouraged participants to 
report significantly greater levels of depth of self-disclosure than participants in 
the control condition (M=3.93, SD=1.75, p<0.001), given this H3 was therefore 
accepted. These results are illustrated in Figure 2.2, where the self-reported 
breadth and depth are both significantly higher in the projected-mirror condition, 
than in the control condition. It appeared from these results that the projected-
mirror was having the effect predicted from the literature. The projected-mirror 
condition was one which increased private whilst reducing public self-awareness, 
which in turn successfully increased breadth and depth of self-disclosure in dyadic 
communication. The results did therefore find support for Joinson’s (2001) results 
and extended Joinson’s findings to depth of self-disclosure.  Of significance, in 
the present study, was the observation that although the participants in the control 
and projected-mirror condition were both anonymous, even within this constant 
the level of private and public self-awareness did still affect self-disclosure. It 
could therefore be confidently concluded from these results that private and public 
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self-awareness were essential factors in explaining heightened self-disclosure in 
CMC, and that anonymity alone can not explain increased self-disclosure in CMC. 
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Figure 2.2:  The differences between the self-reported scores of self-disclosure across the 
conditions 
 
Accuracy of self-disclosure 
The participants in the projected-mirror condition scored themselves at similar 
levels for accuracy (M=8.33, SD=0.62), to the participants in the control condition 
(M=7.40, SD=1.40, p=0.16). It is however possible that the participants in the 
projected-mirror condition and the control condition were both authentic in their 
self-disclosures, although a result showing an opposing score from another 
condition would be needed to verify this (see door-ajar condition, where this was 
confirmed).  In the only other study to consider the true self in CMC, Bargh et al. 
(2002) found CMC increases the access to the true self in CMC. It has also been 
reported that heightened private self-awareness increases an awareness of self-
discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1981).  It is therefore argued here, that in the 
control condition and the projected-mirror condition, the participants’ self-
disclosure was from their true self.  This finding is interesting, as although Bargh 
et al. did find that access to the true self was increased in CMC, they did not 
investigate whether this would translate into optimal self-disclosure.  Further 
support for the suggestion that the participants were presenting their true self in 
this condition, also comes from the participants reporting similar levels of self-
presentation in the projected-mirror condition (M=5.47, SD=1.85) as in the 
control condition (M=4.33, SD=2.38, p=0.27). This measure suggested that the 
participant’s were not presenting a more positive image of themselves, again 
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indicating that they were doing nothing other than self-disclosing from their true 
self.  
 
Further measures 
Various other factors gave more indication of what was occurring in the 
projected-mirror condition.  The participants reported similar scores for 
enjoyment in the projected-mirror condition (M=7.40, SD=1.40,) as they did in 
the control condition (M=7.33, SD=1.05, p=0.99).  The participants also reported 
similar levels of trust (M=4.27, SD=1.79) and embarrassment (M=2.40, SD=0.99) 
in the projected-mirror condition in comparison with the control condition 
(M=3.87, SD=1.81, p=0.46; M=1.73, SD=0.88, p=0.82.  They also reported 
similar levels of accountability (M=3.87, SD=1.77), intimacy (M=3.93, SD=1.83) 
and isolation (M=2.27, SD=1.39) in the projected-mirror condition as they did in 
the control condition (M=3.87, SD=1.22, p=0.99; M=3.87, SD=2.13, p=0.96; 
M=1.93, SD=1.16, p=1.00).  However, the participants in the projected-mirror 
condition also reported that they learnt more from the exchange (M=5.93, 
SD=2.05) than participants in the control condition (M=3.93, SD=2.19 p<0.05).  
The participants enjoyed self-disclosing more broadly and deeply from their true 
self in the projected-mirror condition, and also learnt more than participants in the 
control condition, by doing so.   
 
It is argued in the present thesis, that CMC increases personal goals of self-
disclosure.  Moreover, it is argued that heightened private self-awareness 
encourages this to occur.   Some indication of the goal of self-disclosure in the 
interaction, could be inferred in this condition from the participants in the 
projected-mirror condition reporting their partner to be less sociable (M=6.20, 
SD=1.52) than the participants in the control condition reported their partners to 
be (M=7.60, SD=1.05, p<0.01).  It is argued that this score, in conjunction with 
the heightened private and reduce public self-awareness scores, suggested that the 
participants in the projected-mirror condition may have been more internally 
focused than the participants in the control condition, despite the dyadic 
communication.  The result of greater learning, whilst being less sociable, further 
supports the notion that the participants may use the projected-mirror condition to 
explore themselves.  The results did therefore find some support for Miller and 
Read’s (1987) suggestion that private self-awareness increases personally 
motivated goals.    Returning to the goals of functional analysis (Shaffer & 
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Tomarelli, 1989), it is argued here that the goals in the projected-mirror condition 
may have been less about impression management, and more about gaining self-
clarification.   This also supports Bargh et al.’s, (2002) suggestion that CMC may 
provide a situation akin to the ‘stranger on the train’ phenomenon, although 
significantly the present experiment identified that it is not just the lack of 
identifiability, but also the heightened private and reduced public self-awareness 
that may be attributable to this.  Moreover, the results of the experiment could 
have implications for which representation of Sedikides and Brewer’s (2001) self 
the participant was gathering self-knowledge about.  It was possible that the more 
private self-awareness was increased, and the more public self-awareness was 
reduced, the more likely the participant was to explore, and gain information 
about, the individual self.  In contrast, increasing levels of public self-awareness 
and reducing levels of private self-awareness may have encouraged the relational 
self to be explored by the participants.  Whilst this would need further 
investigation, it could be an important ingredient of what is occurring on-line.   
 
In the projected-mirror condition, the participant was high in private self-
awareness, whilst being low in public self-awareness, yet they were still engaged 
in a social interaction.  This situation is quite unique, but the rewards are high. 
The situation was, for example, low in interpersonal risk, yet high in subjective 
utility.  The projected-mirror condition was therefore an ideal, yet unusual, 
situation to explore the self. In terms of the DDM (Omarzu, 2000), in the control 
condition the goal may have been personal or social, the target was clear and 
willing, and the participant could use self-disclosure to explore social and 
personal goals.  In contrast, the addition of the projected-mirror brought the focus 
more to the self, the situation would become less social and the participant could 
go deeper and broader into self-disclosure.  It is argued here, that as the situation 
was less social they may have achieved more personal goals, and may have been 
less interested in social goals. Moreover, as public self-awareness was also 
reduced, and there was a feeling no-one is looking, the subjective risks were low.  
Although Joinson (2001) could not explain what it was about the CMC 
environment that seemed to heighten private self-awareness, here it seemed that 
the less social the situation the more internally focused the participant appeared to 
become. What may have been heightening private self-awareness may have been 
the opportunity for the participants to be almost alone with their thoughts, yet still 
in an interaction.  
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Door-ajar condition  
 
Private and pubic self-awareness 
The participants in the dyadic door-ajar condition did not report significantly 
lower levels of private self-awareness (M=5.47, SD=0.99) than participants in the 
control condition (M=5.27, SD=2.49, p=0.96).  Nor did they report any 
differences in levels of public self-awareness in the door-ajar condition (M=4.27, 
SD=2.05) than in the control condition (M=4.13, SD=2.26, p=0.98).  Leaving the 
door ajar did not seem to make any difference to their reported levels of private 
and public self-awareness.  Unlike in the projected-mirror condition, the ratio of 
private and public self-awareness was also no different in the control condition 
(M=1.08, SD=0.81) as compared with the door-ajar condition (M=0.80, SD=0.26, 
p=0.35).  The similar levels at which the participants’ in the door-ajar and control 
condition reported their levels of self-awareness are illustrated in Figure 2.1.  The 
lack of difference also led to H4 and H5 being rejected.  These results could 
suggest that participants did not notice the door being ajar, and if they did, it did 
not increase the public threat, nor draw them away from themselves.  Although 
this manipulation was an attempt at a more subtle manipulation than those used by 
Joinson (2001) and Yao and Flanagin (2006), it did not appear to produce the 
desired effect.  There was a possibility, however, that, as was found in Goh 
(2004),  the distraction of the door was overridden by the desire to socialise and to 
attend to the task.  The manipulation in this study may also have been so subtle 
that it was missed entirely by the participants.  Alternatively, the public and 
private self-awareness items on the scale may not have been sufficient to capture 
any differences.  This was particularly possible as the measures required the 
participants to self-report in a task that, in it-self, raised private self-awareness. 
The participants may therefore have been experiencing different levels of self-
awareness to the participants in the control condition, but this would not have 
been captured in this independent measures design. 
 
Breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
More evidence that the door-ajar manipulation was too subtle, as a manipulation 
of self-awareness to inhibit self-disclosure, came from the breadth and depth 
measures of self-disclosure. Due to the lack of significant findings in the self-
awareness scores, it was no surprise that for this dyadic door-ajar condition, there 
was no difference between the participants’ reported breadth in the door-ajar 
condition (M=5.33, SD=1.05) as compared with the control condition (M=5.13, 
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SD=1.19 p=0.88).  The participants also reported similar levels of depth in the 
control condition (M=3.93, SD=1.75), as compared to the door-ajar condition 
(M=4.60, SD=1.18, p=0.48). Therefore in their dyadic interaction the participants 
self-reported self-disclosing to similar levels of breadth and depth to those in the 
control.  The door-ajar condition did not seem to produce the desired effect of 
reducing self-disclosure and H6 was therefore rejected (Figure 2.2). 
 
Accuracy of self-disclosure 
The importance of taking a detailed approach to examining self-disclosure was 
however successfully highlighted by the measures for accuracy.  If only breadth 
and depth of self-disclosure had been measured, it would have been concluded 
that leaving the door ajar (door-ajar condition), did not affect the self-disclosure of 
the participants, and it would have been concluded that the measure was too 
subtle.  However, there was a very interesting significant difference regarding 
whether the self-disclosure came from the true self, which was illustrated in the 
measure of accuracy (Figure 2.2).  In the accuracy of self-disclosure scores, the 
participants in the door-ajar condition (M=5.93, SD=1.80) reported their self-
disclosures to be significantly less accurate, than the participants in the control 
condition (M=7.40 SD=1.40, p<0.05). This showed that the participants were 
noticing, consciously or even subconsciously, that the door was open, and this 
significantly reduced their accuracy of self-disclosure score. The self that was 
presented in the control condition was argued to be a true representation of the 
self, as defined by Bargh et al. (2002), but in the door-ajar condition the self-
report of accuracy of self-disclosure fell. The self-disclosures that were elicited in 
the door-ajar condition were therefore less accurate than in the control condition.  
The self that was presented in the door-ajar condition may therefore have matched 
Higgin’s (1987) descriptions of an ideal, or ought to self. It could, however, be 
confirmed that the participant was not presenting a more positive image of 
themselves in the door-ajar condition, because the participants in the door-ajar 
condition (M=4.40, SD=1.64) did not differ from the participants in the control 
condition (M=4.33, SD=2.38, p=0.99) in their scores for self-presentation.  It was 
possible that the self that was presented could therefore be more akin to Higgins’s 
ought to self, where the participant noticed the door being ajar and the 
experimenter being around, and therefore self-disclosed less from the true self, 
and more how they feel they should. 
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Further measures 
The participants in the door-ajar condition did not score their experience any 
differently for sociability (M=7.40, SD=1.05), or learning (M=4.47, SD=2.17) 
than participants in the control condition (sociability M=7.60, SD=1.05, p=0.89) 
(learning M=3.93, SD=2.19, p=0.77). The participants also reported similar levels 
of enjoyment in the door-ajar condition (M=6.67, SD=1.29) to the participants in 
the control condition (M=7.33, SD=1.05, p=0.32). There were also no significant 
differences in how the participants in the door-ajar condition perceived the 
intimacy of the interaction (M=3.27, SD=2.12) or their isolation (M=2.13, 
SD=1.96), when compared to the control condition (M=3.87, SD=2.13, p=0.91; 
M=1.93 SD=1.16, p=0.99).  The door-ajar condition also did not produce any 
notable differences in the amount the participants trusted their partner (M=5.07, 
SD=2.05), felt accountable for what they said (M=4.40, SD=2.03), or how 
embarrassed they felt (M=2.33, SD=0.97), as compared to the control condition 
(M=3.87, SD=1.81, p=0.99; M=3.93 SD=1.22, p=1.00; M=1.73, SD=0.88, 
p=0.75). The only significant results in the door-ajar condition, was therefore the 
accuracy score. 
 
In terms of DDM (Omarzu, 2000), the goal of the interaction in the control 
condition could have been both personally or socially motivated.  The goal could 
have involved: intimacy; impression formation; or the clarification of the self-
concept (Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989).   In the door-ajar condition, as the self-
disclosure was less accurate it was less likely that the participant was seeking 
more personal goals such as validation of the true self (Swann, 1990; Baumeister, 
1999), or using the situation like the ‘stranger on the train’ phenomenon, to relieve 
stress or worry (cf. Rubin, 1975, Borkovec et al., 1995; Bargh et al., 2002). They 
were also not presenting an ideal self, as this was not represented in the self-
presentation scores, and they were therefore not idealising themselves to their 
partner, which is therefore not consistent with hyperpersonality (Walther, 1996).  
In terms of subjective utility, they had a willing target available for the possibility 
of pursuing the same personal or social goals as the participants in the other 
conditions. However their less accurate self-disclosures suggested that the 
personal goals of self-disclosure could not be achieved.   
 
It is argued here, that the participant, when weighing up subjective risk and 
subjective utility in the door-ajar condition, must have considered it too risky to 
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explore their true self. They therefore enjoyed the interaction as much as the other 
participants, but did not reveal this more intimate part of the self, and as a 
consequence had different aims in their self-disclosure.  In the introduction to this 
thesis, it was argued that it was more personally motivated and authentic self-
disclosure that was linked to the many of the health benefits of self-disclosure (cf. 
Pennebaker, 1995; 1989). In the door-ajar condition, the self-disclosure was less 
accurate than in the other conditions and therefore the participants had less access 
to these benefits.  This condition clearly illustrated that it was not just what was 
happening in the CMC interaction that was important, but also what was 
happening around the participant at the time.  It was therefore the CMC 
experience, and not just the process of using CMC that led to the heightened 
private and reduced public self-awareness that was commonly reported in CMC.  
CMC could be reported to increase the access to the true self (Bargh et al., 2002), 
and to encourage deep self-disclosure. However, what may be particularly 
important about these situations, is how alone the participant felt at the time. It 
should be noted that in most of the CMC research that takes place, participants 
interact individually in private computer cubicles (Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004; Yao 
& Flannigan, 2006).  Although, being able to be physically alone and private 
when interacting is an important benefit of CMC, CMC takes place in cafes, in 
computer hubs, and the situation is not always private.  It is argued here, 
therefore, that it is not just CMC that is important to consider when understanding 
self-disclosure in CMC, but the context and environment at the time.  
 
Result of correlations 
 
The overall results across the three conditions revealed some interesting 
associations between self-awareness and self-disclosure.  An analysis using 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient revealed a strong correlation between both 
breadth of self-disclosure, and private self-awareness r(45)=0.47, p<0.01, and 
depth of self-disclosure and private self-awareness r(45)=0.48, p<0.001.  This 
statistic clearly showed the importance of being aware of one’s private self, and to 
be able to self-disclose to a great breadth or depth.  It confirmed the importance of 
private self-awareness in self-disclosure, but it could also be used to argue that 
heightened private self-awareness is an important factor in raised self-disclosure 
in CMC.   Joinson (2001) and Matheson and Zanna (1988) highlighted the 
importance of understanding self-awareness in CMC to explain behaviour, and 
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this study provided strong confirmation of this. The finding can, however, be 
extended to outside of the CMC literature. It is likely, for instance, that in any 
communication the degree to which the participant is high or low in private and 
public self-awareness is will inevitably affect the resulting self-disclosure.   
 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient also revealed a significant negative 
correlation between accuracy and public self-awareness r(45)=-0.29, p<0.05.  The 
more the participant was publically aware, the less accurate their self-disclosure 
was.  It was likely that, as the participant’s attentional focus became more 
publically focused, that they also became more aware of social desirability 
pressures (cf. Cooley, 1964; Bargh et al., 2002), or they may have changed their 
behaviour to suit their audience (Froming et al., 1982). It is argued that under 
these circumstances that the true self is less likely to emerge, and the self-
disclosure will therefore be less accurate. To optimise self-disclosure from the 
true self it would appear that public self-awareness should be low.  Although 
private self-awareness may raise the participants’ awareness of their self-
discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1981), public self-awareness must also be low 
for self-disclosure, for the true self, to be revealed.  This result was important as it 
illustrates that it was the combination of heightened private and public self-
awareness that allowed for optimal self-disclosure to occur in CMC.  H6 and H7 
were partially accepted, noting that private self-awareness was correlated with 
depth, and public self-awareness negatively associated with accuracy. 
General Discussion 
 
It could be inferred from the proliferation of self-help groups, and the intimacy of 
interactions that are apparent online (Morsund, 1997; Salem et al., 1998; Mckenna 
& Bargh, 2000; Moon, 2000; McKenna et al., 2002), that CMC provides an ideal 
environment for optimal and intimate self-disclosure.  On examination of the 
health benefits associated with self-disclosure (cf. Pennebaker, 1989; 1995), it was 
also noted in the introduction to this thesis, that the benefits are only possible if 
the self-disclosure is optimal and intimate.  It is therefore of great interest that 
CMC appears to provide an encouraging environment for optimal and intimate 
self-disclosure.  Despite this, few experiments exist which examine intimate self-
disclosure in CMC (cf. Goh, 2004; Kiesler et al., 1984), and none exist which 
consider optimal self-disclosure in CMC.  Furthermore, although lack of 
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identifiability has been linked to an increase in depth of self-disclosure in CMC 
(Goh, 2004), no study had previously considered the role of attentional focus in 
depth of self-disclosure.  Lack of identifiability was also reported in a past study 
to increase access to the true self in CMC (Mckenna & Bargh &, 2001).  
However, no study had examined whether this greater access to the true self had 
any subsequent affects upon deep and optimal self-disclosure. Experiment 1 did 
therefore aim to examine the role of attentional focus in optimal and deep self-
disclosure in CMC. 
 
The reported experiment was successful in its aims and, its detailed approach to 
studying self-disclosure, raised many important points. First, the projected-mirror 
condition, which had been used in the past (cf. Yao & Flanagin, 2006; Joinson, 
2001) was seen to increase private whilst reducing public self-awareness. These 
results confirmed the findings of Yao and Flanagin (2001) and Joinson (2001), 
who also found the projected-mirror condition to be a successful manipulation for 
increasing private and reducing public self-awareness. The projected-mirror 
manipulation was also seen to have a similar effect to the more traditional mirror 
manipulation in raising private self-awareness (Scheier & Carver, 1980; Govern & 
Marsch, 1997). Despite the projected-mirror image being captured by a camera, 
which in the past had been seen to increase public self-awareness (Snyder & 
Monson, 1975; Webb et al., 1989; Wiekens & Stapel, 2008), the camera used to 
capture the participant’s image did not appear to increase the participants’ public 
self-awareness score above that in the control condition. 
 
Heightened private self-awareness had previously been reported to increase 
breadth of self-disclosure in CMC (Joinson, 2001), and this was replicated here, 
where the projected-mirror manipulation increased perceived breadth of self-
disclosure, but also increased perceived depth of self-disclosure in the experiment.  
Cozby (1973) had reported there to be no correlation between independent and 
self-reported measures of self-disclosure. However, the results of the self-reported 
breadth and depth, and Joinson’s (2001) independent measure of breadth, did 
seem to converge here.  Increased private self-awareness had also been reported to 
activate personal goals (Miller & Read, 1987), and there was some evidence of 
this here, where the results for self-awareness in conjunction with the participants 
reporting their partner to be less sociable, could be interpreted as the participants 
pursuing more personal motivations of self-disclosure.  It seemed that in the 
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projected-mirror condition, the heightened private self-awareness led the 
participants to be highly aware of their thoughts and feelings (cf. Scheier, Buss & 
Buss, 1978) and led to them becoming absorbed in the task (Kiesler et al., 1984).  
Notably, these are all states of awareness that would be useful when trying to 
pursue personal motivations of self-disclosure.   
 
Significantly, the increased private self-awareness (in conjunction with reduced 
public self-awareness) the projected-mirror manipulation encouraged had 
implications for the presentation of the true self. Heightened private self-
awareness is thought to raise a participants’ awareness of their discrepancies (cf. 
Carver & Scheier, 1981) and therefore their awareness of the true self, and the 
participants in Experiment 1 did appear to present their true self. Bargh et al., 
(2002) had previously reported that it was the lack of identifiability that led to 
increased access to the true self in CMC. However, this experiment clearly 
highlighted that increased private self-awareness could also be used to explain this 
increased access to the true self. However, what was also illustrated from the 
negative correlation between accuracy and public self-awareness was that even if 
the participants have access to the true self, it will not be presented in self-
disclosure unless public self-awareness is low. This finding was consistent with 
past reports of reduced public self-awareness in CMC leading to a lack of 
awareness of the characteristics of the partner in CMC (Weisband & Rening, 
1985) which, in turn, lessened social pressure, and reducing the likelihood of the 
participant changing their behaviour to be consistent with reference groups (cf. 
Froming et al., 1982; Carver & Scheier, 1987).  In the experiment it appeared that 
the reduced public self-awareness reduced the risk involved in self-disclosing 
deep and personal information.  The participant most likely checked their internal 
standards against external reference points (cf. Powers, 1973a; 1973b; Carver & 
Scheier, 1981), weighed up the subjective utility and subjective risk (cf. Omarzu, 
2000), which resulted in the participants self-disclosing deeply and accurately. 
 
The second manipulation of self-awareness to be employed in Experiment 1 was 
the door-ajar manipulation, which was used to try and inhibit self-disclosure in the 
experiment.  It was suggested in the introduction, that quite a unique factor within 
CMC is that the participant is often physically alone (cf. Short et al., 1976; 
Joinson, 2001; Manstead et al., 2011).  CMC can therefore lead to a feeling that 
no one is looking (Weisband & Reining, 1985) and a heightened sense of privacy 
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(Joinson et al., 2008).  CMC has therefore been described as a medium in which 
interpersonal risk is low (Walther, 1996).  The door-ajar manipulation was 
devised to try and disturb this privacy.  It had been previously reported that 
reducing the distance between the experimenter and the participant would reduce 
self-disclosure (Jourard, 1971), and it was predicted that leaving the door ajar 
would increase the psychological distance between the experimenter and 
participant (cf. Manstead et al., 2011).  The door-ajar condition produced 
unexpected results that also highlighted a few important points to consider in this 
type of research. The results did, for example, illustrate the importance of using 
several definitions and measurements of self-disclosure (cf. Cozby, 1973; Goh, 
2004).  If accuracy of self-disclosure had not been measured the door-ajar 
manipulation would have been rejected as a manipulation that could affect self-
disclosure. However, this very subtle manipulation of leaving the door ajar had a 
very dramatic effect. Although the participants’ breadth and depth did not drop 
significantly, the manipulation had a significant negative effect upon their 
accuracy.  In the door-ajar condition the participant had the potential to pursue 
both personal and social goals of self-disclosure.  In this condition however, when 
the participant came to weigh up subjective risk and utility (cf. Omarzu, 2000), or 
when they checked their internal standards against external references point, they 
came to the decision that the conditions were not appropriate to self-disclose as 
accurately as in the control or projected-mirror condition.  The self-disclosure 
behaviour that was elicited was therefore adjusted to suit the situation, and the 
self-disclosure was less accurate.   
 
By the self-disclosure being less accurate, the number of goals that the participant 
could pursue was limited. Returning to the many health benefits of self-disclosure 
(cf. Pennebaker, 1989), in terms of personal goals, if the participants’ self-
disclosures was not genuine, true, stable and congruent (cf. Kernis 2003) the 
experience could not be cathartic, or be used to dissolve worry (cf. Borkovec et 
al.,1995). Also the participants could not be using the situation to explore the 
hidden true parts of the self, and the process of self-disclosure could cause 
discomfort to them, as they could potentially be accentuating their self-
discrepancies (cf. Higgins, 1987).   This manipulation did, therefore, clearly 
illustrate the importance of understanding whether a self-disclosure was accurate, 
and also indicated that what was particularly interesting about CMC, was that 
when the participants’ privacy was intact, the true self could be presented.  
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Moreover, the implications of accurate self-disclosure were not just limited to 
personal goals. In terms of social goals, the participants could not seek to have 
their identity validated by their partner, as they were projecting a less valid goal 
(cf. Swann, 1990; Baumeister, 1999).  Also by not self-disclosing accurately the 
rate at which the close relationship could form might not accelerate (cf. Bargh et 
al., 2002).  It has been reported that in CMC the true self can safely emerge more 
quickly than in FTF interactions (Bargh et al., 2002).  Returning to Altman and 
Taylor’s (1932) onion analogy, it may be that CMC allows the core to be 
displayed, without the peeling of the layers.  It therefore creates a different type of 
relationship, where the true self can be exposed before the slower process of 
peeling has even begun.  The door-ajar manipulation did however inhibit this 
process taking place.   
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to confidently suggest why leaving the door-ajar 
condition led to reduced accuracy. In the door-ajar condition of this experiment, 
many demands were made on the participants’ attentional focus, yet no changes in 
attentional focus were elicited by the measurements of public and private self-
awareness. The task itself was arguably one which activated the participants’ 
private self-aspects (cf. Wiekens & Stapel, 2008) and most likely increased 
private self-awareness. The participant also had an interaction to manage, where 
they were most likely processing what their partner said, whilst weighing up the 
decision of what to self-disclose, and this process most likely activated both 
private and public self-awareness.  The participant was also, consciously or 
subconsciously, aware that the door was open and they were in the presence of the 
experimenter, which could also be linked to increased public self-awareness.  
These possibly competing and complex demands on attentional focus were then 
attempted to be captured by two items of public, and two items of private self-
awareness, in the present experiment.  It is highly likely that the participant was 
flitting from being high or low in private or public self-awareness throughout the 
interaction, and these more subtle undulations were not caught in these quite 
limited measures.  Moreover, the self-reported scores may also have not reflected 
the actual differences in self-disclosure, and the participants in the door ajar 
condition may perceive that given the circumstances their self-disclosure was 
deep, or they were aware of their thoughts.  The participants did not have a control 
condition, to allow comparison of their inter-condition experiences.   
 
 73 
Despite these limitations, this experiment was very successful in eliciting deep 
self-disclosure in an experimental situation, and this allowed an interesting 
analysis of the role of self-awareness in self-disclosure in CMC to ensue. The 
general correlations that were calculated in this study emphasised the importance 
of private self-awareness in increasing access to the true self and inner thoughts 
and feelings.  They also highlighted that for these true thoughts to be self-
disclosed, public self-awareness also needed be low.  It is concluded that it is the 
combination of increased private and reduced public self-awareness that is useful 
for optimal and intimate self-disclosure in CMC.  Joinson (2001) reported that it 
was anonymity and heightened private self-awareness that led to increased self-
disclosure in CMC.  The present study confirmed that anonymity alone cannot 
explain heightened self-disclosure in CMC, and that it is the combination of 
heightened private and reduced public self-awareness that explains the increased 
levels of self-disclosure that have been observed in CMC. 
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CHAPTER 3: Experiment 2  
An experiment investigating the effect of 
manipulations of self-awareness on the self-
disclosure of socially isolated participants in CMC 
 
 
A main aim of the present thesis is to investigate the role of self-awareness in 
personally motivated self-disclosure.  It was very difficult in Experiment 1, even 
in the projected-mirror condition, to claim, that what was being elicited was 
personally motivated self-disclosure.  Moreover, it was likely that the participants’ 
motivations fluctuated from social to personal goals (cf. Omarzu, 2000).  It was 
suggested in the discussion of Experiment 1 that there were many demands made 
on the participants’ attentional focus during the task in Experiment 1.  The 
participants’ completed a task, that involved answering questions of varying 
intimacy about them self, which could be argued to heighten private self-
awareness. Next, there were the manipulations which were engineered to change 
attentional focus, and there was also the partner in the interaction, who also placed 
attentional demands on the participant. In past studies it had been reported that 
when demands were made on both private and public self-focus, the participants’ 
attention could become divided, which would reduce self-disclosure (Shaffer & 
Tomarelli, 1989; Joinson, 2001).  It was considered here that it was important to 
try and keep the experiment as simple as possible in terms of attentional demands.   
 
In Experiment 2 attempts were made to try and simplify some of the attentional 
demands made upon the participant during the task. The task was considered 
essential for the elicitation of deep self-disclosure, and the manipulations were 
essential for understanding self-awareness, it was proposed in Experiment 2 to try 
and reduce the demands of the partner. Moreover, by reducing the demands of the 
partner it was argued that a more convincing exploration of the personal 
motivations of self-disclosure in CMC would be possible.  In very early studies of 
CMC, Social-Presence Theory (Short et al., 1976) was used to understand Internet 
communication, and CMC was reported to be low in social presence (Siegel et al., 
1986).  This idea of presence has more recently been expanded to consider both 
psychological and physical presence (Manstead et al., 2011). For example, in a 
church a person can be surrounded by people who are physically present, but 
when they are praying they are arguably not in the psychological presence of the 
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people around them. What is particularly interesting in CMC is that in 
asynchronous interaction the recipient of the message does not have to be 
physically present, and their psychological presence may also be reduced. Whilst 
this is not an unnatural situation in CMC, in this situation the demands of a ‘real-
time’ interaction are reduced.   In reports of counselling, using CMC, this type of 
writing has been argued to give the participant, ‘a higher degree of freedom to 
define her or his own experiences, explore whatever feels most relevant and 
proceed at the rate they feel most comfortable with,’ it also allows for, ‘greater 
reflection and clarity’ in communication (Wright, 2002, p289).  In terms of trying 
to elicit deep, optimal and personally motivated self-disclosure, this type of 
asynchronous interaction could hold many benefits. 
 
In Experiment 2, it was therefore proposed to ask the participant to answer the 
questions of varying intimacy into an e-mail window. It was argued that if the 
participant was told that their partner would not read their replies to the questions 
for six months, that they were not identifiable or traceable, and that they would 
not receive a reply, that this would further reduce the social goals that could be 
achieved in the situation.  With many social goals such as the promotion of 
intimacy (cf. Laurenceau et al., 1998), managing impression formation (Shaffer & 
Tomarelli, 1989), the development of a relationship (Walther & Tidwell, 1995) 
and the validation of the true self by a partner (Swann, 1990) greatly reduced, it 
was argued that there would be more opportunity for the participant to explore 
more personally motivated goals.   The type of personally motivated goals of self-
disclosure that could be achieved could, therefore, centre more on motives of self-
disclosure, such as self-expression and identity clarification (cf. Shaffer and 
Tomarelli, 1989), or the participant could use the situation to work through their 
problems, or dissolve worry (cf. Borkovec et al., 1984). In terms of the 
representations of the self, it could also be argued that in Experiment 2 the 
distancing of the partner, would make the participant more likely to use the 
opportunity to gain self-knowledge about, what Sedikides and Brewer (2001) 
describe as, the individual, or private, self.  Brewer and Gardner (1996) further 
suggest that motives of the individual self are associated with the enhancing, or 
protecting, of the self psychologically, and arguably this is related to the type of 
personally motivate self-disclosure that may be enhanced in Experiment 2.  This is 
in contrast to the participants in Experiment 1, who were engaged in a 
relationship, and, in this instance, the participants’ relational self would be 
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activated.   Considering which representation of the self the participant is gaining 
knowledge about in CMC, is interesting. It is argued here, that the increased 
psychological and social distance that CMC allows in interactions, begins to blur 
the distinction between the individual self and the relational self.  What may, 
therefore, be particularly interesting about CMC, is that it provides a unique 
situation where self-knowledge about the individual self may be gathered and 
explored. 
 
In the DDM, it was reported that a goal must be salient for self-disclosure to 
occur, and if there are weak goals then no self-disclosure will occur (Omarzu, 
2000).  It would be perfectly acceptable in Experiment 2, for the participant to go 
through the questions and ‘give’ very little of themselves; that is to self-disclose 
little breadth and little depth type information.  This would not be unusual as there 
is already a history of low self-disclosure in CMC tasks (cf. Joinson, 2001).  In 
Experiment 1, the participants did enjoy deep levels of self-disclosure, but there 
was a deeply self-disclosing partner with whom to enjoy mutual reciprocity.   
Reciprocity is consistently reported to be the greatest predictor of self-disclosure 
(Berg & Derlega, 1987; Jourard and Jaffe, 1970; Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989), and 
may therefore have encouraged the participants’ self-disclosure in Experiment 1.  
It was argued in Experiment 2 that without a partner, the participant will be self-
motivated by mainly personal goals of self-disclosure. 
 
 In Experiment 2, the differences between the dyadic and isolated conditions 
(Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) were therefore explored. The same 
manipulations that were used in Experiment 1, to reduce and heighten private and 
public self-awareness, were also replicated in this second experiment, to allow a 
more specific understanding of the role of private and public self-awareness in the 
personal motivated self-disclosure that was exhibited.  It was predicted, based 
upon Goh’s (2004) finding that depth of self-disclosure increases with rapport 
with a partner, that that the participants in the dyadic projected-mirror condition 
would score higher for self-disclosure than the participants in the socially isolated 
projected mirror condition.  It was also predicted that in Experiment 2, where 
there was less of a distraction of a partner, that the door-ajar manipulation would 
have a greater effect upon self-disclosure.  It was therefore predicted that the 
participants in the door-ajar condition would report lower levels of private and 
higher levels of public self-awareness, which would reduce self-disclosure.  It was 
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also therefore predicted that they would report lower levels of self-disclosure than 
the participants in Experiment 1.  Although it was not highlighted in the 
hypotheses, it was also expected that the participants in the door-ajar condition 
would replicate the participants in the door-ajar condition in Experiment 1, and 
report lower levels of accuracy. It was also predicted that the trends from the 
correlations would continue to be followed.  More specifically, that private self-
awareness would be related to depth of self-disclosure, and that public self-
awareness would be negatively associated with accuracy of self-disclosure.   
 
H1:  Participants in the projected-mirror condition will score higher on the 
private self-awareness scale than participants in a control condition  
 
H2:  Participants in the projected-mirror condition will score lower on the 
public self-awareness scale than participant in a control condition  
 
H3:  Participants in the projected-mirror condition will self-disclose 
significantly more breadth and depth than participants in a control condition  
 
H4: Participants in the dyadic projected-mirror condition (Experiment 1) 
will report higher levels of self-disclosure to the participants in the socially 
isolated projected-mirror condition 
 
H5:  Participants in the door-ajar condition will score lower on the private 
self-awareness scale than participants in a control condition  
 
H6:  Participants in the door-ajar condition will score higher on the public 
self-awareness scale than participant in a control condition 
 
H7:  Participants in the door-ajar condition will self-disclose significantly less 
breadth and depth than participants in a control condition 
 
H8:  Participants in the dyadic door-ajar condition (Experiment 1) will 
report higher levels of self-disclosure to the participants in the socially 
isolated door-ajar condition 
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H9:  There will be a correlation between private self-awareness and depth of 
self-disclosure 
 
H10:  There will be a negative correlation between public self-awareness and 
accuracy 
Method 
Overview and design 
 
Participants interacted individually in a semi-structured task, which required them 
to compose an email to a distant partner, where they answered the same questions 
of varying intimacy as in Experiment 1 and using CMC (cf. Goh, 2004, Appendix 
1) using CMC.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions 
that aimed to manipulate self-awareness; control, door-ajar; and the projected-
mirror condition. The experiment therefore compared two conditions (control vs. 
projected-mirror) and (control vs. door-ajar), with self-awareness manipulated as 
an independent factor. These experimental manipulations are described in detail in 
Experiment 1. Dependent measures were obtained post-interaction through an on-
line questionnaire, which explored private and public self-awareness, self-
disclosure and a number of other interpersonal variables.  Again this questionnaire 
is explained thoroughly in Experiment 1, although the scales of trust and sociable 
were removed as the task in Experiment 2 was not dyadic.  Whilst the scales of 
trust and sociable, were removed, an additional measure of word count was added 
to the dependent measure in this second experiment.  It was anticipated that this 
measure of breadth would allow further insight into the participants’ self-
disclosure behaviour.  
 
Equipment 
 
The participant sat in front of a desktop PC equipped with VCON Escort desktop 
video-conferencing hardware, including a fixed-focus video camera, and 17” 
XVGA monitor. Each PC was connected via a LAN to a server hosting a POP 
email account. Asynchronous email communication was achieved by displaying 
on each PC a scrollable e-mail window.  In this window the participants were 
asked to compose an email to a distant partner, who would not read their email.  
In the email would be their answers to the questions of varying intimacy that they 
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chose to answer.  The participants could type as many words as they needed to in 
order to answer the questions, in the allotted time. They could also go back and 
edit their answers at any time during the task.  The email was addressed to 
‘anonymous X’ and the participant was named ‘anonymous Y,’ to try and 
emphasise their lack of identifiability.  At the end of the task they were asked to 
send the email by pressing ‘send.’  In the projected-mirror condition, the email 
communication was supplemented by a silent video-mediated image using a 
fixed-focus camera attached to a PCI card installed in the participant's computer. 
The camera was positioned directly above the monitor and captured the head and 
shoulders of the participant in 25 fps near-broadcast quality video which was 
transmitted at 1.5Mbps for display in a 6-in. square window in the bottom right 
hand corner of the participants’ screen.  
Procedure  
 
Forty five, undergraduate psychology students, aged 18-24 (M=21), from the 
University of Manchester took part in the experiment in return for course credits 
that needed to be collected for their undergraduate course, or they were paid a 
monetary reward of five pounds. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the three conditions.  In all of the conditions the participants were met and shown 
to a computer cubicle where the experiment would begin.  The participants were 
asked to read the questions of varying intimacy (Appendix 1) and were then 
instructed to follow the instructions (Appendix 5) which led them through some 
practice questions.  The instruction explained that they were going to construct an 
email to a partner, where they would answer questions from a list of topics with 
varying intimacy (Appendix 1) using CMC. It was explained that they did not 
have to answer the questions in the order they came, and that they could answer as 
few or as many as they wished.  After answering the practice question they were 
instructed to spend fifteen minutes ‘taking their time’ to answer the questions of 
varying intimacy as a guide.  They were informed that their email was completely 
anonymous and would not even be opened for 6 months.  It was emphasised that 
their answers were completely anonymous and there was no way they could be 
identified from their answers.  They were informed that their answers would be 
read by their partner who would use their answers as a guide to answering 
questions in a future experiment.  When the fifteen minutes had lapsed an alarm 
sounded and the participant was instructed to answer the post-test questionnaire. 
 80 
Results and Discussion  
 
A MANOVA was conducted over the dataset of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Self awareness (control x projected-mirror x door-ajar) and social isolation 
(dyadic x socially isolated) were compared for self-disclosure, self-awareness and 
several other interpersonal variables. An inter-experiment comparison was also 
conducted to allow comparisons to be made between the participants in the 
socially isolated experiment (Experiment 2), and participants in the dyadic 
experiment (Experiment 1)  There was a significant multivariate effect for 
condition (Lambda=0.25 F(16,70)=4.47, p<0.001; Table 3.1).  There was also a 
significant multivariate effect for experiment (social isolation as compared to 
dyadic interaction) (Lambda=0.511 F(24,146)=2.42, p<0.001).  Further analysis 
involved a series of one-way ANOVA and Post-hoc TUKEY tests that explored 
the main effects.  There were two main comparisons of interest: whether the 
manipulations in the socially isolated experiment affected the self-disclosure of 
the participants in Experiment 2; and how the self-disclosure of the participants in 
the dyadic experiment (Experiment 1) compared to the self-disclosure of the 
participants in the socially isolated experiment (Experiment 2).  
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 Control Projected-
mirror 
Door-ajar F 
value 
Sig 
3.93b 4.33b 6.33a Public self-
awareness  
 
(2.19) (2.23) (1.29) 
6.53 p<0.005. 
6.73a 5.8 5.07b Private self-
awareness (1.16) (1.97) (1.58) 
4.06 p<0.05 
7.60a 5.67b 6.07 Breadth 
 (1.35) (2.47) (2.09) 
3.82 p<0.05. 
5.13a 4.27 3.13b Depth 
 (1.96) (2.55) (1.64) 
3.47 p<0.05 
8.60a 8.40 7.53b Accuracy 
 (0.83) (0.74) (1.41) 
4.51 p<0.05 
449.33a Word count 517.80a 
(174.95) (201.54) 
295.33 b 
(108.91) 
7.03 p<0.005 
2.53a 3.53a 5.00b Self-presentation 
 (1.06) (1.55) (1.85) 
9.95 p<0.001 
7.13a 5.80b 6.07 Enjoyment 
(1.13) (1.82) (1.16) 
3.78 p<0.05 
Isolation 3.13
 
2.67
 
3.00
 
0.31 p=0.74 
 (2.16) (1.45) (1.31)   
Embarrassment 2.47
 
3.27
 
3.60
 
1.72 p=0.19 
 (1.41) (1.83) (1.88)   
Intimacy 3.20
 
3.53
 
5.07
 
2.77 p=0.07 
 (2.27) (2.03) (2.60)   
Learning 4.87
 
3.93
 
5.00
 
0.98 p=0.38 
 (2.07) (2.46) (2.67)   
Accountability 5.33
 
4.40
 
3.60
 
1.31 p=0.27 
 (2.29) (2.26) (2.61)   
Ratio of 0.62a 0.93 1.35b 
private to public 
self-awareness 
 
(0.40) (0.84) (0.41) 
5.93 p<0.01 
Table 3.1:  A Summary of the means (standard deviations) and univariate effects across the 
isolated conditions in Experiment 2, Different subscripts indicate significant differences (Tukey; 
p<0.05).  
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Socially isolated projected-mirror condition vs. control  
 
Private and pubic self-awareness 
The participants in the projected-mirror condition (M=5.80, SD=1.97) self-
reported similar levels of private self-awareness to participants in the control 
condition (M=6.73, SD=1.16, p=0.70). The participants also reported similar 
levels of public self-awareness in the projected-mirror condition (M=4.33, SD= 
2.23) in comparison with the control condition (M=3.93 SD=2.19, p=0.99).  
There was no significant difference found between the control condition (M=0.62, 
SD=0.40) and the projected-mirror condition (M=0.93, SD=0.84, p=0.32) for the 
ratio of private to public self-awareness. These fairly similar levels of private and 
public self-awareness in the control and projected-mirror conditions are illustrated 
in Figure 3.1. The projected-mirror manipulation in the socially isolated 
experiment, did not therefore seem to be successful in raising private self-
awareness as it has in the past (Yao, 2001, Joinson, 2001), or as it did in 
Experiment 1. H1 and H2 are therefore rejected. 
 
Breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
Unsurprisingly, following on from the results of the self-reported self-awareness, 
there was no significant difference in the participants’ report of depth of self-
disclosure between the control condition (M=5.13, SD=1.96) and the projected-
mirror condition (M=4.27, SD=2.55, p=0.79).  However, a significant effect was 
found for breadth of self-disclosure with the post-hoc analysis finding that 
participants in the projected-mirror condition (M=5.67, SD=2.47) reported 
significantly less breadth than participants in the control condition (M=7.60, 1.35, 
p<0.05).  The projected-mirror manipulation did not have the expected effect of 
heightening private whilst reducing public self-awareness, which in Experiment 1 
translated into increased depth, and in Joinson’s (2001) study translated into 
reduced breadth.  In this socially isolated experiment, the results challenge 
Joinson’s findings as the manipulation had a negative effect upon breadth.  This 
illustrates the importance of understanding the context in which the manipulation 
is given. In this experiment the participant self-disclosed to a distant partner and 
there was a task which attempted to elicit deep self-disclosure.  In Joinson (2001) 
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instances of spontaneous self-disclosure were counted in an ice-breaker task.   Not 
only were the tasks that the participants were engaged in completely different, but 
the way of measuring breadth was also different.   Although a mirror has been 
reported to increase salience of private self-aspects (Scheier & Carver, 1977; 
Scheier & Carver, 1980), Wiekens & Stapel (2008) illustrated that depending on 
what aspect of the self is salient at the time a mirror could raise both private and 
public self-aspects.  It is therefore important to carefully consider not just the 
manipulation but how the task and environment may be affecting the participants’ 
attentional focus.  It is argued that in this experiment the reduced cognitive 
demands increased the affects of the projected-mirror, although this was not 
captured in the private and public self-awareness measures. Moreover, if only 
breadth had been measured in this experiment, it could have been used to argue 
that in a socially isolated situation the manipulation reduced self-disclosure.  
However, the breadth measurement indicated how widely the participants 
discussed themselves.  It may therefore be that, without the need to engage in an 
interaction, the mirror was more distracting in the socially isolated experiment 
than in the dyadic experiment. H3 was rejected, as the projected-mirror 
manipulation did not increase self-disclosure when the participant was socially 
isolated  
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Figure 3.1:  Illustration of how public and private self-awareness varies across the conditions 
 
Accuracy of self-disclosure 
The participants in the control condition (M= 8.60, SD=0.83) and the projected-
mirror condition (M=8.40, SD=0.74, p=0.99) did not differ in their reported 
accuracy. Not finding a difference here, may however suggest that the participants 
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were authentic in their self-disclosures in both conditions.  The participants in the 
projected-mirror condition in Experiment 1 were reported to be presenting a true 
and accurate presentation of the self, and this was verified in the inter-experiment 
comparisons of the projected-mirror condition reported below.  
 
Further measures 
To further investigate the self-disclosure behaviour of participants in the socially 
isolated projected-mirror condition, an additional measure of word count was 
explored. As the participants in the projected-mirror condition self-disclosed 
almost as deeply as participants in the control condition on fewer topics, it could 
be suggested that overall they would use fewer words than participants in the 
control condition.  It could be, for example, that the projected-mirror image was 
distracting the participants and, as a consequence, was reducing the overall time 
that could be dedicated to deeply self-disclosing on a range of topics.  However, 
there was no significant difference between the control condition (M=517.80, 
SD=174.95) and the projected-mirror condition (M=449.33, SD=201.54, p=0.50) 
for an additional measure of word count. The participants in the isolated 
projected-mirror condition therefore used more words on each of the topics than 
participants in the control condition.   This therefore raised questions about what 
these extra words on each topic were being used for, and the self-presentation 
scores were examined to try and elucidate this.  In the absence of a confederated, 
it was possible for example that the projected-mirror manipulation was reflecting 
the parts of the self that were usually observed publically, as had been reported in 
mirror manipulations in the past (Wiekens & Stapel, 2008).  The extra words in 
this instance may have been used for additionally presenting and exploring a more 
ideal self. No differences were however found in the self-presentation scores for 
the projected-mirror (M=3.53, SD=1.55) and control condition (M=2.53, 
SD=1.06, p=0.63). The participants in the isolated projected-mirror condition 
were not presenting a more positive image of themselves than participants in the 
control condition.   
 
An examination of the other variables that were measured in the experiment could 
however provide some further evidence as to what was occurring. The self-
disclosure of the participants in the projected-mirror condition was as truthful and 
as deep as the participants in the control condition.  They did use more words in 
answering fewer questions, but they reported reduced levels of enjoyment in the 
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door-ajar condition (M=5.80, SD=1.82) compared to participants in the control 
condition, (M=7.13, SD=1.13, p<0.08).  They did not differ in their scores for 
how embarrassed they felt (M=3.27, SD=1.83), how isolated they felt (M=2.67, 
SD=1.45), how intimate they found the interaction (M=3.53, SD=2.03), or the 
amount of learning they reported (M=3.93, SD=2.46), compared to the 
participants in the control condition (M=2.47, SD=1.41, p=0.42; M=3.13, 
SD=2.16, p=0.73; M=3.20 SD=2.27, p=0.91; M=4.87, SD=2.07, p=0.50).  There 
was also no difference in the accountability scores for the projected-mirror 
condition (M=4.40, SD=2.26) compared with the control condition (M=5.33, 
SD=2.29, p=1.00).  Compared to the control condition it does therefore appear 
that the participants in the socially isolated projected-mirror condition were taking 
a detailed look at the self, and a truthful look at the self, which was not as 
enjoyable as in the control condition.  The projected-mirror manipulation may 
have encouraged the participant to look at their self from various viewpoints, 
which could explain the extra detail.   
 
Socially isolated projected-mirror vs. Dyadic isolated projected-mirror 
The participants in the dyadic projected-mirror condition (M=6.00, SD= 1.93) 
reported similar levels of private self-awareness to participants in the isolated 
projected-mirror condition (M=5.80, 1.97, p=0.86) for private self-awareness.  
The participants in the dyadic projected-mirror condition also reported similar 
levels of public self-awareness (M=2.53, SD=0.60) to the participants in the 
isolated projected-mirror condition (M=4.33, 2.23, p=0.24). A difference in the 
ratio of private to public self-awareness was found between the projected-mirror 
condition and the control condition, in Experiment 1.  This was, however, not 
replicated in this second, isolated experiment.  The ratio of public to private self-
awareness in the projected-mirror condition did not however differ in the isolated 
experiment (M=0.93 SD= 0.84) as compared to the dyadic experiment (M=0.80, 
0.44, p=0.23). The scores for self-awareness were therefore difficult to interpret.  
One trend that does stand out is that the participants in the dyadic condition, 
where it could be predicted that they would be more aware of their partner and of 
their public self-aspects, reported similar levels of public self-awareness to the 
participants in the isolated condition.  It would be reasonable to predict that 
participants engaged in a dyadic interaction, would score higher for public self-
awareness than participants who do not have a ‘real-time’ partner, and who are 
not receiving any feedback, nor are they managing an interaction.   
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A mirror is thought to make individuals more aware of their inner hidden thoughts 
and feelings (Fenigstein et al., 1975), and it has been reported to increase 
introspection (Webb et al., 1989).  However, it has also been reported that it could 
provide an ‘other orientated’ perspective, that is seeing the self through the eyes 
of the other (Wiekens & Stapel, 2008).  It is argued that this could be happening 
in this second experiment, and that this could explain the participants reporting 
similar levels of public self-awareness to the participants engaged in dyadic 
interaction.  In the dyadic interaction, the participant has to manage a dialogue as 
part of the task, but the participant in the isolated condition does not.  It may be 
the case therefore that the participant in the isolated condition has more time to 
watch their mirror image, thus making the ‘other orientated’ perspective stronger.  
Webb et al., did for example find in an earlier study, that a large mirror had the 
effect of anticipated interaction with others. With less distraction in the isolated 
projected-mirror condition, it was possible that the participant’s own image may 
have, in effect, appeared larger to the isolated participants, thus having similar 
effects to the larger mirror. It was confirmed that the participants’ public self-
awareness scores in the projected-mirror condition were due to the projected-
mirror and not just from the participants being isolated, as when the dyadic and 
isolated control condition were compared, participants in the dyadic control 
condition reported similar levels of public self-awareness (M=4.13, SD=2.26) to 
the participants in the isolated control condition (M=3.93, SD=2.19, p=0.99).  
This indicates that it was the addition of the projected-mirror manipulations which 
was increasing the public self-awareness score slightly, rather than the isolation.   
 
Although the differences between the self-awareness scores for the participants 
who were in dyadic interaction (Experiment 1) compared to the participants who 
were socially isolated (Experiment2) were not significant, there are great 
differences between these participants for their levels of self-disclosure.  The 
participants in the dyadic projected-mirror condition reported significantly higher 
levels of depth of self-disclosure (M=6.33, SD=1.72) than those participants in the 
isolated mirror condition (M=4.27, SD=2.55, p<0.05).  Also, participants in the 
isolated projected-mirror condition reported slightly lower levels of breadth of 
self-disclosure (M=5.67, SD=2.47) compared to the participants in the dyadic 
projected-mirror condition (M=6.73, SD=1.28, p=0.49), although this difference 
is not significant.  H4 is therefore rejected accepted that the participants in the 
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dyadic experiment self-disclosed at greater levels than the participants in the 
socially isolated experiment, particularly for depth. 
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of items that could indicate that the dyadic experiment brought out more 
traits that could be associated with being social in the socially isolated experiment 
 
In Experiment 1, the projected-mirror condition led to increased self-reported 
levels of private self-awareness, and decreased levels of public self-awareness, 
which led to raised levels of depth of self-disclosure.  In this second experiment, 
the projected-mirror manipulation, did not increase private self-awareness, nor did 
it reduce public self-awareness, and thus did not increase depth of self-disclosure.  
Based upon the inter-experiment results for self-awareness in the projected-mirror 
condition, these results did not come as a surprise. However, it did seem peculiar 
that the projected-mirror condition was not having the same effect in the isolated 
condition as it did in the dyadic experiment. Moreover, the dyadic and isolated 
projected-mirror conditions produced quite different results when self-disclosure 
was examined.   This could be explained again by the isolation in the second 
experiment perhaps intensifying the manipulation, and it acting more like a large 
mirror manipulation, although participants in the socially isolated projected-mirror 
condition did score themselves at similar levels of isolation (M=2.67, SD=1.45) to 
their counterparts in the dyadic experiment (M=2.27, SD=1.39, p=0.86).   The 
intensifying of the manipulation was supported by the participants in the dyadic 
projected-mirror condition reporting that they enjoyed the task (M=7.40, 
SD=1.40) more than the participants in the isolated projected-mirror condition 
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(M=5.80, SD=1.82, p<0.05).  It was possible that the participants in the isolated 
projected-mirror condition, did not enjoy seeing this image of themselves, yet they 
still self-disclosed deeply but on fewer topics and in more detail.  The projected-
mirror image, in this case, may have provided a slightly different perspective of 
the self for the participant, which slightly raised public self-awareness and 
reduced enjoyment.  Although, support for this could be evidenced in the 
measures for learning and embarrassment, the participants in the projected-mirror 
condition, who were socially isolated, scored themselves at similar levels for 
learning (M=3.93, SD=2.46) and embarrassment (M=3.27, SD=1.83) as the 
participants engaged in dyads (Experiment 1) (M=5.93, SD=2.05, p=0.14; 
M=2.40, SD=0.99, p=0.45).   
 
These differences between the dyadic and isolated projected-mirror conditions 
could perhaps also be explained by differences in goal. It was possible, for 
example, that if the goal was more social, the projected mirror could have a 
positive effect upon enjoyment and subsequently the self-disclosure.  Enjoyment 
was seen in Goh (2004) to be linked to rapport, which was also linked to increased 
self-disclosure, in situations which were deemed to be social.  If, however, the 
goal was more personal, the projected mirror could have a less positive effect 
upon self-disclosure.  This idea that the goal of self-disclosure may have been 
different in the dyadic and socially isolated experiments was further supported by 
the results for self-presentation.  The participants in the dyadic projected-mirror 
condition reported themselves to present a more positive image (M=5.47, 
SD=1.85) of themselves than the participants in the isolated projected-mirror 
condition (M=3.53, SD=1.55, p<0.05).  This finding was important for several 
reasons. First, it indicated that the participants in the dyadic projected-mirror 
condition were idealising the self, which could support the assertion that they 
were pursuing more social goals than the participants in the socially isolated 
experiment, and this also provides some support for Walther’s (1996) 
hyperpersonality theory.  Second, it was reported in Experiment 1 that the 
participants in the dyadic projected-mirror condition were exhibiting their true 
self. However, compared to the isolated projected-mirror condition, they seemed 
to be presenting an ideal self.  The differences between the isolated projected 
mirror condition and the dyadic projected mirror condition that could indicate a 
difference in goals are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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The participants in the socially isolated projected-mirror condition (M=8.40, 
SD=1.74) reported similar levels of accuracy to their counterparts in the dyadic 
projected-mirror condition (M=8.33, SD=0.62, p=0.14).  As the participants in the 
dyadic projected-mirror condition were reported to be engaging in optimal self-
disclosure in the isolated projected-mirror condition, and the control condition in 
Experiment 1, it could be inferred that the participants in the projected-mirror 
condition in Experiment 2 were also engaging in optimal self-disclosure.  Public 
self-awareness was reported at fairly similar levels in the isolated projected-mirror 
condition, when compared to the dyadic projected-mirror condition.  However, 
this did not cause the accuracy of self-disclosure to drop.  The participants in the 
dyadic and isolated projected-mirror conditions may also have been experiencing 
different types of activators of public self-awareness.  The participants in the 
dyadic projected-mirror condition may have been wondering what their partner 
was thinking of them, whilst the participants in the isolated projected-mirror 
condition may have been viewing themselves from an ‘outside’ perspective.   The 
more specific activators of public self-awareness were not operationalised in the 
scales of public self-awareness, and this is a limitation in the methodology.  
 
Briefly, before moving on to discuss the door-ajar manipulation, it is worth 
reporting a few inter-experiment differences between the control conditions in 
Experiment 1 and 2.  These results strengthen the interpretation of the projected-
mirror condition discussed above, as they allow an examination of whether the 
differences are due just to the isolation in Experiment 2 or whether they are just 
due to the difference of the projected-mirror manipulation in the socially isolated 
experiment.  One example is the score for enjoyment; participants in dyads in the 
control condition did for example enjoy the task (M=7.33, SD=1.05) as much as 
participant in the socially isolated control (M=7.13, SD=1.13, p=0.99).  The 
reduced score for the participants in the projected-mirror isolated condition was 
therefore due to the projected-mirror manipulation and not just the manipulation. 
This indicated that it was the projected mirror that the participants were not 
enjoying, which could be used to support the notion that they were viewing their 
self from a different perspective.  Similarly, the participants in the control 
condition of the socially isolated experiment reported greater levels of breadth 
(M=7.60, SD=1.35) and depth (M=5.13, SD=1.96) of self-disclosure to the 
participants in the dyadic control condition (M=5.13, SD=1.19, p<0.01; M=3.93. 
SD=1.75, p=0.48), although only breadth of self-disclosure was significant,  
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whereas in the projected-mirror condition, the participants in the socially isolated 
condition reported significantly less depth than their counterparts in Experiment 1. 
Again this indicates that this was due to the mirror rather than the social isolation. 
 
These results increase the intensity of the interpretation. The social isolation 
should have increased breadth and depth, but the projected-mirror manipulation 
actually reduced it.  It was concluded that the projected-mirror manipulation did 
therefore have a negative impact upon the self-disclosure, when compared to the 
control conditions in each Experiment.  Surprisingly, there were no differences 
found between the socially isolated control participants for private self-awareness 
(M=6.73, SD=1.16), public self-awareness (M=3.93, SD=2.19), or ratio of self-
awareness (M=0.62, SD=0.40), when compared to the participants who were in 
dyads in the control condition (M=5.27, SD=2.49, p=0.21; M=4.13. SD=2.26, 
p=1.00; M=1.08. SD=0.81, p=0.24).  However, this again may be due to the 
limitations of the public and private self-awareness measures.   
Door-ajar condition vs. control condition 
 
Private and pubic self-awareness 
Participants in the door-ajar condition scored lower for private self-awareness 
(M=5.07, SD=1.58) to the participants in the control condition (M=6.73, 
SD=1.16, p=0.06), and H5 was accepted (Figure 3.1). More indication that the 
participants were distracted from their private thoughts and their attention was 
moving to the external came from the public self-awareness scores. For the public 
self-awareness measurement, the participants in the door-ajar condition (M=6.33, 
SD=1.30) scored higher on the public self-awareness scale than participants in the 
control condition (M=3.93, SD=2.19, p<0.05). H6 was therefore accepted.  The 
ratio of private to public self-awareness also showed participants in the control 
condition (M=0.62, SD=0.40) to have a lower ratio of private to public self-
awareness, than participants in the door-ajar condition (M=1.35, SD=0.42, 
p<0.05). These results appeared much stronger than in the dyadic door-ajar 
condition and again it indicated that the participants being in an isolated condition 
was intensifying the effect of the manipulations on the participants. 
 
Although the isolated door-ajar condition did not reduce private self-awareness as 
an independent measure it did as a ratio of public self-awareness. This subtle 
manipulation of leaving the door ajar had therefore a similar effect on reducing 
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private self-awareness, as Joinson’s (2001) manipulation, where he played 
episodes of the Simpsons.  The distraction used here was however less obvious 
and less cognitively demanding than watching The Simpsons.   The ratio of private 
to public self-awareness scores did therefore illustrate that simply providing this 
distraction, or this ‘chink’ in the amour of the participant’s privacy, had a great 
effect on their attentional focus.  This supports the findings of Froming et al. 
(1982) who suggested that merely the presence of someone being around was 
enough to increase public self-awareness.  This effect was not achieved in 
Experiment 1, but again this could be due to the isolation of the participant 
intensifying the manipulation.  It may also be linked to differences in the goal of 
the interaction.  In the dyadic interaction, the goal was more social, and the self 
was idealised (more than in the isolated conditions). As the true self was not being 
exhibited to the extent it was being presented in the isolated conditions, the risk to 
its vulnerability was greatly lessened.  The door being ajar did not matter as much, 
as if the experimenter was to accidentally come across the participant’s self-
disclosure it would be their ideal self that was being presented.  If, however, the 
experimenter was to accidentally come across the participant’s self-disclosure in 
the isolated condition, the risk was high, as their true self was being presented.  
Again this supported the continuing argument that for the true self to be revealed 
safely in the task, the more alone the participant must feel.  Support for these 
discussions was therefore sought from the other variables. 
 
Breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
As was expected from the results for self-awareness, the participants in the door-
ajar condition who were also socially isolated, self-reported significantly less 
depth (M=3.13, SD=1.64) than participants in the control condition (M=5.13, 
SD=1.96, p<0.05). There was, however, no significant difference in the breadth of 
self-disclosure between the control condition (M=7.60, SD=1.35) and the door-
ajar condition (M=6.07, SD=2.09, p=1.13), although there was a significant 
difference for word count, in the door-ajar (M=295.33, SD=108.91) compared to 
the control condition (M=517.80, SD=174.95). H7 was therefore accepted for 
depth.  The results for depth were therefore in line with the expectations from the 
ratio of private and public self-awareness results.  It was expected that these levels 
of private and public self-awareness would result in reduced self-disclosure.  The 
door-ajar condition provided a situation where the participants’ public self-
awareness was raised and their private self-awareness was reduced.  In this 
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situation they were less able to become absorbed in their private thoughts, due to 
the distraction of the door being open, as a consequence they self-disclosed less 
depth-type information.  This would be predicted by the DDM (Omarzu, 2000), 
where it could be said that the subjective risk increased, and therefore the depth 
dimension reduced. 
 
Accuracy of self-disclosure 
It was reported in Experiment 1 that increasing public self-awareness reduced 
accuracy.  This was replicated  in Experiment 2 where, a significant difference 
was also evident for accuracy of self-disclosure, with the post-hoc analysis finding 
that participants’ whose door was ajar (M=7.53, SD=1.41) reported their self-
disclosure to be less accurate than participants in the control condition, (M=8.60, 
SD=0.83, p<0.05).  The possibility of self-disclosing for social reasons was 
reduced in this isolated door-ajar condition. Therefore, it is argued that this 
increased the likelihood of the participant pursuing personal goals, such as relief 
of distress, or identity clarification (cf. Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989), and for these 
goals to be achieved the conditions needed to be safe enough for the true self to 
emerge.  It is suggested here that the subjective risk was too high therefore the 
participants did not self-disclose accurately, which does also infer that they were 
not presenting their true self.  Moreover, the subjective utility was low as they 
could not achieve the personal goals and as a consequence depth of self-disclosure 
also decreased significantly.  
 
These results again emphasised the importance of using diverse measures of 
breadth, and depth of self-disclosure.  In the only other study which manipulated 
self-awareness and measured the effects upon self-disclosure, only breadth of self-
disclosure was measured (Joinson, 2001).  It is interesting to note that by only 
measuring breadth and not depth and accuracy, the conclusion that leaving the 
door ajar did not affect self-disclosure in CMC, would have been drawn.  Clearly 
this is not the case and the interest in this condition comes in the intensity of the 
difference between the door-ajar condition and the control condition for depth.   
Leaving the door ajar greatly affected the participants desire to divulge any 
intimate information about themselves.  As was discussed in the introduction to 
this thesis, it is the instances of deep self-disclosure in CMC that are particularly 
interesting. Despite this few studies have investigated depth of self-disclosure.  
Moreover, many studies have tended to focus upon anonymity (Kiesler et al., 
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1984).  Clearly, however, anonymity alone can not explain the results, and it is 
attentional focus that has emerged as the important factor.  Significantly, 
anonymity is not just important to consider in terms of lack of identifiability, or 
whether the interaction is anonymous.  It is also the participants’ perception of 
their anonymity at the time that is important. For instance, if public self-awareness 
is reduced and the participants become unaware of others around them (Froming 
et al., 1984), they can become immersed in the task (Kiesler et al., 1984), and this 
could encourage feelings of anonymity.  In the door-ajar condition these feelings 
of anonymity were disturbed, even though the task was still anonymous.  It was, 
therefore, the CMC experience and not just what was happening on the screen that 
was important to consider, but what was happening around the participant at the 
time.  This is particularly significant when returning to the literature as CMC 
experiments will inevitably involve a private computer cubicle (cf. Goh, 2001; 
Joinson, 2001), however CMC commonly takes place in cafes, public places and 
computer hubs. 
 
Further measures 
The importance of considering what was happening around the participant in 
CMC, was also evidenced by the self-presentation scores, where the participants’ 
whose door is ajar, showed greater self-presentation concerns (M=5.00, SD=1.85) 
than participants in the control condition (M=2.53, SD=1.06, p<0.005). Leaving 
the door ajar encouraged the participant in Experiment 1 to present what was 
suggested to be their ought to self (cf. Higgins, 1987), and in Experiment 2 they 
also exhibited what could be considered to be their ideal self (cf. Higgins, 1987).  
Presenting an ideal self in a dyadic situation was easily explained. However, 
presenting an ideal self in the socially isolated condition is more difficult to 
explain.  The participants in the isolated door-ajar condition did not have an 
immediate partner to impress by their ideal self.  This socially isolated door-ajar 
condition was however one where the reward of pursuing social motivations of 
self-disclosure were arguably reduced.  There were rewards to be gained in 
pursuing personal motivations of self-disclosure, but in this instance the risks 
were seen to be too high.  The participant therefore appeared to be not taking the 
time and effort to explore their true self, but presenting an ideal and less accurate 
self, which may have been activated by the increased threat to their privacy by the 
door being ajar.  The participant may have been presenting this ideal and less 
accurate self for their distance anonymous partner, but it is argued here that if this 
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was going to have this effect then it would be evident in the socially isolated 
control condition. In addition, it was clearly the door-ajar condition that was 
having this effect.  Despite these quite dramatic differences in the scores for self-
awareness, self-disclosure and for accuracy and self-presentation, there were no 
other significant differences found for any other variables. The participants in the 
door-ajar conditions reported similar levels of enjoyment (M=6.07, SD=1.16, 
learning (M=5.00, SD=2.67) and isolation (M=3.00, SD=1.31) to the participants 
in the control condition (M=7.13, SD=1.13, p=0.99; M=4.87, SD=2.07, p=0.99; 
M=3.13, SD=2.16, p=0.81).  The participants in the door-ajar condition also 
reported similar levels of embarrassment (M=3.60, SD=1.88), intimacy (M=5.07, 
SD=2.60) and accountability (M=3.60, SD=5.33) to the participants in the control 
condition (M=2.47, SD=1.41, p=0.18; M=3.20, SD=2.27, p=0.64; M=5.33, 
SD=2.29, p=1.00). 
 
Socially isolated door-ajar vs. dyadic door-ajar 
The differences for self-awareness, self-disclosure, accuracy and self-presentation 
between the control and door-ajar condition in the socially isolated experiment 
(Experiment 2) did seem to suggest that the effects of the manipulation were 
intensified when the participants were socially isolated.  An inter-experiment 
comparison was conducted to try and gain more insight into why this might be the 
case.   Surprisingly, the only significant difference between the scores for the 
participants in the socially isolated door-ajar and the dyadic door-ajar conditions 
was for accuracy.  In the door-ajar condition if the participants were in the socially 
isolated condition, they reported themselves lower for accuracy (M=7.53, 
SD=1.41) than their counterparts in the dyadic experiment (M=5.93, SD=1.80, 
p<0.01).  This was perhaps explained by the participants in the dyadic door-ajar 
condition still being able to chat to their partner whilst presenting a less accurate 
picture of themselves. This result was interpreted using the DDM (Omarzu, 2000). 
It was noted that even though there was a risk, the subjective utility was higher 
than in the dyadic door-ajar condition, as the participants could still pursue more 
social goals.  However, in the socially isolated door-ajar condition, where there 
was less possibilities for achieving social goals, as the subjective risk was high, 
but the subjective utility was more limited.   It is argued here that personal goals 
of self-disclosure are more linked to the true self, and this increased the subjective 
risk.  In FTF communication, and often in everyday communication there are 
pressures and risks (Bargh et al., 2002), therefore, the opportunities to explore this 
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true self are fairly rare.  It is argued here, that the reduced public and increased 
private self-awareness in CMC gives the participant the opportunity for the true 
self to explored with little interpersonal risk.   
 
This increased feeling of risk in the socially isolated door-ajar condition was not 
captured in any of the measures of self-awareness.  The participants who were 
socially isolated did not report any differences in private self-awareness (M=5.07, 
SD=1.58), or ratio (M=1.35, SD=0.41) when compared to the participants in the 
dyadic experiment (M=5.74, SD=0.99, p=0.99; M=0.80, SD=0.44, p=0.09).  The 
participants did however report greater levels of public self-awareness in the 
isolated experiment (M=6.33, SD=1.29) than the participants in the dyadic 
experiment (M=4.27, SD=2.05, p=0.06).  This result may not be significant, but 
considering the dyads actually had a partner to increase public self-awareness 
levels, in the socially isolated experiment the heightened public self-awareness is 
evidence that they were distracted by the manipulation.   The participants in the 
socially isolated experiment also reported similar levels of breadth (M=6.07, 
SD=2.09) and depth (M=3.13, SD=1.64) to the participants in the dyadic 
experiment (M=5.33, SD=1.05, p=0.83; M=4.60, SD=1.18, p=0.26), for the door-
ajar condition. H8 was therefore accepted. 
 
The participants also reported similar scores for self-presentation, where it could 
be concluded that the participants in the door-ajar condition in both the socially 
isolated (M=5.00, SD=1.85) and the dyadic experiments (M=4.40, SD=1.64, 
p=0.94) were presenting a more positive image of themselves.  The participants in 
the socially isolated experiment also reported similar levels of enjoyment 
(M=6.07, SD=1.16), isolation (M=3.00, SD=1.31), embarrassment (M=3.60, 
SD=1.88), intimacy (M=5.07, SD=2.60), and learning (M=5.00, SD=2.67), to the 
participants in the dyadic experiment for enjoyment (M=6.67, SD=1.29, p=0.82), 
isolation (M=2.13, SD=1.96, p=0.74) embarrassment (M=2.33, SD=0.97, p=0.19), 
intimacy (M=3.27, SD=2.12, p=0.07) and learning (M=4.47, SD=2.17, p=0.98).  
It is therefore argued that the socially isolated door-ajar manipulation was more 
intense than its dyadic counterpart, due to the reduced possibility for pursuing 
social goals, and that in the isolated conditions there was more time to attend to 
the manipulation.  This was also found in the projected-mirror manipulation.  
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The difference in the results between the participants who were isolated and those 
involved in dyadic interaction, can be explained by the different experimental 
situations, activating different motivational goals of self-disclosure.  In the dyadic 
interaction the motivations were arguably more social, and social pressures were 
evident by the participants’ reduced accuracy and higher self-presentation scores.   
Even though they were anonymous the participants were still managing a social 
situation, and were more likely to present a self that was idealised than 
participants in the isolated conditions. This was evidenced in their higher scores 
for self-presentation that indicated they were more likely to present their ideal self 
than participants who were socially isolated.  It is argued here that the participants 
in the socially isolated condition did not have an immediate partner to impress, 
and were as a consequence more likely to be engaging in personally motivate 
optimal self-disclosure, than participants in the dyadic interaction, which also 
added more risk to the situation. 
Overall correlations 
 
The overall results of all six conditions revealed some interesting associations 
between self-awareness and self-disclosure.  These results are useful as they step 
away from considering the differences between the conditions, and seek to 
understand how varying self-disclosure and self-awareness across all of the 
conditions. An analysis using Pearson’s correlation coefficient revealed again a 
strong correlation between both breadth of self-disclosure and private self-
awareness, r(90)=0.45, p<0.001, and depth of self-disclosure and private self-
awareness, r(90)=0.42, p<0.001, and H9 was accepted This again confirmed the 
importance of being able to access innermost thoughts and feelings to be able to 
self-disclose.   
 
Again the Pearson correlation analysis also revealed a significant negative 
correlation between accuracy and public self-awareness r(90)=-.20, p<0.05, H9 
was therefore accepted.  Moreover, when the results of Experiment 1 and 2 were 
combined it was also found that accuracy was also correlated with private self-
awareness, r(90)=0.28, p<0.001.  The participant feeling alone increased private 
self-awareness, and this in turn increased the accuracy of their self-disclosure.  
This supports Carver & Scheier (1981) who linked increased private self-
awareness to an awareness of self-discrepancies, and extends Bargh et al. (2002) 
link of the lack of identifiability to an awareness of the true self, to consider self-
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awareness.  It was also found that depth was negatively correlated with public 
self-awareness, r(90)=-0.21, p<0.05.  This suggested that to gain optimal self-
disclosure, the participant needed to be away from distraction, and with as little 
threat from other people as possible. This again accounted for the deep self-
disclosure that has been reported on-line.  It is suggested here that one possible 
reason for the high self-disclosure found on-line is that it was an environment 
outside of their FTF interactions where the participants felt that they can ‘safely’ 
exhibit their true self. This supported Bargh et al.’s (2002) suggestion that the true 
self is more accessible in CMC.  These findings also extend their work to suggest, 
that it is not just that the true self that is more accessible in CMC, but that the true 
self is more likely to presented within self-disclosure. 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
The greatest challenge for researchers interested in increased self-disclosure in 
CMC lies in understanding what type of self-disclosure is occurring on-line, 
measuring it, and identifying what properties of CMC are leading to this 
behaviour.  It is argued in this thesis that what is particularly notable about the 
self-disclosure in CMC, is that, in some instances, it is surprisingly intimate and 
optimal, and that the experience of self-awareness in CMC increases the pursuit of 
personal motivations of self-disclosure.  Moreover, it is argued that the 
anonymity, and increased private and decreased public self-awareness in some 
CMC interactions, can lead to the participant feeling almost alone (Manstead et 
al., 2011), which may lead to the participant exploring their individual, or private 
self.  Using a method similar to Goh (2004) it is argued that in the experiments 
presented in Part 1, that deep and intimate self-disclosure was elicited. This was 
particularly important as previous studies of self-awareness and self-disclosure 
only succeeded in eliciting low levels of breadth of self-disclosure (Joinson, 
2001), and although depth of self-disclosure had been measured in a limited 
number of previous experiments (cf. Kiesler et al., 1984; Goh, 2004), it was not 
examined in terms of self-awareness.  It is, therefore, argued that the type of self-
disclosure that was elicited in the Experiments 1 and 2, was similar to the more 
notable self-disclosure occurring on the Internet. 
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The next challenge in the experiments was to try and understand the role of self-
awareness in the increased levels of self-disclosure in CMC.  Most studies 
examining self-disclosure in CMC tended to focus upon the anonymity of CMC 
(Kiesler et al., 1984; Spears & Lea, 1994; Mckenna & Bargh, 2000; Goh, 2004).  
However, several studies also indicated the importance of considering self-
awareness to explain behaviour in CMC (Weisband & Reining, 1995; Matheson 
& Zanna, 1998; Joinson, 2001; Lea et al., 2001). Significantly, the experiments in 
Part 1 of this thesis were the first to examine the effects of private and public self-
awareness on intimate and deep self-disclosure in CMC.  Furthermore, the results 
of the two experiments in Part 1 of the present thesis, were successful in finding 
that anonymity alone cannot explain increased self-disclosure in CMC, and that it 
is a combination of increased private self-awareness and reduced public self-
awareness, that encourages optimal and intimate self-disclosure in CMC. 
Significantly, in the reported experiments it was an increase in private self-
awareness that was particularly related to deep self-disclosure, whilst an increase 
in public self-awareness, seemed to inhibit accuracy.   
 
This finding of a negative correlation between public self-awareness and accuracy 
was an interesting result, as it allowed another strand to be added to Bargh et al.’s 
(2002) argument that the lack of identifiability in CMC increases access to the 
true self.  In the Part 1 experiments, it was argued that increased private self-
awareness increased personal motivations of self-disclosure (cf. Miller & Read, 
1987), and increased an awareness of self-discrepancies (cf. Carver & Scheier, 
1981), which arguably gave the participant the potential to self-disclose from the 
true self.  It was, however, also illustrated that for this to be translated into self-
disclosure from the true self that public self-awareness had to be low.  It had been 
reported previously that the lack of identifiability in CMC allowed the participants 
to be free to explore their true self with little risk (Mckenna & Bargh, 2000; Bargh 
et al., 2002). In the present experiments all the participants lacked idenfiability, 
but within that constant, reducing public self-was associated with accurate self-
disclosure, which could be interpreted as self-disclosure from the true self.  This 
clearly indicated the importance of attentional focus in increased self-disclosure in 
CMC. What is particularly interesting about the anonymous CMC interaction, is 
that it both raised private self-awareness (Matheson & Zanna, 1988; Joinson, 
2001), which increased access to the private self (Bargh et al., 2002), and also 
reduced public self-awareness (Matheson & Zanna, 1988) that allowed for self-
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disclosure from the true self to occur.  In this situation, it is argued that the 
concerns of the relational self were reduced and the individual, or private self, was 
explored, using optimal and intimate self-disclosure. For this optimal and intimate 
self-disclosure to occur, it is argued here that both experiences of self-awareness 
are important.   
 
In the experiments in Part 1, it also emerged that care needed to be taken when 
using the projected-mirror manipulation to raise private self-awareness. In the 
dyadic interactions used by Yao & Flanagin (2006) and Joinson (2001), it was 
successful in increasing private self-awareness, whilst also reducing public self-
awareness.  It was also a successful manipulation which was used to increase 
private self-awareness, whilst reducing public self-awareness in Experiment 1, 
where it also led to increased levels of depth of self-disclosure.  However, in 
Experiment 2, where the participant were not managing a ‘real-time’ dyadic 
interaction, and was in a situation more akin to asynchronous email 
communication, the manipulation was reported to become too intense.  It was 
suggested in the results of Experiment 2, that as the participants were not engaged 
in a ‘real-time’ interaction, that they had less attentional and cognitive demands to 
manage.  It was further suggested that, in this instance, the projected-mirror 
manipulation may have become more like the large mirror manipulation, that had 
been previously reported to produce effects similar to future anticipation with 
others (Webb et al., 1989; Snyder & Monson, 1975), and also increase public self-
aspects (Wiekens & Stapel, 2008).  The projected-mirror manipulation was 
therefore reported to be a problematic manipulation, whose effects were difficult 
to predict. Shaffer and Tomarelli (1989) and Joinson reported that when attention 
is split, self-disclosure is reduced.  There may have been many different, and 
possibility conflicting attentional demands, in the projected-mirror condition in 
Experiment 2, which may have led the participants to self-disclose less than their 
counterparts who were in the dyadic interaction in Experiment 1.  It was also 
suggested in, the results section of Experiment 2, that the measurements of self-
awareness were not adequate for capturing the attentional demands in the 
condition.  
 
Although the projected-mirror manipulation was not a straightforward 
manipulation, it was an interesting manipulation.  In Experiment 1, the reduced 
public and increased private self-awareness scores coupled with the participants 
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scoring their partner lower for sociability, led to the conclusion that the projected 
mirror was increasing personal motivations of self-disclosure.  In Part 1 of this 
thesis, personally motivated self-disclosure was defined as self-disclosure where 
the recipient is less important.  An example of this is the stranger on the train 
phenomenon where the motivation of self-disclosure may be to ‘get something off 
one’s chest,’ and the recipient may be just a sounding board (Rubin, 1975; Bargh 
et al., 2002).  It had previously been argued that this situation was occurring on-
line (Bargh et al., 2002), and in Experiment 1 it was thought that the participants 
motivations may have been moving towards this type of personally motivated 
self-disclosure.  However, when this condition was compared to the projected-
mirror condition in the socially isolated condition it was clear that the participants 
were presenting a more positive image of themselves in the dyadic interactions.  
This was consistent with previous work that had suggested that CMC encourages 
the hyperpersonality, or the idealisation of the self and others (Walther, 1996). 
Returning to Altman and Taylor’s (1973) onion analogy, it would seem that 
although in Experiment 1 it was concluded that the participants in the projected-
mirror condition were presenting their true self, the results of Experiment 2 
revealed that the participants in Experiment 1 had  another layer of  Altman and 
Taylor’s ‘onion’ to be revealed. This illustrates the difficulty of ever knowing 
whether the true self is being presented in research. 
 
Whilst these results did suggest that the participants in the dyadic interaction were 
not presenting their true self, they also indicated that the participants in the 
socially isolated projected-mirror condition (compared to the dyadic condition) 
were presenting their true self.  It was suggested, in the results section of 
Experiment 2, that in the socially isolated projected-mirror condition, the number 
of social goals that could be achieved were reduced by the elimination of the 
‘real-time’ dyad.  Moreover, it was argued that if the participant engaged in deep 
self-disclosure, that it would most likely be personally motivated self-disclosure.  
The participants did not have a ‘real-time’ partner to receive feedback from (cf. 
Swann, 1990; Baumesiter, 1999), or to make an impression on, or become 
intimate with (cf. Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989). Without social goals of self-
disclosure to pursue, it was argued that the participant could use the situation to 
‘get things off their chest,’ and to dissolve worry (Borkovec et al., 1984).  
Returning to Shaffer and Tomarelli’s (1989) summary of the functions of self-
disclosure, they could also have used it for self-expression, or identity 
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clarification. It has been argued that this asynchronous type of communication is 
ideal for pursuing these types of goals, as it gives the participant the freedom to 
explore themselves at a comfortable rate, and provides them clarity and reflection 
in communication (cf. Wright, 2002).  It was argued in the introduction to Part 1 
of this thesis, that what is particularly interesting about these types of more 
personally motivated self-disclosures is that they are associated with the 
presentation of the true self, or accurate self-disclosure. It is therefore argued that 
what lay at the crux of the self-disclosure decision in the socially isolated 
conditions, was whether the true self could be presented, or not. 
 
In the socially isolated conditions of the present experiment, it is argued here that 
with fewer social goals salient that the participant had to make the decision of 
whether it was ‘safe’ to explore the true self in this way (cf. Bargh et al., 2002). . 
In the DDM (Omarzu, 2000), the depth is the dimension which is reported to be 
most at risk, and it is also argued here that accuracy is also greatly at risk. This, in 
turn, suggests that the interpersonal ‘stakes’ were high in this condition.  More 
specifically, when weighing up subjective utility and subjective risk (cf. Omarzu, 
2000), the risks were high, and the rewards were arguably limited to goals linked 
to accurate and deep self-disclosure.  Moreover, with the social, physical and 
psychological presence of the partner (cf. Manstead et al., 2011) reduced, it is 
further argued that the participant was almost ‘alone’ with the manipulation, and 
with the true self.  In this instance, it is argued that the participant was more 
tentative about the self-disclosure that they revealed.  It is even possible that the 
social isolation coupled with viewing a ‘real-time’ image of the self, increased the 
participants’ private self-aspects too much, or there could have been several 
activators of public and private self-awareness at play. Unfortunately, this was not 
backed up by the self-awareness scores, but this could again have been due to 
competing attentional demands that were not picked up by the measures. The 
socially isolated projected-mirror condition did, however, lead the participants to 
report significantly lower levels of self-disclosure than their counterparts in the 
dyadic condition. More research is, however, required to understand the projected-
mirror manipulation further, but it is concluded that its effects will most likely be 
dependent upon what other attentional demands are present at the time. 
 
It was also observed in Experiment 2 that the door-ajar manipulation was also 
intensified in the socially isolated condition, and produced the effects that had 
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initially been predicted.  In Experiment 2, the door-ajar manipulation reduced 
private and increased public self-awareness, which greatly reduced self-
disclosure.  Moreover, the self-disclosure was reported to be less accurate and was 
reported to reveal an idealised image of the participant.  Again, it is argued that in 
Experiment 2, the self-disclosure ‘stakes’ were higher, and with less social goals 
to pursue, the participant was more at risk. With no ‘real-time’ partner to achieve 
many of the social goals, the partner may have possibly wanted to pursue personal 
goals. However, when they weighed up the subjective risk with subjective utility, 
the risks were too high, and this resulted in them adjusting their self-disclosure to 
suit the situation. The results of this experiment again highlight the differences 
between the dyadic and socially isolated situations, and also emphasise the 
importance of not generalising about the effects of the manipulations.  It was 
suggested earlier in the introduction to this study that CMC may provide a 
situation where the relational self is distanced and motives more associated with 
the individual self may be pursued.  The relational self may, therefore, be more 
associated with, what are considered within this thesis as, the social goals, and the 
individual self may be more associated with what are considered the personal 
goals of self-disclosure.  It may be that as private self-awareness increases and 
public self-awareness decreases information concerning the individual self may be 
gathered.  In contrast, as public self-awareness increases and private self 
awareness decreased information concerning the relational self may be gathered.  
Although the present experiments can be linked to these representations of the 
self, more research could be conducted to explore these links in the future. 
 
It is argued here, that the effects of the manipulations will depend upon what other 
attentional demands, or activators of public and private self-awareness, are present 
at the time.  The results did, however, also indicate that when the effects of self-
awareness were marked, that the self-awareness scales were successful in 
capturing the differences.  It is, therefore, the more subtle nuances, and specific 
different activators of public and private self-awareness that were not picked up in 
the scales.  One of the merits of the reported experiments was the detail that was 
involved in the measurements, particularly of self-disclosure. However more 
detail can always be added, and more research would be useful which identifies, 
more specifically, the different activators of public and private self-awareness, 
and tests their individual effects on self-disclosure in CMC. 
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It is apparent that the more subtle changes in attentional focus were extremely 
difficult to capture in the reported experiments. The participant most likely shifted 
from being high or low in private or public self-awareness quite rapidly (cf. 
Omarzu, 2000), and the measurements of self-awareness were extremely limited. 
Private self-awareness seemed to be defined fairly well in the experiments, by 
how attentive, or not, the participant was to their internal thoughts and feelings 
(cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier et al., 1978; Carver & Scheier, 1981), but 
public self-awareness appeared more complex.  Weikens and Stapel (2008) 
advised that it is important to specify, and be clear about, what self-aspects are 
being activated.   In the present experiments, there were many possible types of 
public self-aspects that could be activated.  The participant could be aware of the 
physical presence of the experimenter (cf. Jourard, 1971), which may have raised 
public self-awareness (cf. Froming et al., 1984). They could also have been 
bothered about how the other participant may have viewed them, which would 
also increase public self-awareness (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  In the projected-
mirror condition, they could even be aware of their public self-aspects from 
receiving an ‘other orientated’ perspective of themselves (Webb et al., 1989). 
Significantly, each of these possible activators of public self-awareness could 
have different effects upon self-disclosure, in addition to activating different 
motivations of self-disclosure (cf. Miller and Read, 1987), and encouraging 
different presentations of the self (cf. Higgins, 1987). These different types of 
activators of public self-awareness were not accommodated in the measures of 
public self-awareness, and this is one of the greatest limitations in the present 
study.  In future research it would be useful to concentrate on identifying specific 
public self-aspects to activate, and operationalise them in the measurement tools.  
This said, although the experiments in this thesis did not have particularly detailed 
measurements of self-awareness, they did capture some important changes in 
public and private self-awareness. 
 
It is clear from Experiments 1 and 2 that there are many factors to consider when 
trying to understand self-disclosure in CMC.  Strongly emerging from the results 
is the importance of self-awareness in explaining increased self-disclosure in 
CMC. It is argued that it is the participants’ levels of self-awareness that is the 
deciding factor in what to self-disclose.  Returning to the DDM (Omarzu, 20000), 
the model begins with recognising the importance of dispositional factors in self-
disclosure.  This is an important starting point as self-monitoring and self-
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consciousness have both been linked to self-disclosure in past research (Shaffer et 
al., 1982; Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989).  The DDM then indicates the target of the 
self-disclosure, and again the self-disclosure will depend on how aware the 
participant is of themselves in relation to this other (cf. Delerga & Chaikin, 1977).  
It was also illustrated in the reported experiments that the situational factors also 
greatly affect the level of self-disclosure.  It is argued here that on all levels of the 
DDM a calculation of the levels of private and public self-awareness could be 
made, and it would be the sum of these individual experiences of self-awareness 
that would better predict the self-disclosure outcome.  The DDM (Omarzu, 2000) 
is a model that began to attempt to structure some of the complex decisions that 
are made during the decision to self-disclose, which ultimately results in the 
weighing up of subjective risk and subjective utility.  Although it is not explored 
in this thesis, it is emerging that parallels can be drawn between the process of 
weighing up the subjective utility and subjective risk, and those that are described 
in self-regulation models of self-awareness (cf. Powers, 1973a; 1973b; Carver & 
Scheier, 1981).  In these models, the decision to self-disclose would be weighed 
up, consciously or subconsciously, by a process of checking internal standards 
with external reference points, and the discrepancy between these standards would 
be resolved by adjusting the self-disclosure behaviour (cf. Carver & Scheier, 
1981).  It is argued here that applying this type of model to the self-disclosure 
decision in future research could begin to accommodate for complexity of the 
decision, whilst also accounting for the more subtle nuances of attentional focus 
that are involved.  
 
Moving into Part 2 of the present thesis there were many possible avenues for 
extending the experiments in Part 1.  One finding that did however stand out as 
being particularly interesting was the ability of CMC, or more specifically of the 
increased private and reduced public self-awareness, to encourage the true self.   
This finding was very interesting in terms of the CMC literature, as it could be 
used to explain the acceleration of on-line friendships (cf. Mckenna & Bargh, 
2000), the on-line ‘stranger on the train’ phenomenon (Bargh et al., 2002), and 
also the proliferation of self-help groups (Salem et al., 1998; Moon, 2000).  It also 
highlighted the potential of CMC to investigate the more elusive parts of the self, 
such as the true self.  It is reported that there is a great desire to explore and 
present the true self in everyday life (Rogers, 1951; Bargh et al., 2002), but this is 
not often possible due to social demands and pressures in everyday life (cf. Roger, 
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1931; Bargh et al., 2002).  Moreover, when it is considered that the individual 
does desire to be the true self (cf. Rogers, 1931; Bargh et al., 2002), and may be 
aware of their self-discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1980), and this can cause 
discomfort (Higgins, 1987).  Furthermore, that the exhibition of the true self is an 
important in not feeling alone in the world (Veltman, 2005), and is also associated 
with many of self-disclosure benefits associated with health (Jourard, 1961; 
Pennerbaker, 1989), an important question emerges.  If the true self is so 
important and so beneficial, why is it not more easily exhibited in everyday life? 
 
It is argued here that the vulnerability of the true self, which is arguably evidenced 
in Experiments 1 and 2 by the participants requiring specific and ‘safe’ conditions 
for it to emerge, is an example one of the habitual ways in which aspects of the 
self are managed. Moreover, it is argued that these behaviours, or the way in 
which the private and public self, or private and public self-awareness, is managed 
are learnt within society and are driven by cultural norms.  Markhus and Kunda 
(1986) describe a dynamic self, in which a distinction is drawn between the 
working self and the cognitions that are stored in the long-term memory.  The 
working self they describe as a changeable structure that draws on the cognitions 
in the long-term memory, which then adapts to ongoing situations and events 
(Markhus & Wurf, 1986).  This theory is useful as it makes a distinction between 
the experiences of public and private self-focus that could be considered 
dispositional, such as self-consciousness and self-monitoring (Shaffer et al., 1982; 
Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989), and the more situational and temporary changes of 
self-awareness, that are viewed in Experiments 1 and 2. The distinction also 
begins to recognise that the ongoing effects of differing levels of self-awareness 
could affect the individual’s disposition, and also that the disposition of the 
individual affects the way in which public and private self-awareness is managed.   
 
It is, therefore, further argued that the habitual ways in which self-awareness is 
managed are learnt through society and are driven by cultural norms, and that as 
the participants in the Part 1 experiments were British, that they will have a 
particular way in which they manage their private and public self, and manage 
their levels of private and public self-awareness.  In the reported experiments, it is 
argued that what was observed was the British people’s habitual ways of dealing 
with the aspects of the self, and that behaviours such as hiding the true self may be 
culturally specific.  In the second part of this thesis, this will be tested by 
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replicating the experiments on a population from a different culture. There is a 
shift therefore in the second part of this thesis; rather than trying to understand 
how the self is affected in CMC, CMC will be used as a tool to try and understand 
more about the cultural self.  The second part of this thesis will begin with a 
literature review of the cultural self, which will explore cultural differences in the 
managements of the private and public self, and will also explore cultural 
differences in self-disclosure.  Experiments 1 and 2 will then be replicated on 
members of a different culture. 
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PART 2 
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CHAPTER 4: Introduction to Part 2 
Introduction 
 
By using CMC to study self-awareness and self-disclosure, it is possible to not 
only understand the impact CMC is having upon communication, but also how 
CMC may be providing new ways of gaining self-knowledge.   Furthermore, 
CMC allows for well-researched topics, such as self-disclosure, self-awareness 
and self-knowledge, to be examined within a new context.  In Part 1, of this thesis, 
it was illustrated that the CMC environment encourages intimate and optimal self-
disclosure at least in certain circumstances.  Significantly, it was identified that 
increased private self-awareness within CMC is associated with increased depth 
of self-disclosure, and that reduced public self-awareness within CMC is 
associated with increased accuracy of self-disclosure.  Whilst these findings do go 
some way towards explaining why self-disclosure may be increased in CMC, they 
also indicate the presentation of the true self, which is argued to be less easily 
presented in FTF communication due to social pressures (cf. Bargh et al., 2002).  
More specifically, it was observed in Part 1, that the lower public self-awareness 
was, the more likely the true self would be presented.  It has been reported in the 
literature that self-disclosure of the true self is essential for good health 
(Pennebaker, 1995; Jourard, 1961) and it has also been reported to be important in 
the formation of close relationships (Altman and Taylor, 1973).  It seems quite 
peculiar, therefore, that something as important as the true self need ever be 
hidden, and that a simple rise in public self-awareness, by leaving the door ajar, 
could cause the true self to retreat. To understand more about how the true self has 
become so vulnerable, and where the pressures have come from to keep the true 
self hidden, it is useful to trace back where and when the individual learnt that the 
true self should be hidden. These questions therefore, direct discussion to the 
socialisation process, and more widely to the cultural patterns that may lead to 
such pressures. 
 
The ‘self, communication and culture are interrelated; the self grows through 
communication with others in the culture; culture is manifested in the 
communicative styles common to a society, and culture is reflected in the 
individual selves formed in a particular culture,’ (Asai and Barnlund (1998, p431-
432). It is likely, therefore, that the British participants in Experiments 1 and 2 
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learnt at a young age the communicative styles that were common to their society, 
and this possibly included the need to be careful when they presented their 
private, or true self. There is a long history in psychology of research indicating 
behavioural change in the presence of others.  In one of the earliest conducted 
psychology experiments, it was illustrated that children performed a simple task 
faster in pairs then when alone (Triplett, 1898).  This theme of people acting 
differently, when in the presence of others has continued to run through many 
social-psychological theories such as Self-Discrepancy Theory (Higgins, 1987), 
Social-Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Self-Presentation Theory 
(Goffman, 1959), and impression management (Schlenker, 1980) and are also 
recognised in empirical work through the acknowledgement  of demand 
characteristics (cf. Asch, 1952).  In terms of the self, these observations of people 
acting in different ways in the presence of other people are clearly highlighted in 
the distinction between the private and the public self, where the private self is 
described as the self that is only visible to the individual, whilst the public self is 
visible to both the individual and to others (Barnlund, 1975). Culture is ‘a 
powerful regulator of many aspects of human behaviour [that] directs perception, 
memory, and inferences concerning both oneself and others’ (Cross and Madson, 
1997, p6).  It is therefore argued here that the way in which the private and public 
self are constructed, and the way in which these selves are managed, will be 
regulated and driven by culture.  
 
Given these factors, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 cannot be generalised 
outside of the British culture.  It is further argued that British culture teaches its 
members communicative styles of self-disclosure that become norms in Britain, 
and that these styles will differ to the styles of self-disclosure that will drive the 
norms in other cultures.  In Part 2 of this thesis, the experiments presented in Part 
1 will be replicated on participants from a different culture in order to gain some 
understanding of cultural differences in the way that self-awareness affects self-
disclosure in CMC. It is envisaged that the results will not only contribute to the 
literature on CMC, but will add an interesting cultural perspective to how self-
awareness affects self-disclosure in different ways.  Before these experiments are 
reported, quite a substantial literature review will be presented.  This will start 
with a brief discussion of the importance of cross-cultural work, followed by a 
discussion of attempts to classify various differences between cultures.  The 
literature review will then look more specifically at research that has been 
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conducted investigating cultural differences in self-disclosure and self-knowledge. 
Finally, the literature will be summed up in terms of the experiments that are to 
follow.  The broad aims of the second part of this thesis are therefore twofold; 
first, to assess the cultural validity of the results of Experiments 1 and 2, by 
replicating the experiment on participants from another culture, and second, to 
compare the results of the participants from both cultures to try and understand 
how culture may drive self-disclosure, self-awareness and self-knowledge, which 
ultimately affects the construction of the private and public self.   
Cross-cultural research 
 
Producing sensitive, multi-cultural theory is extremely important.  Although there 
has been an increase in international psychological research over the last 40 years 
(O’Donnell, 2006), Western research still oppressively dominates.  In, for 
example, the best-selling American psychology text book Social Psychology 
(Baron and Bryne, 1994), of the 1,700 citations listed, only 100 refer to studies 
conducted outside of America (O’Donnell, 2006).  Questions do therefore arise of 
how many of the 1,600 citations in the American psychology book are even 
relevant outside of the West.  Hsu (1985), for example, argues that Western 
psychology is simply not relevant outside of the West, and notes that many of the 
celebrated studies such as those in conformity are not replicated outside of the 
West (cf. Bond and Smith, 1996).  Reflecting this upon the results of Experiments 
1 and 2, questions remain as to whether behaviours, such as hiding the true self, 
will be universal.  It is argued here that CMC may be used in different ways, in 
different cultures, and the differing levels of self-awareness in CMC may have 
different effects upon self-disclosure in different cultures.  
 
Cross-cultural work is however extremely challenging.  An example of the 
difficulties that can arise can be clearly seen in the cross-cultural-trait approach to 
cultures, which literally ‘transports and tests,’ personality dimensions 
operationalised by Western measurement tools, to other cultures (Church , 2000, 
p18). In Western psychology, traits are often considered to be at the core of 
personality as this approach fits well within a scientific paradigm, because it 
allows personality to be understood systematically (McCrae, 2001). However, 
before even the transportation of personality dimensions begins, problems arise 
with the universality of the conception of even personality itself.  Scholars such as 
Hsu (1985), for instance, argue that even the idea of personality is an expression 
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of the Western ideal of individualism. It is suggested here, that if even personality 
itself may not be relevant outside of the West, this has great implications for 
generalisation of the results of the experiments in Part 1.  It is hoped, however, 
that by replicating the experiments on members of a different culture in 
Experiments 3 and 4, a greater insight will be gained into the role of personality 
and the true self, and how they affect self-disclosure. 
 
Despite the challenges of cross-cultural research, the rewards are great, and this is 
recognised by several scholars. Baumesiter (2005) believes, for instance that the 
search for similarities between cultures will eventually allow for an understanding 
of the universals in human behaviour.  Moreover, Hsu (1985, p46) believes that 
examining the basic elements of being human will ultimately ‘unlock the secrets 
of cultural stability and change.’ Furthermore, it is envisaged by Shen (2003) that 
contrasting cultures will ultimately lead to an upgraded form of multiculturalism 
that is one where the research facilitates the mutual enrichment of the compared 
cultures.  In the following piece of work, similarities and differences will be 
observed in the way that members of different cultures use self-disclosure to 
explore themselves. Moreover, the effects of self-awareness on self-disclosure 
will be explored, and discussed in terms of how they could lead to different 
constructions of, and ways of managing the, private and public self.  In the final 
discussion (Chapter 7) the results will then be used to achieve an upgraded form 
of multiculturalism. 
Culture and the self 
 
It is possible that behaviours such as the hiding of the true self may be 
symptomatic of a Western culture.  Moreover, different cultures, with different 
norms, structures and practices, will lead to different motivations and goals of 
self-disclosure.  Different cultures perpetuate different structures and values 
within their members, and cultural psychologists have made attempts to categorise 
these differences. In one of the most famous and defining studies in the history of 
cultural research a large-scale survey of 117,000 respondents in over 50 countries 
identified four dimensions that countries could be classified around (Table 4.1) 
and ranked 50 countries around these dimensions (Table 4.2; Hofstede, 1983). 
Although these categories are quite general, they do provide a useful starting point 
for any cultural investigation, and also allow rich discussions to ensue about 
cultural differences and similarities of particular countries.  Of these dimensions, 
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it is the difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures that has 
attracted the most research.   
 
Western cultures are considered to be underpinned by individualism, which places 
emphasis upon personal goals, rather than goals associated with in-groups 
(Hamid, 1994).  There is also an emphasis in these cultures to become 
autonomous (Cohen & Gunz, 2002), and independent and the members view 
themselves as separate from others (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991). This has led to 
members of Western cultures being described as having an independent self-
construal (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991; Table 4.3).  In these societies, the 
individuals look to pursue social goals in their relationships, and they look to gain 
information and give information about themselves (Hamid, 1994). A fair 
exchange is one where they self-disclose in such a way that poses minimal threat 
and maximum benefit to both parties, and this requires the individual to be 
sensitive to their partner, and to be successful in their presentation strategies 
(Hamid, 1994).  The individual’s behaviour is organised and given meaning 
through their own internal thoughts, feelings and actions (Markhus & Kitiyama, 
1991). Geertz (1973, p48) famously described the independent individual as, 
‘bounded, unique….a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgment, and 
action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other 
such wholes and against a social background.’ In these cultures, the individuals 
are at the centre of their psychological and social field and the self is experienced 
as distinct from the group (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991).   In terms of culture 
being a powerful regulator of many aspects of human behaviour (Cross & 
Madson, 1997), in Western cultures much of this behaviour is driven by the 
independent construal, and various different types of behaviour have been explore 
in terms of this perspective (cf. Cross & Madson, 1997; Asai & Barnlund, 1998; 
Triandis, Bontempo & Villareal, 1998; Cohen & Gunz, 2002; Wagar & Cohen, 
2003; Kito, 2005) 
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Power-Distance  
 
The amount of respect and deference  
between superior and subordinate,  
Uncertainty-Avoidance The focus on planning and creation of  
stability as a way of dealing with uncertainty 
Individualism-Collectivism Whether one’s identity is defined by personal 
choices 
Masculinity-Feminism Relative emphasis on achievement or on  
interpersonal harmony 
Table 4.1:  Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and their descriptions 
 
County Power-distance Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Individualism Masculinity 
Africa (East) 22 36 34 39 
France 15 12 10 35 
Germany(West) 43 29 15 9 
Great Britain 43 47 3 9 
Japan 33 7 22 1 
Korea (South) 27 16 44 41 
Malaysia 1 46 36 25 
Singapore 13 53 40 28 
United States 38 43 1 15 
Table 4.2:  A sample of the results of Hofstede’s (1983) study where fifty countries were ranked in 
terms of the different cultural dimensions  
 
 Person Behaviour 
Independent 
view 
(Western) 
Autonomous entity defined by 
distinctive attributes and 
processes 
Determined by internal attributes 
Interdependent 
view 
(Eastern) 
Interdependent entity who is 
part of an encompassing social 
relationship 
Consequence of being responsive 
to others. 
Origins in relationships and 
behaviour 
is the result of actions within a 
social 
relationship 
Table 4.3:  Summary of the main features of independent and interdependent self-construals 
(Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991) 
 
In contrast, collectivist cultures, and typically East-Asian cultures, place less 
emphasis upon personal goals and place more importance upon the in-group and 
interdependence of members (Hamid, 1994).  The members of these types of 
societies are therefore often descried as having an interdependent self-construal 
(Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991; Table 4.3).  In these cultures where the emphasis is 
upon interrelatedness (Cross & Madson, 1997) the individual is connected to 
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others, and group harmony, communion and cohesion are important (Ting-
Toomey, Gao, Trubisky, Yang, Kim, Lin & Nishida, 1991).  These individuals 
focus more upon the context and background detail in interactions, and are not 
driven by personal disposition.  In Chinese society progress is considered to come 
from obeying rules, and from creating harmonious conditions, and this can be 
contrasted with the Western view of progress, which seems to be made primarily 
through the individuals’ capacities (Hamid, 1994). The self member of the 
collectivist culture who has an interdependent self-construal does possess internal 
thoughts, feeling and emotions, but these do not play a powerful role in regulating 
behaviour (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991). The interdependent self-construal is 
therefore not bounded by changes with the changing social situation (Markhus & 
Kitiyama, 1991), and in this sense the private self, rather than being distinct or 
unique, becomes an extension of the collective self (Triandis et al., 1988, 1999) 
and with the self in harmony with the group the individual learns to interpret from 
the perspective of the other.  In terms of culture being a powerful regulator of 
many aspects of human behaviour (Cross & Madson, 1997), in collectivist 
cultures, typically East-Asian, behaviour is regulated by this interdependent 
perspective, and various different types of behaviour have been explored in terms 
of this perspective (cf. Cross & Madson, 1997; Triandis et al., 1998; Cohen & 
Gunz, 2002; Wagar & Cohen, 2003; Asai & Barnlund, 1998; Kito, 2005). 
Self-disclosure and culture 
 
Culture is ‘a dynamic cultural creation [where the] individuals’ self-views, 
emotions, and motivations take shape and form within a framework provided by 
cultural values, ideals, structures and practices’ (Cross and Madson, 1997, p6).   It 
does, therefore, follow that the process of self-disclosure, which is central in all 
communication and forms a link between the self and others, will be culturally 
driven.  This has been confirmed by various studies, which have shown marked 
differences in the self-disclosure behaviour of members of collectivist and 
individualistic cultures. Commonly, for instance, members of Japanese cultures, 
which are considered to be collectivist, are found to be restrained, formal and 
cautious (Barnlund, 1975; Miyanaga, 1991; Asai and Barnlund, 1998; Kito 2005). 
Research conducted on Chinese participants has also revealed that a central facet 
of their communication is centred around saving ‘face’ (Gudykunst, Gao, & 
Franklyn-Stokes, 1996) and this results in non-intimate self-disclosure (Goodwin 
& Lee, 1994). Moreover, there are various reports of members of East-Asian 
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cultures having group rules that centre round restraining emotional expression 
(Goodwin & Lee, 1994).  In contrast, for members of North American cultures, 
who live in an individualistic culture, which drive the independent self-construal, 
verbal expression is encouraged and self-disclosure is open (Miyanaga, 1991).  In 
addition members of North American cultures also partake in more risky 
interpersonal self-disclosure (Goodwin & Lee, 1994).  There have been various 
pieces of research that have confirmed these assertions, that generally converge in 
the observation that members of individualistic cultures self-disclose more than 
members of collectivist cultures (Barnlund, 1975; Asai and Barnlund, 1998; 
Barnlund, 1989; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991; Kito, 2005).    
 
Although these observations are widely supported, many questions arise as to 
what exactly is being reported in these studies.  The complexity of researching the 
definition, measurement and operationalisation of self-disclosure, was clearly 
illustrated in Part 1 of this thesis.  Questions arise therefore as to how 
comprehensively these issues are being met in the cross-cultural research on self-
disclosure.  One difficulty that arises, in understanding self-disclosure across 
culture, comes from the challenge of measuring self-disclosure.  Whilst this was a 
concern throughout Part 1, the addition of culture adds further complexity to such 
methodological issues.  Self-disclosure is, for example, commonly assessed by 
asking the participants to report retrospectively on their past self-disclosure 
behaviour, and this usually involves asking the participants which topics of 
varying intimacy they have discussed with various people (Jourard, 1971; Asai 
and Barnlund, 1998).  This does, therefore, instantly raise the issue of whether the 
scales used are relevant to the type of the self-disclosure that is ‘normal’ within 
the culture. For instance, on examining the topics involved in these types of 
questionnaires it is apparent that they often describe topics that are more typical of 
individualistic cultures (Asai & Barnlund, 1998).  An example of this is, assessing 
a person’s self-disclosure by asking the participant whether they discuss their 
personal habits with their friends (cf. Miller, Berg, & Archer, 1983).  It is, 
however, clear from the descriptions of the independent and interdependent self-
construal and their associated self-disclosure behaviour, that this would be a far 
more comfortable and relevant topic for a person with an independent self-
construal.  Members of individualistic cultures are reported to spend more time 
focusing and discussing their private self, and issues surrounding it (Asai and 
 116 
Barnlund, 1998).  This line of questioning in research methodology, may therefore 
favour the type of self-disclosure that is more typical in an individualistic culture.   
 
It is likely that certain types of self-disclosure are more relevant to, and more 
evident in, certain cultures, and these differences may not be captured by the self-
disclosure tools.  If a self-view is directed and driven by a collectivist culture, or 
by an individualistic culture, the information that is more relevant to this self-view 
will be the information which supports the individual’s desires, opinions and 
characteristics.  It has been illustrated, for instance, that individuals are more 
likely to pay attention to information that is self-relevant, and to resist feedback 
that is inconsistent with their self-view (cf. Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  It follows, 
therefore, that members of individualistic or collectivist cultures will gather self-
knowledge that they feel is more relevant to them, and inevitably this will be 
entwined with what is relevant within the culture.  The member of the collectivist 
culture, who is considered to have an interdependent view of the self, will restrain 
their unique attributes to maintain harmony within the social context (Markhus 
and Kitiyama, 1991).  In contrast, the individualistic individual, with an 
independent self-construal, will find ways in which to express the unique 
attributes of the self, and look to use self-disclosure to validate internal attributes 
(Markhus and Kitayama, 1991).  They will, therefore, be motivated by these 
ideals in their social relationships (Cross and Madson, 1997), and will thus gather 
self-knowledge and decide whether it is consistent, or inconsistent, with their 
private, or individual, self-view.  It is possible therefore that self-disclosure is 
more tactical than the research indicates, or illustrates. 
 
Although there is no research that specifically examines tactical self-disclosure, 
there is cross-cultural research that examines tactical self-enhancement, and this 
can be used to inform the present discussions. In studies of self-enhancement, 
Heine and Lehman (1999; Heine & Ruby, 2010) did for example, compare 
Americans and Japanese for positive regard, and found that the Japanese rated 
themselves to be less self-descriptive, and also rated themselves to have less 
positive traits than other Japanese people. Heine and Lehman (1999) used this 
evidence to suggest that the Japanese do not try and enhance the individual self 
and do not construct a positive self-view.  In subsequent research, however, 
Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi (2003) illustrated that self-enhancement was more 
tactical, and that the motivations for self-enhancement were different for members 
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of individualistic and collectivist cultures.  Furthermore, Sedekides et al. 
illustrated that Japanese participants with an interdependent self-construal self-
enhanced on collectivist attributes such as communion, whilst American 
participants with an independent self-construal self-enhanced on individualistic 
attributes such as agency.  This research does therefore support the notion that in a 
collectivist culture the motivations for behaviour are driven by interdependent 
ideals, and the motivations for individualists cultures are driven by goals that 
reflect independent ideals.  To understand cross-cultural differences in self-
disclosure, it would therefore be wise to understand more about the motivations 
that underlie the self-disclosure behaviour.  
 
Further support for this more tactical type of self-disclosure also comes from the 
relationships that develop within the cultures.  It would seem that members of 
individualistic cultures tend to pursue independent desires and motivations within 
their social relationships.  In contrast, individuals from collectivist cultures have 
interdependent desires and motivations within their social relationships. Cross and 
Madson (1997) reported, for example, that in relationships between members of 
individualistic cultures, partners in relationships may act as mirrors to allow them 
to compare themselves, or as sounding boards for them to display their uniqueness 
(Cross & Madson, 1997; Markhus & Cross, 1990).  Moreover, the partners are 
there to gain feedback from, and to reaffirm and validate aspects of, their unique 
self (cf. Swann, 1990).  In contrast, individuals with interdependent construals are 
closer and more connected to others, and their boundaries are described as being 
open and porous, and more flexible (Cross and Madson, 1997).  The goal in the 
relations of individuals with an interdependent construal is to maintain 
connectedness and to form harmonious relations (Cross & Madson, 1997).  These 
individuals’ motivations in relationships may even be shaped by others, and 
other’s needs may be as important, or more important, than their own (Cross & 
Madson, 1997).  These studies therefore, support the idea that culture drives and 
dictates not only the nature of the relationships they form, but also the way in 
which communication is conducted within this relationship, and how information 
about the self is gathered.  Moreover, theses different cultural desires will also 
drive the motivations behind self-disclosure. 
 
Another example of how culture can drive and motivate different behaviour is 
evidenced in research investigating cross-cultural differences in cognitive 
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dissonance. Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, Zanna, Kitayama and Lackenbauer 
(2005) do, for instance, argue that the rationalization of decisions is part of human 
nature.  Significantly, however, they also argue that culture shapes the way in 
which this rationalisation occurs. This was illustrated in an experiment by Heine 
and Lehman (1997) who investigated the link between cognitive dissonance and 
self-affirmation in Canadian and Japanese participants.  Their results showed that 
whilst Canadians did need to justify their choices (although this was reduced 
when a self affirmation task was completed), the Japanese did not experience 
cognitive dissonance in a free-choice task.  This led Heine and Lehman to suggest 
that if a person has an interdependent view of the self, the making of a non-
optimal choice for the self is not as threatening as it is for people who have an 
independent view of the self.   This study, and perspective on cultural variation in 
cognitive dissonance, has however met with several challenges. Sakai (1981) has 
for example, illustrated that Japanese participants in a public condition show more 
attitudinal change after giving a counter-attitudinal speech than Japanese 
participants in an anonymous condition.  Sakai (1981) attributed this effect to 
dissonance reduction, and argued that this is evidence of the Japanese participants 
experiencing cognitive dissonance.  Hoshino-Browne et al. (2005) have further 
illustrated that the experience of cognitive dissonance may differ depending on 
whether the participant has an independent view of the self, as compared to an 
interdependent view of the self.  More specifically they found that whilst 
European Canadians justified choices made during an experiment chosen for their 
self, the Japanese were more likely to justify the choices they had made for a 
friend.  Hoshino-Browne et al’s (2005) study clearly illustrates that Easterners and 
Westerners can both experience dissonance but that the arousal of dissonance will 
vary within different cultures.   These studies do therefore emphasise not just the 
great effect that culture has upon different drives and motivations, but they also 
emphasise the care that must be executed in experimental work to ensure that the 
tasks do not favour a particular cultural view of the self.   
 
This tendency of members of individualistic cultures to pursue individual goals, 
and for members of collectivist cultures to be driven by more communal goals, 
has led to discussions of the private self being primary in individualistic cultures, 
and the public or collective self being primary in collectivist cultures (Markhus &  
Kitiyama, 1991; Kashima & Kashima, 1998; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & 
Iuzzini, 2002).  Returning to the descriptions of the independent and 
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interdependent self-construals (Table 4.3), and the distinctions between the 
individualistic and collectivist cultures, these distinctions do seem to support the 
notion that individual-self primacy is linked to individualistic cultures (cf. 
Gaertner et al., 2002). Evidence to support the prevalence of the individual-self 
primacy in individualistic cultures is argued from studies indicating that the 
Japanese (collectivists) are less likely to use first person pronouns than 
Australians (Kashima & Kashima, 1998), and also from studies of self-
enhancement, that suggest that members of collectivist cultures do not self-
enhance the individual, or private, self (Heine & Lehman, 1999). However, 
participants from collectivist cultures have also been reported to show greater 
preference for letters and numbers occurring in their own birth and name 
(Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997), and also show very strong interest for the self in 
cross-cultural comparisons of exchange principles (Fijeman, Willemsen, & 
Poortinga, 1996), which does seem to indicate the primacy of the private self in 
collectivist cultures.  Sedikides and Gaertner (2001) do, therefore, provide a 
sensible conclusion to the conflicting results in their Boomerang Model of the 
Self, where they argue that the individual self is primary universally.  They 
describe the individual self as the ‘home base [and] as the secure and solid 
springboard for exploration,’ and they describe how the person may go off and 
explore the social world, but will always ‘boomerang’ back to the individual self, 
or the ‘homebase’ (Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001, p.19). Given this, the individual, 
or private self, is primary in both individualistic and collectivist cultures. It is 
further asserted here that the individual, or private self, is primary in both cultures, 
but their may be a tendency for the members of collectivist cultures to choose to 
focus upon the more collective ideals that could develop the public or the 
collective self, whilst members of individualistic cultures focus more upon 
independent ideals, that could develop the private or individual self.  If this is 
accurate, and the members of collectivist and individualistic cultures tend to focus 
on culturally self-relevant information, it follows that, rather than there being a 
difference in the importance of the public or private self, there may be a difference 
in the amount of self-knowledge that is gathered about the private, in comparison 
with the public self, within the two cultures.  
Culture, self-disclosure and self-knowledge 
 
Another way of trying to understand the type of self-disclosure that is being 
exhibited by members of collectivist cultures, is to recognise that self-disclosure is 
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a tool to both explore the self and the other, and gain more information about the 
self (Asai & Barnlund, 1998).  The differences between the collectivist and 
individualistic self-disclosure behaviour can, therefore, also be understood in 
terms of self-knowledge.   It has been argued, so far, that the private self is 
important to members of collectivist cultures, but that the norms of the culture 
may drive desires and motivations, which may be more associated with the public 
or collective self.  Conversely, the private self is also important to members of 
individualistic cultures, but the culture may drive desires and motivations that 
may be more associated with the private, or individual, self. It is, therefore, argued 
that members of different cultures will differ in the habits they have, and in 
particular whether the private or public self is activated in daily life. This, in turn, 
will have implications on how complex they become in the long-term memory 
(Wagar & Cohen, 2003; Triandis, 1989).  This will lead to further differences in 
the information that is stored in the long-term memory, more specifically 
members of individualistic cultures will have richer representations of personal 
cognitions, and members of collectivist cultures will have richer representations of 
collective cognitions (Waga & Cohen, 2001).  Linking this to self-disclosure, it 
could be argued that as a collectivist may be more likely to self-disclose from 
their public, or collective self, they will gather more self-knowledge about their 
public self and this, in turn, will increase the complexity of their public self  
(Triandis, 1989).  In contrast, a member of an individualistic culture may 
encourage its members to self-disclose from the private self and this could 
increase the complexity of the members of this cultures’ private self (Triandis, 
1989).  
 
Fortunately, this link between self-knowledge and self-disclosure has been 
examined empirically.  In an interesting study, Asai and Barnlund (1998) set out 
to test a hypothesis that had been earlier presented by Barnlund (1975), which was 
that the Japanese may not know themselves as well as Americans, due to the 
Americans verbally and non-verbally sharing their private self with others, whilst 
the Japanese do not. Asai and Barnlund noted that verbal expression is not the 
only way of coming to know the self, and also suggested that the self can become 
known by keeping a diary, writing, introspection or simply pondering, in the 
absence of another (Derlega & Grezelak, 1979).  Therefore, at this point Barnlund 
(1975) did not make a distinction between whether or not it was possible that the 
Americans knew more about their private self, and that the Japanese knew less. 
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Asai and Barnlund, therefore, proposed to examine the validity of these 
statements, and their study provided some insight into how the relationship 
between self-disclosure and self-knowledge differs between the two cultures. 
 
Asai and Barnlund (1998) started their study with a useful depiction which makes 
a distinction between the different parts of the self (Figure 4.1).  In Figure 4.1 the 
private self contains both the undisclosed self, which is accessible by the person 
but not by anybody else, and also a self, which is unknown even to the individual, 
described as the unconscious self.  Asai and Barnlund suggest that the boundary 
between the unconscious and the conscious self is distinguished by self-
knowledge, and that the boundary between the private and public self is 
distinguished by self-disclosure.  Asai and Barnlund went on to propose two 
hypotheses about the relation between these selves, based upon Mead’s (1934) 
Social-Origin Theory. They first suggested that people who do not engage in 
verbal interaction will have less knowledge of their private self and therefore 
know themselves less well.  The second hypothesis was based upon Duval and 
Wicklund’s (1972) theory of objective self-awareness, which suggests that it is 
possible to know the self in the absence of others, and therefore those low in 
verbal expression could know themselves well, but verbal expression to others 
could be restrained by their culture.   Asai and Barnlund tested these hypotheses 
across the two cultures by examining how the self-disclosure patterns of Japanese 
and American participants were related to their level of self-knowledge. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Asai and Barnlund’s (1998) depiction of the public, private and unconscious (UC) self 
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In their study, using a combination of self-report questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews, Asai and Barnlund (1998) found a high positive correlation 
between self-knowledge and self-disclosure, which supported the notion that an 
individual builds a self by self-disclosing and understanding the self from how 
others see them, which was true in both cultures.   The findings also indicated a 
reciprocal relationship between self-knowledge and self-disclosure where the 
deeper the knowledge of the private self, the higher the self-disclosure; and the 
higher the self-disclosure, the deeper the knowledge.  Significantly, Asai and 
Barnlund also reported evidence of different goals of self-disclosure being 
pursued in the two cultures. It seemed that whilst the Americans reported higher 
self-disclosure of personal matters, which was linked to them enhancing self-
understanding, the Japanese suppressed these tendencies to maintain peaceful 
relations, with their aims being centred round harmony.  Asai and Barnlund’s 
work does, therefore, support the suggestion that members of individualistic 
cultures tend to self-disclose more from the private self, thus increasing the 
complexity of the private self, and further increasing the likelihood they will self-
disclose from this self (cf. Triandis, 1989; Wagar & Cohen, 2003). In contrast, 
members of collectivist cultures tend to self-disclose less from their private self, 
and this leads to the private self being less complex, which in turn decreases the 
likelihood of them self-disclosing from this less complex private self (Wagar & 
Cohen, 2003). Asai and Barnlund’s work therefore supports the notion that there 
are tactics at play within self-disclosure behaviour.  Finally, Asai and Barnlund 
reported that their results, investigating whether the members of collectivist 
cultures had a more complex public or collective self than the members of the 
individualistic culture were, less conclusive. 
 
This study by Asai and Barnlund (1998) provides the first, and only, attempt to 
understand how self-disclosure and self-knowledge are related, within a cultural 
context.  The results do not just inform discussions on how cultures differ, but 
they also allow a more general insight into the relationship between self-
disclosure and self-knowledge.   Asai and Barnlund did however raise quite a 
serious criticism of their own work.  They expressed concern that the level of self-
disclosure that were measured in their study were based around how well the 
participants could verbally detail their feelings.  Asai and Barnlund acknowledged 
that this could potentially favour Western participants and may not have reflected 
the self-knowledge of the Eastern participants.  This limitation is particularly 
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problematic when it is noted that the study was based around the observation that 
member of East-Asian cultures are restrained verbally.  Despite this, the study 
does raise some interesting issues, and opens the discussion on how self-
disclosure relates to self-knowledge.  Moreover, it highlights the reciprocal 
relationship between self-disclosure and self-knowledge, and the tendency of 
members of individualistic cultures to self-disclose more from the private or 
individual self, than members of collectivist cultures, and this is particularly 
pertinent within the present thesis.   
 
The experiments presented in Part 2 of this thesis, therefore aim to delve deeper 
into this relationship between self-disclosure and self-knowledge, across culture.  
By using CMC, the experiments presented remove the issue of the verbal channel 
possibly favouring the members of the individualistic cultures, as CMC uses a 
textual channel. In the following experiments, the self-disclosure task involves 
communication using text, and this could be found to be more favourable to 
members of collectivist cultures.  Asai and Barnlund (1998) did note that 
members of collectivist cultures may have different ways of exploring the self, 
and writing, or CMC, may be more appealing to members of collectivist cultures. 
In individualistic cultures, interactions commonly involve personal self-
disclosures and the members are well practiced in this type of self-disclosure (cf. 
Hamid, 1994).  CMC, and particularly the asynchronous type of CMC that will be 
explored in Experiment 4, gives the participant the time and freedom to explore 
their personal self (Wright, 2002), and this may be useful to members of 
collectivist cultures, who are not as accustomed to this type of self-disclosing. 
There is no past research that has investigated cultural differences in self-
disclosure using this medium. It could be concluded from Asai and Barnlund’s 
work that due to the different motives, desires and values that are perpetuated in 
different cultures, members of collectivist cultures simply have less of a need to 
explore the private self, than members of individualistic cultures.  It is quite 
likely, therefore, that no matter how a self-disclosure task is mediated, that East-
Asians will always self-disclose less about personal matters, than Westerners, 
simply because they have less self-knowledge to self-disclose from, and because 
they are simply less interested in doing so. 
 
However, if the individual, or private self, is the ‘homebase’ of the self (Sedikides 
& Gaertner, 2001, p19), and an individual lives in a culture which does not 
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promote the exploration of the private self.  There is the possibility that the 
member of a collectivist culture may desire to explore the private self, but their 
culture does not present many opportunities in which to do so. In Part 1 of this 
thesis, it was seen that in the experiments, anonymity, heightened private and 
reduced public self-awareness in the experiments led to a situation (particularly in 
Experiment 2) where the participant was almost alone.  In this situation, the 
external, social and cultural demands were greatly reduced, and it was seen that 
the British participants were able to express their true self in certain conditions of 
the experiment. The situation allowed for an insight into the individual’s true 
desires of self-disclosure, rather than those that were mediated by cultural 
pressures.  In Experiments 3 and 4, this situation will be replicated on members of 
collectivist cultures.  It is, therefore, possible that what could emerge is an insight 
into the individual desires of the member of the collectivist culture, which could 
potentially differ from the desires intrinsically linked to their culture.  In this 
situation, it is possible that the participants will continue to act in accordance with 
their cultural norms, and show little interest in exploring their private self.  It is 
also possible, however, that when the participants are alone with their personal 
desires, and are communicating away from the cultural pressures of FTF 
communication, they may be observed to explore their private self using self-
disclosure.  Experiments 3 and 4, therefore, attempt to elucidate whether there are 
differences between the interdependent individual’s desires for self-knowledge of 
the private self, and the culture’s desire for the individual’s self-knowledge for the 
private self in a CMC context.   
 
The question is, therefore, poised to whether the members of collectivist cultures 
will be interested in exploring the private self, if they are given the opportunity.  If 
the private self is less relevant in collectivist cultures, there may not exist in the 
participants a desire to explore it.  Although, deep self-disclosure on aspects of the 
private self is consistently linked to good health (Jourard, 1961; Pennebaker, 
1989), questions remain to whether this could be an important process for 
members of individualistic culture. There is, however, some evidence of the 
relevance and importance of discussing personal issues and the private self for 
members of collectivist cultures, from the content of suicide notes of 
Singaporeans. Chia, Chia, and Yai (2008) studied 398 suicide notes of 
Singaporeans.  The writers were mostly young, single, and did not tend to have 
mental or physical illness. Common reasons for suicide included school and 
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relationship, financial, and marital problems.  Negative emotions of despondency, 
emptiness, guilt and shame, hopelessness, and anger were also expressed.  These 
suicide notes do, therefore, suggest that the issues of the private self are relevant 
to collectivist cultures.  Moreover, many of the personal motivations of self-
disclosure discussed in Part 1, such as dissolving worry (Borkovec et al., 1995) 
and resolving personal problems (Pennebaker, 1989) would involve self-
disclosing from the private self.    
 
The Singaporeans’ suicide notes do, therefore, raise an important question.  
Namely, do members of collectivist cultures such as Singaporeans actually self-
disclose less from the private self than the British, and if they do self-disclose less, 
whether it is cause for concern, or whether they have their own methods for 
dealing with problems? It has been reported, for example, that the Chinese have 
fewer skills for entering relationships, but they make life-long deep intimate 
relations where they self-disclose deeply (Wheeler et al., 1989; Gudykunst et al., 
1996; Kito, 2005). The needs of the individual may, therefore, be met within these 
types of close relationship.  However, Barnlund (1989) also found that regardless 
of how close the American participants were to a same-sex friend, they 
consistently discussed more than Japanese counterparts.  Given this, it would 
appear that even though members of East-Asian cultures self-disclose more to 
close friends, as compared to other friends, they do consistently self-disclose less 
than people from the West.  This leads to a further question of what consequences 
this self-disclosure behaviour may have upon the self, and well-being of members 
of East-Asian cultures?  Before moving on to describe the experiments, there are 
two more areas that are worth discussing.  It has been suggested in the present 
discussions that different cultures drive different motivations for self-disclosure.  
It is therefore useful to examine where these cultural drives originated, and how 
these drives may affect how the self is viewed between different cultures.  
Culture and consistency on the self 
 
Much of the work examining cross-cultural differences in self-disclosure focuses 
on American culture, which is suggested to drive individualism and disconnect the 
individual from society (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991).  In contrast, much of the 
work investigating collectivism focuses upon East-Asian cultures, which 
encourage group harmony and cohesion (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991).  Spencer-
Rodgers, Boucher, Peng, and Wang (2009) point out that Westerners have a desire 
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for consistency, both in their lives and their selves, and this underpins many 
important theories in social psychology, such as Cognitive-Dissonance Theory 
(Festinger, Rieckens, & Schacter, 1956).  It has, however, also been reported that 
theories such as Cognitive-Dissonance Theory have not been replicated 
successfully on East-Asians (Heine & Lehman, 1999).  Spencer-Rodgers et al. 
also claim that the reasons why these studies have not been replicated on East 
Asians, can be traced back to the philosophical traditions of the two cultures.   In 
particular, a difference in how consistency is accepted, or rejected, in the cultural 
traditions of East Asians compared with Western cultural traditions (Spencer-
Rodgers et al.., 2009)   Spencer-Rodgers et al., note that East-Asians folk theories 
are underpinned by Taoism, where inconsistency is accepted, and contradiction is 
approached with compromise.  In contrast, in Western folk theory consistency is 
sought and this, in turn, emphasises non-contradiction.   
 
These differences, in the acceptance of consistency, have been illustrated in 
various studies and in particular, in research investigating self-esteem (Choi and 
Choi, 2002; Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009).  East Asians are reported, for 
example, to have lower levels of self-esteem than Euro-Americans (Heine, 
Lehman, Markus, & Kitiyama, 1991), although Boucher et al., (2009) found 
convincing evidence that these results could be explained by differences in the 
acceptance criteria of inconsistency within the cultures. Boucher et al., argued that 
East Asians have an ability to possess and accept inconsistent self-esteem, and 
that an acknowledgement of this explains the results obtained by Heinie et al.. 
Boucher et al. then use this argument to reinforce that the important difference 
between the cultures is that East-Asians accept inconsistency, and Euro-
Americans, do not. These discussions of whether consistency is accepted, or 
rejected, within a culture can also be extended to discussions of how inconsistency 
of the self, is accepted, or rejected, in different cultures.  
 
In Western cultures, for instance, the individuals’ private self is reported to be 
relatively stable and consistent across contexts (English & Chen, 2007).  
However, in Eastern cultures the private self is suggested to be more variable. 
Several researchers have also argued that East-Asian cultures, in particular, have a 
self that is more variable than within Western cultures (Triandis, 1989; Markhus 
and Kitiyama, 1991). A consequence of this is that the Westerner desires stability 
and views inconsistency as a weakness, but the Easterner accepts inconsistency 
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and their private self adapts better to differing situations (English & Chen, 2007).  
Whilst these inconsistencies are fairly hidden, on an individual level, it is worth 
noting that in individualistic societies there are references to this inconsistency in 
everyday language.  In Western conversation it would not be unusual to hear of 
people going off ‘to find themselves’ and praised for ‘being them self’.   
Significantly, however, this is only possible if an individual seeks a stable self. To 
an East Asian who does not desire a stable self and accepts a variable self, this 
wish would most likely be less understood. 
 
These revelations could have a huge impact on the cultural validity of the results 
of Experiments 1 and 2.  One of the main findings of the experiments in Part 1 
was that the reduced public self-awareness in CMC, allowed the participant’s true 
self to emerge.  However, it is highly possible that the notion of desiring, 
pursuing, and thus possessing a true self, is born from this individualistic desire 
for consistency.  It follows, therefore, that by accepting contradiction, and not 
desiring consistency, the idea of a true self may not be desired in collectivist East-
Asian cultures.  Moreover, if the self is culturally and socially constructed, aspects 
of the self only exist if they are desired.  In the experiments in Part 1, the British 
participants are seen to reveal their true self when public self-awareness is 
reduced, and are also seen to hide their true self when public self-awareness rises.  
Hsu (1985) described the Westerner to possess a mask, or persona, which shields 
their true self, and there was arguably some evidence of this mask appearing in 
Experiment 2.  When public self-awareness rose in Experiment 2, the mask 
appeared, and the true self was no longer used to self-disclose from.  If a member 
of collectivist culture does not desire a true self, they may have less need of a 
mask (cf. Hsu, 1985).  Therefore, the participants who are members of collectivist 
cultures in Experiments 3 and 4, may not be affected by increased levels of public 
self-awareness in the same way. 
Culture and self-awareness 
 
Leary and Buttermore (2003, p 366) note that, ‘the ability to think consciously 
about the oneself, I, is perhaps the cardinal psychological characteristic that 
distinguishes human beings from other animals……[and that] the ability to think 
consciously about oneself also underlies introspection, self-evaluation and the 
development of the self-concept’  It is also true that the ability to be self-aware is 
a universal, and in the developing baby, self-awareness of the self, as different 
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from the mother, or the external world, is thought to develop at around six weeks 
(Greenspan & Greenspan, 1989).  From this point, the child begins to understand 
themselves as distinct from the outside world and the other, and begins to draw a 
boundary line between what has been described as ‘is me’ as opposed to ‘not me’ 
(cf. Markhus, 1977).    From a self-awareness perspective, the adult can at any 
given moment be aware of the private self, or can be aware of the public self, and 
can to some extent direct their attention where they choose (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972).  Whilst this is a universal ability, culture regulates behaviour (Cross & 
Madson, 2007), and affects the perspective the individual takes on the self and the 
other (Cohen & Gunz, 2001).  More specifically, interdependence moves 
awareness away from the self and on to others resulting in people with 
interdependent self-construals being better at taking on other’s perspectives, than 
people with independent self-construals (Wu & Keysar, 2007). This difference is 
perspective taking, of how much the person views a situation from the other, or 
their own perspectives, has led to rich discussions of cultural differences in self-
awareness. 
 
There are various pieces of research that suggest that members of individualistic 
cultures may be more motivated to attend to goals associated with the personal 
self, and could therefore be higher in private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 
1975). In contrast, members of collectivist cultures may be more motivated to 
attend to goals associated with the self as a social object, and will therefore be 
higher in public self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  Although these 
suggestions seem very reasonable, the empirical support for these assertions is 
fairly inconclusive. It has been found, for example, that the Japanese, Koreans and 
Americans show no differences in private self-consciousness scores, but 
Americans do score higher for public self-consciousness (Gudykunst Yang, & 
Nishida, 1987), and the Japanese score higher for private self-consciousness than 
the Koreans, with the Americans somewhere in between.  Whether these 
inconclusive results are due to limitations in the tools of measurement, or whether 
these subtle differences are too difficult to capture, is open to question, but in 
general the results of cross-cultural work on self-awareness are limited.  However, 
studying self-awareness does not have to rely on asking participants to fill out 
self-consciousness scales, and there has also been some interesting work that has 
investigated behavioural change in public and private situations. 
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One such study investigated how members of individualistic and collectivist 
cultures behaved when placed in a situation which is private and anonymous, as 
compared to one which was public (Bontempo et al., 1990).  In this study, which 
attempted to investigate behavioural intention and perceived norms of pro-social 
behaviour, it was found that the behaviour of Americans (individualistic) and 
Brazilians (collectivist) differed depending on whether they were in a situation 
that was private, as compared to a situation that was public.  In particular, it was 
found that the Americans were less likely to perform pro-social behaviours, with 
high personal, cost in a condition which was anonymous, than when the situation 
was public, whilst the Brazilians were reported to be happy to perform pro-social 
behaviour, with high personal cost, in both conditions.  Bontempo et al.’s results 
revealed the Brazilians behaviour was consistent and did not depend upon whether 
the situation was public or private.  Bontempo et al., used these results to argue 
that the Brazilians have internalised in-group norms, whereas the Americans 
illustrated compliance due to social desirability pressures in the public condition.  
Bontempo et al., further concluded that whilst the behaviour of members of 
collectivist cultures could be predicted from in-group norms, attitude also played a 
part in the behaviour of participants from individualistic cultures.   
 
This study by Bontempo et al. (1990) adds several pertinent points to the present 
arguments.  Although Bontempo et al. did describe the Brazilians as more 
consistent in their behaviour, this was due to them being less affected by social 
desirability pressures than the participants who were members of individualistic 
cultures. In Experiments 1 and 2, in this thesis, it was suggested that CMC gave 
the participants an environment where social desirability pressures were reduced 
in comparison to the FTF environment.  In CMC, it was observed that when 
public self-awareness was reduced the accuracy of the British participants’ self-
disclosure increased.  Furthermore, when the situation became more public, and 
public self-awareness was increased the British participant was less likely to 
exhibit their true self.  In Bontempo et al.’s study, the public condition 
encouraged the participant to ‘appear’ in a way they felt was compliant, whilst in 
the private condition the participants acted in a way, that they wanted to, and not 
in a way that was compliant.  Furthermore, in the public condition, they carried 
out the pro-social activity with high personal cost, and it could be argued that they 
were presenting an ought to self (cf. Higgins, 1987).  Comparisons can be drawn 
with the results of the British participants in Experiment 1 and 2, within the 
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present thesis.  In Experiments 1 and 2, the participants self-disclosed in a way 
that they felt was more desirable when public self-awareness was raised.  The 
Experiments 1 and 2, and the study by Bontempo et al., both illustrate that 
members of individualistic cultures are affected by rising levels of public self-
awareness. 
 
Bontempo et al.’s (1990) conclusions about members of collectivist cultures could 
therefore have implications for the experiments in the second part of the thesis.  
They found that participants from the collectivist culture were less affected by 
social desirability, and it is possible therefore that the members of the collectivist 
cultures in the replication of Experiments 1 and 2, may therefore be less affected 
by increased public self-awareness.  Moreover, Bontempo et al. reported that the 
behaviour of members of collectivist cultures’ was more consistent across 
cultures, and less affected by attitude and directed just by in-group norm.  Given 
this, in the experiments in Part 2, it is possible that the participants will follow in-
group norms no matter how private and public self-awareness is manipulated.  
There may, therefore, be differences in how members of different cultures react to 
the manipulations of self-awareness.  The findings of Bontempo et al. do, 
however, only really provide some insight into public self-awareness, and it is 
unclear how raising private self-awareness could affect members of collectivist 
cultures.   
 
It was noted in Part 1, that an individual must be aware of the self and aware of 
the other for self-disclosure to take place.  Moreover, it was purported that as an 
individual becomes more aware of their inner thoughts and feelings, they become 
high in private self-awareness and this increases personal motivations for self-
disclosure (Miller and Read, 1987).  Moreover, the individual who is high in 
private self-awareness will also be more aware of their self-discrepancies 
(Higgins, 1987).  In Experiments 1 and 2, it was observed that increasing private 
self-awareness led to more intimate self-disclosure, and in Experiment 1 the 
manipulations that increased private self-awareness also activated more personal 
motivations of self-disclosure.  There are many issues that arise when considering 
whether members of collectivist cultures will follow this pattern.  It is unclear, for 
example, whether members of collectivist cultures will respond to the same 
manipulations to increase private self-awareness.  Furthermore, when they are in a 
state of high private self-awareness it is unclear whether this will encourage them 
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to self-disclose more intimately.  It is possible, for instance, that if increasing 
private self-awareness activates more personal motivations of self-disclosure, the 
members of collectivist cultures may be more likely to self-disclose from their 
private self.   Moreover, it was argued in Part 1 that CMC gave the participants an 
opportunity to pursue their personal desire away from cultural pressures and it 
will therefore be of interest to see what effects the manipulations would have upon 
members of a collectivist culture. 
 
It is, therefore, possible that raising private self-awareness may increase the 
members of collectivist cultures’ awareness of their private self, which could, in 
turn, increase their self-disclosure from the private self.  However, it is also 
possible that their motivations for self-disclosure are driven by collectivist ideals, 
such as harmony and communion (cf. Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991), and they may 
then have no desire to explore the private self. An individualistic culture requires 
the members to have a strong personality which bolsters their uniqueness. When, 
however, the cultural demands are lessened the individual may exhibit their desire 
to express their more vulnerable private self.  Similarly, it may be found that the 
collectivists usually adhere to the cultural motivations of communion and 
harmony and do not explore their private self, to the extent the members of 
individualistic cultures do.  By using CMC in Experiments 1 and 2, it was 
possible to differentiate between motivations that were driven by culture, and 
motivations that were driven by the individual.  When cultural demands are 
lessened in the experiments by reducing public and increasing private self-
awareness, it is possible that the collectivist may express more individually driven 
desires.  Also, the members of collectivist cultures may be more consistent over 
differing conditions of public self-awareness, although it is not clear whether this 
consistency will hold across conditions of differing private self-awareness.  
Significantly, there is no past research that examines the role of self-awareness in 
self-disclosure, across cultures, and the experiments in Part 2 will therefore be the 
first to examine these issues.   
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Chapter 5: Study A and Experiment 3 
Are there differences between Singaporean and 
British self-reported scores for openness, past self-
disclosure, and self-monitoring? 
 
Introduction 
 
Singapore was selected as the collectivist culture that would be compared with the 
British culture in terms of their self-disclosure behaviour.  Singapore and Britain, 
whilst being very different, also have many similarities.  Both countries are for 
example islands, both multi-cultural, both economically successful, and both have 
English as their first language. Significantly, however, the British are considered 
to be an individualistic culture and the Singaporeans are considered to be a 
collectivist culture (Hofstede, 1983). The sentiment of Hsu (1985), that much of 
psychology is driven by individualistic ideals and is at most irrelevant outside of 
the West, has also been echoed by Singaporean scholars.  Ho, Chan, Peng and Ng. 
(2001, p393), for instance, also suggest that ‘methodological individualism is 
alien to Eastern intellectual traditions.’ Ho et al. further argue that the relational 
(collectivist) concept of the self, which they consider Singaporeans to be, ‘has 
long been eclipsed by the individualistic view and [that] now the relational 
concept demands to be heard’ (Ho et al., 2001). In terms of self-disclosure 
behaviour, Singaporean participants were therefore deemed a suitable culture for 
comparison with the British participants.  
 
Study A 
 
Although the main part of this chapter consists of the replication of Experiment 1 
on Singaporean participants (Experiment 3), before this is described, a pilot study 
(Study A) will first be considered, which was conducted to assess the participants’ 
perceptions of their self-disclosure behaviour.  Members of collectivist cultures 
are commonly reported to self-disclose less than members of individualistic 
cultures (Barnlund, 1975; Asai and Barnlund, 1998; Barnlund, 1989; Ting-
Toomey et al., 1991; Kito, 2005). Therefore, before the effects of the 
manipulations of self-awareness could be tested on Singaporean participants, it 
was first necessary to ascertain that the Singaporeans’ self-disclosure behaviour 
was typical of a collectivist culture.  In Study A, British and Singaporean 
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participants were given several topics and were asked how much they would self-
disclose about these topics to a friend and a stranger.  This allowed a comparison 
to be made between how much Singaporean and British participants felt they 
would self-disclose on certain topics to strangers and friends. In collectivist 
cultures self-disclosure is also reported to be restrained, whilst in individualistic 
cultures it is reported to be open and free (Barnlund, 1975; Miyanaga, 1991; Asai 
and Barnlund, 1998; Kito 2005).  The Singaporean and British participants were, 
therefore, also asked to rate how open they felt that they were to other people’s 
self-disclosure.  These measures of self-disclosure allowed for an idea of the 
likelihood of Singaporeans and British participants’ self-disclosing on certain 
topics, and also how open they felt they were to other people’s self-disclosure.  
The measure of how open they considered themselves to be was also an indication 
of how much they recognised self-disclosure as a process of mutual reciprocity 
(cf. Miller et al., 1983).  It was predicted that, in line with the collectivist ideal or 
interdependent self-construal, the Singaporeans would report themselves to be less 
likely to self-disclose on the topics than participants from Britain.  It was also 
predicted that Singaporeans would also report themselves to be less open than the 
British participants.  
 
H 1:  Singaporean participants will score lower than British participants 
when asked to score their self-disclosure of various topics to friends and 
stranger  
 
H2:  Singaporean participants will score themselves lower on a questionnaire 
measuring openness than the British participants. 
 
Method 
 
Materials 
 
The questionnaire consisted of two sections. In the first section the ten items of 
Miller et al.’s (1983) openers questionnaire were presented.  The participants were 
asked to rate how much they agree, or disagree, with the 10 statements on a scale 
from one to nine.  The statements were designed to test how open (‘people 
frequently tell me about their self,’ ‘I’ve been told I am a good listener’) the 
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participant perceived themselves to be.  The second section required the 
participant to rate how likely they were to self-disclose on 10 topics of varying 
intimacy from The Self-disclosure Index, to a stranger and to a friend (Miller et 
al., 1983).  These measures described the participant’s likelihood of self-
disclosure behaviour to a friend (‘To a friend I would disclose my personal 
habits’) and to a stranger (‘To a same-sex stranger I would disclose my deepest 
feelings’).  The cronbach’s alpha internal consistency in previous literature ranges 
from 0.86-0.93 (Kito, 2005).  In the present study the coefficient alphas for the 
scales ranged from 0.75-0.92.  
Procedure 
 
Ninety Chinese-Singaporean and White-British participants (mean age=20) were 
asked to individually complete an on-line anonymous questionnaire which 
examined their openness and past self-disclosure.  Participants were recruited by 
email and poster adverts and either gained credits for their undergraduate course 
or received a five pound payment for taking part in the study of self-disclosure.  
The participants were met and then taken individually to an isolated computer 
cubicle where the questionnaire was visible on-line. They were told that they were 
taking part in a study to examine how much university students self-disclose about 
themselves.  They were also informed that the questionnaire was anonymous and 
could not be traced back to them. The experimenter left the participant to 
complete the questionnaire in private and closed the door. The questionnaire was 
constructed using Statpac and the participants were asked to rate the items from 
the scales on a nine-point scale.  When the questionnaire was completed they 
pressed ‘send’ and the questionnaire was sent to a holding account. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
A MANOVA was conducted with culture (Singapore vs. British) compared across 
the three measures of self-disclosure (self-disclosure to a friend; self-disclosure to 
a stranger; and openness).  There was a significant multivariate effect for 
condition (lambda=0.67 F(3,86) = 14.08, p<0.001).  The differences were 
explored using ANOVA, and the results illustrated that Singaporeans consistently 
self-disclose less to both friends and strangers (Table 5.1).  Moreover, they also 
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reported themselves to be less open than the British participants.  H1 and H2 were 
therefore accepted. 
 
 Self-disclosure to a friend Self-disclosure to a stranger Openness  
British 6.88a 4.02a 7.18a 
Singaporean 5.58b 3.33b 6.24b 
F 20.83 6.93 21.03 
Table 5.1:  Differences between Singaporean and British participants mean scores on the Opener 
questionnaire and the Self-Disclosure Index. Different subscripts indicated significant differences 
(Tukey; p<.05). 
 
The results confirmed that Singaporean and Britain participants did report 
different self-disclosure behaviours and the results were consistent with the 
expected collectivist and individualistic dimensions.  The Singaporeans 
consistently scored lower than the British participants on the likelihood that they 
would self-disclose on various topics to both strangers and friends.  Various 
studies have previously reported members of individualistic cultures to self-
disclose more than members of collectivist cultures (Barnlund, 1975; Ting-
Toomey et al., 1991; Asia & Barnlund, 1998; Kito, 2005), and the here were 
consistent. These results combined with the results of the score for openness were 
also consistent with reports of members of individualistic cultures being open and 
members of collectivist cultures being restrained (Barnlund, 1975; Miyanaga, 
1991; Asai and Barnlund, 1998; Kito 2005). The Singaporeans consistently 
reported that they would be less likely to self-disclose on certain topics than the 
British participants, and the reduced scores for self-disclosure and openness are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, where they are compared with the British participants’ 
scores.  Whilst these results were as expected and did highlight the Singaporeans 
as an excellent comparison with the British participants, in terms of their self-
disclosure behaviour, it must however be noted that these results did rely on the 
participants reporting the likelihood they would self-disclose to a friend or a 
stranger on various topics. This type of self-disclosure could be argued to favour 
an individualistic style of self-disclosure, where members openly self-disclose 
from their private self (Asai and Barnlund, 1998). Most of the questions on the 
Self-Disclosure Index asked the participants to report on the likelihood they would 
self-disclose on topics that may be more typical of the topics discussed by 
members of individualistic cultures.  Furthermore, asking the participants to 
consider how likely they are to self-disclose on various topics is in effect also 
asking them to personally self-disclose.  It is possible therefore that, as was 
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demonstrated in the past studies on self-enhancement (Sedikides et al., 2003), the 
self-disclosure behaviour of the members of the collectivist cultures may be more 
tactical.  Therefore, these items on the Self-Disclosure Index may therefore not 
reflect self-disclosure that is more typical of a collectivist culture.  In a collectivist 
culture self-disclosure has been reported to be used to maintain harmony and 
bolster others (Cross and Madson, 1997), rather than being centred around the 
private self. 
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Figure 5.1:  Illustration of how past self-disclosure to a friend and stranger, and openness varies 
across Singaporean and British participants 
 
However, in defence of the present study examining self-disclosure items that 
were arguably about the private self, it should also be noted that the aim of Part 2 
of this thesis is to compare personally motivated self-disclosure in CMC, across 
the Singaporean and British culture.   The focus is not therefore upon tactical self-
disclosure, but upon how self-disclosure from the private, or individual self, 
differs across culture. The participants self-reporting how likely they were to self-
disclose on the various topics does, therefore, allow an understanding of how 
deeply the participants were willing to explore aspects of the private self, and this 
is what is of interest in Part 2 of this thesis.  A main aim of Part 2 was also to use 
CMC to examine whether the Singaporeans self-disclose less from the private 
self, than the British, because they want to, or because they are not able to do so 
within their culture.  It is argued in the present thesis that the private self is the 
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‘homebase’ of the self (cf. Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001, p.19), and that members 
of collectivist cultures may be interested in talking about private and intimate 
topics, but perhaps do not have as many possibilities to do so, within their 
collectivist cultures.  It is for this reason that the main focus of the experiments in 
Part 2 was to examine whether differing levels of private self-awareness in CMC 
will encourage self-disclosure from the private self in Singaporean participants.  
From Study A, the Singaporeans were seen to be less open, and to self-disclose 
less, than the British participants, and they are therefore a good choice of culture 
to compare with the British participants in Experiment 1 and 2.   
 
EXPERIMENT 3: What differences do manipulations 
of self-awareness make on Singaporean 
participants and British participants self-disclosing 
in dyads? 
 
Introduction 
 
In Experiment 3 the self-disclosure behaviour of Singaporean participants, 
interacting in dyads and using CMC, was investigated, and the results were 
compared to the British participants’ results in Experiment 1. No past research had 
investigated Singaporeans’ personally motivated self-disclosure in CMC, nor had 
any past research directly manipulated Singaporeans’ levels of self-awareness and 
tested the effects on self-disclosure in CMC. It was, therefore, unclear how the 
Singaporeans would respond to using CMC for self-disclosure, or to the 
manipulations of self-awareness in the experiment.  It was possible, for instance, 
that the Singaporean participants would continue to self-disclose in line with the 
desires of a collectivist cultures.  Members of collectivist cultures are reported to 
be driven by desires for harmony and communion (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991) 
and are also reported to be less interested in exploring their private self (Asai & 
Barnlund, 1998). It could be argued, therefore, that the type of self-disclosure 
elicited by the task in the present experiment, would not suit the tactics of 
members of collectivist cultures (cf. Sedikides et al., 2003).  If this was the case, 
in Experiment 3, due to the fact that the task in this experiment encouraged self-
disclosure from the private self, this would result in the Singaporean participants 
reporting lower levels of self-disclosure than the British participants.  Moreover, 
Asai and Barnlund have previously reported that members of collectivist cultures 
have less self-knowledge of the private self, and have consequently less to self-
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disclose about the private self.  If this assertion by Asai and Barnlund is accurate, 
it would be expected that again the Singaporean participants would self-disclose 
less than the British participants in the task. 
 
Whilst members of collectivist cultures are generally considered to be verbally 
restrained (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991; Asai & Barnlund, 1998; Kito, 2005), it is 
noted here, that most of these observations were based upon FTF communication.  
Asai and Barnlund reported that it was possible that members of collectivist 
cultures have other means by which they explore the self.   It is, therefore, 
possible that the Singaporeans could find the textual channel more comfortable for 
self-disclosure. In Experiments 1 and 2, increased private self-awareness was used 
to explain heightened depth of self-disclosure in CMC.  In the absences of any 
relevant past research examining the effects of self-awareness on Singaporeans’ 
self-disclosure, it is difficult to predict how the Singaporean participants would 
react to increased levels of private self-awareness in the experiment, and how this 
would subsequently affect their self-disclosure behaviour.  In British participants 
it was suggested that the increased private self-awareness led to increased 
personal motivations (cf. Miller & Read, 1987), an increase awareness of self-
discrepancies (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1980), and increased self-disclosure (cf. 
Joinson, 2001, Experiment 1 and 2),   It is, therefore, of great interest to 
investigate what the effects of raising private self-awareness for the Singaporean 
would be. It is quite possible that a state of increased private self-awareness could, 
for instance, prove to be an enlightening prospect for the Singaporean.  In 
collectivist cultures, the self is not highlighted as being unique (Markhus & 
Kitiyama, 1991; Hamid, 1994) and focus tends to be on the relational aspects of 
the self (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991; Cross & Madson, 1997).  The raising of 
private self-awareness could potentially increase the awareness of the private self 
for the Singaporean, which could, in turn, provide the Singaporean with a 
different perspective upon the self.  It is suggested here, that this could then lead 
the Singaporean participants to self-disclose more than expected. A first 
hypothesis was therefore explored, which examined the difference between the 
Singaporeans and British participants self-disclosure, in what could be considered 
a typical ‘real-time’ dyadic CMC interaction, with no additional manipulations of 
self-awareness.  Most of the literature on cross-cultural differences of self-
disclosure has suggested that members of collectivist cultures self-disclose less 
than members of individualistic cultures; the first hypothesis was therefore based 
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upon these reports. It was predicted that the Singaporean participants would self-
disclose significantly less than the British participants when asking and answering 
questions of varying intimacy using CMC (H1). 
 
Next, the projected-mirror condition, and the door-ajar condition were explored 
for the Singaporean participants, and then compared to the results of the British 
participants. In the dyadic projected-mirror condition, the projected mirror was 
seen to increase the British participants’ private self-awareness, whilst decreasing 
their public self-awareness, which supported previous work by Joinson (2001) and 
Yao & Flanagin (2006).  It also supported earlier work with mirrors that 
illustrated that the reflection of the self back on the self, increases private 
awareness (Scheier & Carver, 1980; Gibbons et al, 1979; Baldwin & Holmes, 
1987).  It was evident from the results of Experiment 1, that the image of the self, 
in this condition increased private self-awareness, which encouraged deep self-
disclosure in the Western participants.  Again however, it is unclear how the 
Singaporeans would react in the projected-mirror condition.  As was suggested 
earlier increased private self-awareness could increase access to personal thoughts 
and feelings (Carver & Scheier, 1981), activate personal motivations (Miller and 
Read, 1987) and increase awareness of self-discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 
1981).  If the effects were similar on the British participants it could also lead to 
increased personally motivated and deep self-disclosure, similar to that which was 
elicited form the British participants in Experiment 1.  However, it was also 
possible that if the Singaporeans self-disclosure continued to be driven by 
collectivist aims and desires, that they would not be interested in exploring this 
part of the self, and even if their private self-awareness was increased, this would 
not translate into increased levels of self-disclosure in this condition.  Again in the 
absence of any directly relevant experiments for comparison, H2 was based on the 
notion that collectivist participants would self-disclose less than members of 
individualistic cultures (H4). 
 
Bontempo et al. (1990) reported members of collectivist cultures to be more 
consistent across public and private situations, than members of individualistic 
cultures. On closer examination of Bontempo et al.’s results, it is clear that it was 
the public situation in the experiment that activated the social desirability 
pressures within the participants from the individualistic culture.  This resulted in 
members of the individualistic culture acting differently in the public to private 
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condition, whilst members of the collectivist culture did not.  In the door-ajar 
condition in Experiment 1, the British participants’ public self-awareness was 
increased, and drawing parallels to Bontempo et al.’s study, the social desirability 
pressures seemed to activate. The British participants’ in the door-ajar condition 
were then seen to idealise themselves, their self-disclosure dropped, and 
significantly, their accuracy of self-disclosure decreased.  It was concluded in 
Experiment 1, that whilst private self-awareness in CMC increases the British 
participants access to their true self (cf. Bargh et al., 2002), it was the reduced 
public self-awareness, and lowered subjective risk, that allowed them to self-
disclosure, from their true self.   
 
Two main issues are raised by comparing the results of Bontempo et al.’s (1990) 
study with Experiment 1.  First, Bontempo et al. confirmed that members of 
collectivist cultures were not affected by social desirability pressures in the same 
way as members of individualistic cultures were.  It was, therefore, predicted that 
reducing public self-awareness in CMC, would only have an effect upon British 
participants’ self-disclosure, and not upon Singaporean participants’ self-
disclosure.  The door-ajar condition in Experiment 1 was, however, seen to only 
affect the accuracy of the participants’ self-disclosure, and not their depth of self-
disclosure. The hypothesis was, however, again based on the general observation 
in the literature that members of collectivist cultures self-report less than members 
of individualistic cultures. It was, therefore, predicted that in the door-ajar 
condition, in Experiment 3, the Singaporean participants would report lower 
levels of depth of self-disclosure than the British participants (H3). 
 
The second main issue that was raised, when comparing the results of Experiment 
1 to Bontempo et al.’s (1990) study, is the contentious and difficult issue of the 
cultural relevance of the true self.  It could be argued that the British participants 
were particularly affected by social desirability pressures in Experiment 1, 
because they were protecting their true self. It has, however, been argued in the 
literature that members of collectivist cultures do not desire a true self (cf. Hsu, 
1985), or a consistent and stable self (Chen & English, 2006).  If the true self is 
not relevant in Chinese culture (Hsu, 1985), it could be argued that the 
Singaporean participants in Experiment 3, may not possess the persona, or mask, 
that shields the true self (cf. Hsu, 1985), and that this shield would not be seen to 
slip on, and then off, in the control and door-ajar condition, as was evidenced in 
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Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 in the door-ajar condition, when public self-
awareness was increased, the mask slipped on, but as public self-awareness was 
reduced, the mask could come off.  In the potential absence of this mask on the 
private, or particularly the true, self of the Singaporean (cf. Hsu, 1985), it was 
predicted that the Singaporeans self-disclosure would not be affected by differing 
levels of public self-awareness, and the levels of accuracy would not change 
between conditions for the Singaporean participant. The British participants’ 
accuracy of self-disclosure was, however, reduced by the door-ajar manipulation. 
It was, therefore, also predicted that as the British participants were more likely to 
be affected by social desirability pressures (cf. Bontempo et al., 1990), that the 
Singaporean participants would report higher levels of accuracy of self-disclosure 
than the British participants in the door-ajar condition (H4). 
 
H1:  The Singaporean participants will self-disclose significantly less that the 
British participants when asking and answering questions of varying 
intimacy in a control condition. 
 
H2:  Singaporean participants will self-disclose less than the British 
participants in the projected-mirror condition, when answering and asking 
questions of varying intimacy in an anonymous CMC situation. 
 
H3:  Singaporean participants will self-disclose less than the British 
participants when the door is left ajar, when answering and asking questions 
of varying intimacy in an anonymous CMC situation. 
 
H4:  The Singaporeans’ accuracy of self-disclosure will be higher than the 
British participants’ self-disclosure in the door-ajar condition. 
 
Method 
 
Overview and design 
 
During the experiment the Singaporean and British participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions: control; projected-mirror; or door-ajar.  The 
experiment therefore compared six conditions, with culture (British vs. 
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Singaporean) and self-awareness (control vs. projected-mirror vs. door-ajar) 
manipulated as independent factors.  Participants interacted individually with a 
trained female confederate, who the participants believed was another student, 
using a text-based computer conferencing system in a semi-structured discussion 
designed to elicit self-disclosures. Dependent measures also obtained post-
experiment through an on-line questionnaire, which explored private and public 
self-awareness, self-disclosure and several interpersonal variables. The 
equipment, conditions and questionnaires were exactly the same as those used in 
Experiment 1, and these are described in detail in the method section of 
Experiment 1. The experiment was approved by the University Ethics committee 
and ethical consideration was shown at all stages of the experiment. 
Procedure 
 
Forty-five, British undergraduate psychology students, aged 18-24 (M=20) and 45 
Chinese-Singaporean undergraduate students aged 18-22 (M=20) took part in the 
experiment in return for credits that they had to collect on their undergraduate 
course, or a five pound monetary reward.  The students were matched for age 
(M=20), gender (all female) and first language (English).  It was made clear to the 
participants at the beginning of the experiment that they would be interacting with 
another student from their culture. They were told that they were going to spend 
some time answering and asking various personal questions with each other using 
CMC. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: 
control; projected-mirror; and door-ajar.  In all of the conditions the participants 
were met and shown to a computer cubicle where the experiment would begin. 
They were asked to read the instructions and list of questions, which explained 
that they were going to spend 25 minutes exploring various questions with a 
partner.  They were also told that they were completely anonymous in the 
interaction and that their answers would only be seen by the partner, and then 
would be accessed six months later for analysis.  It was emphasised that their 
answers could not be traced back to them.  The participants were then asked to 
wait for their partner to say ‘hello,’ and following this greeting were asked to ask 
their partner the practice question.  The semi-structured discussion would then 
begin. This process continued for 25 minutes.  After 25 minutes an alarm sounded 
and  the participants were asked to fill in a post-test questionnaire 
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Results and Discussion 
 
 
A MANOVA was conducted to allow comparison between the British and 
Singaporean participants in the dyadic conditions.  Condition (control x projected-
mirror x door-ajar) and culture (British x Singaporean) were compared for various 
measures of self-disclosure, self-awareness and various other interpersonal 
variables.  There was a significant multivariate effect for condition (lambda=0.67 
F(22,148) = 1.50, p=0.83) and country (lambda=0.63, F(11,74) = 3.90 p<0.001).  
There was also an interaction between condition x country (lambda=0.56 
F(22,148) = 2.26, p<0.005). Further analysis involved a series of one-way 
ANOVA and Post-hoc TUKEY tests to explore how the cultural differences in 
self-disclosure and self-awareness in each of the conditions manifest themselves.  
The results of the univariate analyses are reported in Table 5.2. 
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 Control  Projected-
mirror 
 Door-
ajar 
 F 
value 
Sig 
 British Sing British Sing British Sing   
4.13
 
5.00a 2.53b 3.60 4.27 5.20a Public self-
awareness (2.26) (2.48) (1.60) (2.80) (2.05) (2.33) 
2.73 p<0.05 
5.27ad 5.73 6.00b 6.27bc 5.47cd 5.67bc Private self-
awareness (2.49) (2.05) (1.92) (1.67) (0.99) (1.88) 
5.45 p=0.74 
5.13ad 6.13 6.73b 6.67bc 5.33cd 6.53bc Breadth 
 (1.19) (1.41) (1.28) (1.49) (1.05) (1.36) 
4.29 p<0.00
5 
3.93a 6.27b 6.33b 5.67 4.60 6.13b Depth 
 (1.75) (1.67) (1.71) (2.29) (1.18) (1.60) 
4.98 p<0.00
1 
7.40c 8.00bc 8.00bc 8.20bc 5.93ad 8.20bc Accuracy 
 (1.40) (1.13) (0.61) (1.15) (1.80) (1.15) 
7.98 p<0.00
1 
3.93
 
5.00
 
5.93
 
5.67
 
4.47
 
5.27
 
Learning 
(2.19) (2.10) (2.05) (2.13) (2.17) (2.12) 
1.86 p=0.11 
7.60
 
7.00
 
6.20
 
7.13
 
7.40
 
6.80
 
Sociable 
(1.05) (1.20) (1.52) (1.56) (1.05) (1.57) 
2.02 p=0.08 
7.33 7.27 7.40 7.87 6.67 7.73 Enjoyment 
(1.05) (1.28) (1.40) (1.30) (1.29) (1.03) 
1.75 p=0.13 
4.33 4.67 5.47 5.33 4.40 5.00 Self-
presentation (2.38) (2.23) (1.84) (2.23) (1.64) (1.81) 
0.82 p=0.54 
3.87a 5.80b 5.07 5.80b 4.27 5.53 Trust 
 (1.81) (1.57) (2.05) (1.52) (1.80) (1.36) 
3.51 p=0.01 
3.87
 
3.73
 
3.93
 
2.60
 
3.27
 
3.40
 
0.83 p=0.53 Intimacy 
(2.13) (2.46) (2.12) (2.06) (1.83) (2.06)   
3.93
 
4.87
 
3.87
 
4.80
 
4.40
 
4.13
 
0.64 p=0.67 Accountability 
(1.22) (1.96) (1.77) (2.76) (2.03) (2.44)   
1.73 2.40 2.33 1.80 2.40 2.33  0.81 p= 0.55 Embarrassment 
(0.88) (1.45) (0.98) (1.57) (0.99) (1.88)   
1.93 3.67 2.13 2.73 2.27 2.40 2.09 p=0.08 Isolation 
(1.16) (2.16) (1.96) (1.79) (1.39) (1.30)   
1.08a 0.90 0.46b 0.70 0.80 1.00 1.53 p=0.88 Ratio 
0.81 0.40 0.44 0.71 0.44 0.50   
Table 5.2:  Table illustrating the univariate effects and means and (standard deviations) of the 
British and Singaporean participants on all dependent variables across the conditions in 
Experiment .  Different subscripts indicate significant differences (Tukey; p<0.05). 
 
Control condition 
 
The first comparison that was investigated was how British participants and 
Singaporean participants differed in their self-reported scores for the control 
condition.   The control condition involved no additional manipulations of self-
awareness, and represented a typical ‘real-time’ chat situation that is often 
encountered on-line. In this situation the participant was alone in a room and was 
communicating to another person in a different location, and they were both 
visually anonymous.  Although this condition employed no forced manipulation 
of self-awareness, it has previously been reported to be high in private self-
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awareness and low in public self-awareness (Matheson and Zanna, 1998; Joinson, 
2001; Yao, 2001).   
 
Breadth, depth and accuracy of self-disclosure 
The Singaporean participants self-disclosed far more than was expected in the 
task.  It was predicted that the Singaporeans would self-disclose at lower levels 
that the British participants, yet the Singaporeans reported themselves to self-
disclose to a greater depth (M=6.27, SD=1.67) than the British participants 
(M=3.93, SD=1.75, p<0.01).  Also the Singaporeans’ breadth of self-disclosure 
followed this trend where they self-disclosed higher levels of breadth (M=6.13, 
SD=1.41) than the British participants (M=5.13, SD=1.19, p=0.30), although this 
result was not significant. H1 was therefore rejected, noting that the Singaporean 
self-reported greater levels of depth of self-disclosure than the British participants. 
The Singaporean participants also reported (M=8.00, SD= 1.13) similar levels of 
accuracy in their self-disclosure to the British participants (M=7.40, SD=1.40, 
p=0.78).  The finding that the Singaporean participants reported greater depth than 
the British participants was particularly interesting as it was consistently reported 
in the literature that members of collectivist cultures self-disclose less than 
members of individualistic cultures (Barnlund, 1975; Asai and Barnlund, 1998; 
Barnlund, 1989; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991; Kito, 2005).  It was also reported in 
Study A that Singaporean participants were less likely to self-disclose, on topics, 
similar to those used in this experiment, to a stranger, than British participants. 
Moreover, it is widely reported that British people’s self-disclosure increases in 
CMC (Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Joinson, 2001; Goh, 2004).  
The Singaporean participants’ self-reported depth of self-disclosure does therefore 
surpass an already inflated observation of British participant’s depth.  The results 
clearly indicated that there was something about the CMC environment which 
encouraged greatly inflated levels of self-disclosure in the Singaporean 
participants. 
 
Returning to the literature review, the finding that Singaporean participants self-
reported self-disclosing to a greater depth in CMC, than the British participants, is 
important.  There are no studies prior to this that report members of collectivist 
cultures self-disclosing at a deeper level than members of individualistic cultures, 
even outside of the CMC literature (Barnlund, 1975; Asai and Barnlund, 1998; 
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Barnlund, 1989; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991; Kito, 2005).  Asai and Barnlund 
(1998) reported that members of collective cultures have less self-knowledge 
about their private self, and as a result have less information to self-disclose.  
Clearly this was not the case in the control condition of this experiment, even if 
the Singaporeans did have less private self-knowledge, they managed to self-
disclose what they considered to be, deep information from the private self. It is 
also reported in the literature that individuals in a collectivist culture are interested 
in goals that maintain harmony and suppress their unique attributes, whereas an 
individual in an individualistic culture looks to bolster their uniqueness in self-
disclosure (Markhus and Kitayama, 1991).  The task in this experiment asked the 
participant to answer questions that were arguably mainly associated with the 
private self.  It could, therefore, be argued that if the Singaporean participant was 
not interested in exploring their private self, then they would not have answered 
the questions to such a deep level. This does therefore support the suggestion that 
the individual, or private, self is the cornerstone of the self (Sedikidies and 
Gaertner, 2001), as in the experiment the Singaporean was interested in exploring 
the private self.  It also challenges research that has argued that the individual or 
private self is not primacy in collectivist cultures (cf. Kashima & Kashima, 1997; 
Heine and Lehman, 1999). 
 
The Singaporean participants also reported their self-disclosure to be as accurate 
as the British participants. The score in the control condition for accuracy for the 
British participants was reported in Experiment 1 to support the assertion that the 
self-disclosure was from the true self.  It could be suggested here that the 
Singaporean participants’ self-disclosure score was also accurate and therefore 
from the true self, although whether the true self has the same meaning in Chinese 
culture is still open to question.  If the Singaporean participant possesses a self 
that is variable, and less stable (English & Chen, 2007), then questions arise of 
what baseline score their accuracy could be compared with.  The British 
participant has their conception of a true self to compare the accuracy of their self-
disclosure against. However, the Singaporean participant may just have been 
suggesting that they were not outwardly lying by their accuracy score in this 
condition. The Singaporean may hold equally valid but variable projections of the 
self, and this causes problems for assessing whether their accuracy score of self-
disclosure can be related to the concept of a true self. Further research is therefore 
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required to understand more about the true self in Singaporean culture, although 
the self-presentation item which is discussed later may elucidate this further. 
 
It is also possible that the textual channel within this condition may be a factor in 
the Singaporeans participants’ raised depth of self-disclosure.  Members of 
collectivist cultures have been described as being verbally restrained (Markhus & 
Kitiyama, 1991; Asai & Barnlund, 1998), and it may be that the Singaporeans 
found it easier to self-disclose in this type of textual communication, rather than 
using a verbal channel.  This would, however, need testing in an experiment 
which examines the channel as an independent variable and this was unfortunately 
not tested here. Irrespective of the reasons behind the surprise result, that 
Singaporeans reported exploring their private self in more depth than the British 
participants, the result is important. It could, for example, be argued that this 
CMC control condition revealed a side of the Singaporean that is not usually seen, 
or even exhibited, in their everyday interactions.  The condition appeared to give 
the Singaporean participant an opportunity to explore their private self.  Raised 
levels of depth of self-disclosure were associated with high levels of private self-
awareness in Experiment 2, and it is possible to examine the self-awareness data 
in Experiment 3 to see if it was an increase in private self-awareness that 
encouraged the Singaporeans to self-disclose so deeply. 
 
Private and public self-awareness 
In Part 1 of this thesis, increased scores for depth of self-disclosure were linked to 
private self-awareness. It could, therefore, be suggested that the Singaporeans may 
have been experiencing greater levels of private self-awareness in this condition. 
This was not, however, the case as the Singaporeans reported only a slightly 
higher level of private self-awareness (M=5.73, SD=2.05) than the British 
participants (M=5.27, SD=2.49, p=0.98), which was not significantly different.  It 
was also suggested that self-disclosure can increase if public self-awareness is 
reduced. However, the Singaporean participants reported higher levels of public 
self-awareness (M=5.00, SD=2.48) than the British participants (M=4.13, 
SD=2.26, p=0.90), although again this was not significantly different.  In the 
experiments in Part 1 of this thesis a further measure of self-awareness was 
calculated, and this was the ratio of public to private self-awareness.  This was 
investigated in Experiment 3, however there was also no difference found 
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between the ratio of public self-awareness to private self-awareness, for the 
Singaporean participants (M=0.90, SD=0.40) as compared to the British 
participants (M=1.08, SD=0.81, p=0.95).  It did not appear, therefore, to be the 
differences in the levels of self-awareness that could explain the differences 
between the Singaporean and British participants’ self-disclosures.   
 
Further measures 
There were no differences found between the Singaporean (M=7.27, SD=1.28) 
and British participants for enjoyment (M=7.33, 1.05, p=0.95), and there was also 
no difference found for learning, and the Singaporean participants reported 
(M=5.00, SD=2.10) similar levels of learning to the British participants (M=3.93, 
SD=2.19, p=0.74). The Singaporeans did report that they were accurate in their 
self-disclosures and they also scored similarly (M=4.67, SD=2.23) to the British 
participants for self-presentation (M=4.33, SD=2.38, p=1.00).  It was argued in 
Experiment 1 that the British participants were presenting a true self in this 
control condition. It is also argued here that the Singaporeans were not presenting 
a more positive image, nor being inaccurate.  They did genuinely appear to be 
using this condition to present an accurate and non-idealised self in their self-
disclosure.  There were also no differences between the Singaporeans scores for 
intimacy (M=3.73, SD=2.46), accountability (M=4.87, SD=1.96) or 
embarrassment (M=2.40, SD=1.45), when compared to the British participant 
(M=3.87, SD=2.13, p=0.80; M=3.93, SD=1.22, p=0.82; M=1.73, SD=0.88, 
p=0.75).  The Singaporeans also reported similar scores for learning (M=5.00, 
SD=2.10), how sociable they viewed their partner (M=7.00, SD=1.20), and the 
isolation of the condition (M=3.67, SD=2.16) to the British participants (M=3.93, 
SD=2.19, p=0.74; M=7.60, SD=1.05, p=0.82; M=1.93, SD=1.16, p=0.06).  
 
There was, however, one important difference between the British participants 
and the Singaporean participants. The Singaporeans participants reported more 
trust in their partner (M=5.80, SD=1.57) than the British participants (M=3.87, 
SD=1.81, p<0.05).  Trust is essential in the formation of a relationship, and in 
self-disclosing deeply (Altman and Taylor, 1972; Jourard, 1971), and the 
increased trust of the Singaporeans could, therefore, easily explain the increased 
self-disclosure in the control condition for the Singaporean participants.  
However, it was not clear why the Singaporean participants would trust their 
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partner more than the British participants. Although the Singaporean participants 
did self-disclose deeply, it was not explained by the self-awareness scores, or the 
other variables. Although trust was found to be a significant variable, it would 
need further investigation, and it was raised again later, when the results indicated 
that it was not that the Singaporean participants was more trusting, but that the 
British participant was less trusting.  The CMC environment is one which is 
generally considered to be high in private and low in public self-awareness 
(Matheson & Zanna, 1988; Joinson, 2001), and the control condition that was 
reported here is typical of the type of CMC environment that these studies are 
referring to. The Singaporeans did not report greater levels of private self-
awareness than the British participants, but the British participants were already 
experiencing high levels of private self-awareness and reduced levels of public 
self-awareness, and the Singaporean participants’ self-awareness scores indicated 
they were having a similar experience.  It would be necessary to compare the 
Singaporean participants in this condition to another condition, where the 
participants were perhaps communicating FTF to confirm this, but this was not 
tested. 
 
Whilst the control condition in this experiment gave the Singaporeans an 
opportunity to explore their private self, of which there are arguably fewer 
opportunities to do so than in British culture.  It was also possible that the 
Singaporeans’ deep self-disclosure was not driven by personal motivations, but 
may have represented them acting within their cultural norms.  It was possible, for 
example, that the Singaporeans were matching their partners’ high self-disclosure 
in the task, to achieve harmony and communion (cf. Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991), 
and this type of behaviour would be typical of a member of a collectivist culture. 
In replications of Asch’s (1952) conformity study, for instance, members of 
collectivist cultures have been seen to match a confederates’ inaccurate answer to 
keep harmony (Bond and Smith, 1996).  It was therefore possible that this was 
what the Singaporean participants were doing in this experiment, and they may 
have been matching the confederate’s answers to achieve harmony.  It was argued 
earlier, in the interpretation of the results, that the Singaporeans were using this 
situation to explore their private self, and that this represented their individual 
desire, that may be different to their cultural norms.  However, it was also possible 
that the Singaporean participant did not desire this type of exploration and that 
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their self-disclosing deeply may not have been personally motivated, but rather, 
was for the benefit of their partner. The goal of a relationship in collectivist 
cultures has been reported to be to bolster the other person (Cross and Madson, 
1997), and this may have been what was occurring in this condition.  This would 
again be typical behaviour of a member of a collectivist culture.  It was, however, 
possible to explore the Singaporean participants further by examining their 
behaviour in the manipulated conditions. 
Projected-mirror condition 
 
In Experiment 1, the use of the projected-mirror manipulation was seen to 
increase the ratio of private and public self-awareness.  In other words it raised 
private whilst reducing public self-awareness.  This resulted in the participants 
reporting increased levels of depth and breadth of self-disclosure. The British 
participants also reported themselves to not be presenting a more positive image 
in their self-disclosures, but they did report their partner to be less social than they 
did in the control condition.  These results were taken to suggest that the 
projected-mirror manipulation was having the expected effect of turning the 
participants’ attention away from the social aspects of the interaction and more to 
the personal aspects.  In the control condition, the Singaporeans self-disclosed 
more and trusted their partner more than the British participants.  However, it was 
unclear, as there is an absence of any similar studies, how the projected-mirror 
manipulation would affect the Singaporean participants.  It was reported that 
members of collectivist cultures do not change their behaviour across public and 
private situations (Bontempo et al, 1990).  It was, therefore, predicted that the 
projected-mirror condition would not affect the self-disclosure of the Singaporean 
participants, and as the projected mirror had increased the self-disclosure of the 
British participants in Experiment 1, it was predicted that the Singaporeans would 
self-disclose less than the British participants in this condition. 
 
Private and public self-awareness 
The Singaporeans participants reported slightly higher private self-awareness 
scores in the projected-mirror condition (M=6.27, SD=1.67) than in the control 
condition (M=5.73, SD=2.05, p=0.97), although the result was not significant.  
The participants also reported slightly lower public self-awareness scores in the 
projected-mirror condition (M=3.60, SD=2.80) than in the control condition 
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(M=5.00, SD=2.48, p=0.55), although again the result was not significant.  
Surprisingly, the results did not follow the pattern of the British participants and 
no difference was found in the ratio of public self-awareness to private self-
awareness between the projected-mirror condition (M=7.13, SD=1.55) as 
compared with the control (M=7.00, SD=1.20, p=0.92).  In this dyadic projected-
mirror condition the manipulation did not significantly raise the Singaporeans’ 
private self-awareness whilst reducing public self-awareness, as it did for the 
British participants.  In Experiment 1 the dyadic projected-mirror condition 
replicated the results of Joinson’s (2001) and Yao & Flanagin’s (2006) studies, 
where it raised private whilst reducing public self-awareness in dyadic 
communication. In this study, however, the participants were engaging in dyadic 
communication, but the manipulation did not have the desired effect of increasing 
private self-awareness. These results do, therefore, indicate the importance of 
understanding that manipulations of self-awareness could have different effects on 
participants from different cultures. It has been suggested that members of 
collectivist cultures are more consistent across private and public conditions 
(Bontempo et al., 1990). This could also suggest that members of collectivist 
cultures are less susceptible to situational manipulations of self-awareness.  
Support for this was found here, where the manipulation of the projected mirror 
did not affect the Singaporeans reported levels of self-awareness, but did affect 
the British participants’ reported levels of self-awareness. The manipulation is not 
successful in this instance, as it did not affect the Singaporeans self-reported self-
awareness. 
 
Breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
Unsurprisingly, following on from the results for self-awareness, the Singaporean 
participants did not report any difference between breadth in the projected-mirror 
condition (M=6.13, SD=1.41), as compared to the control condition (M=6.67, 
SD=1.49, p=0.87).    For depth of self-disclosure, however, the projected-mirror 
manipulation seemed to inhibit self-disclosure slightly (M=5.67, SD=2.29) as 
compared to the control condition (M=6.27, SD=1.67, p=0.93), although this was 
not significant, and H2 was therefore rejected. The projected-mirror manipulation 
did not have the effect on self-awareness that it did on the British participants, 
therefore it had no bearing upon the self-disclosure.  It should, however, be noted 
that the Singaporean participants’ self-reported self-disclosure was higher in the 
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control condition than the British participants self-disclosure was.  It follows, 
therefore, that the Singaporeans’ self-disclosure was still high in the projected-
mirror condition as it was similar to that in the control condition, but the 
projected-mirror condition had not done anything more to increase it further.  The 
British participants’ breadth (M=6.73, SD=1.28) and depth (M=6.33, SD=1.71) of 
self-disclosure were also high in the projected-mirror condition, as compared to 
the control condition, but the Singaporean participants’ self-disclosure was at a 
similar level for breadth (M=6.76, SD=1.49, p=1.00), and was slightly lower, but 
not significantly, for breadth  (M=5.67, SD=2.29, p=0.89).  It was, therefore, 
concluded that the Singaporeans were more consistent in their depth of self-
disclosure across the control and projected-mirror conditions than the British 
participants, and this is clearly illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2:  An illustration of how the Singaporean participants’ depth of self-disclosure is more 
consistent across the control and projected-mirror conditions than the British participants’ depth 
of self-disclosure in Experiment 3 
 
Accuracy and self-presentation 
The Singaporean participants reported themselves to present an accurate self in 
the projected-mirror condition (M=8.20, SD=1.15) and in the control condition 
(M=8.00, SD=1.13, p=0.99).  They also presented a similarly positive image of 
themselves in the projected-mirror condition (M=5.33, SD=2.23) as they did in 
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the control condition (M=4.67, SD=2.23, p=0.95). Furthermore, the Singaporeans 
presented a similarly positive image (M=5.33, SD=2.23), and reported similar 
levels of accuracy (M=8.20, SD=1.15, p=1.00) in the projected-mirror condition 
as the British participants (M=5.47, SD=1.84, p=, M=8.33, SD=0.61, p=1.00).  It 
was inferred from these results, that the projected-mirror manipulation did not 
seem to affect the participants’ accuracy of self-disclosure, and they continued to 
present a self that was not positively inflated.  Using these results to draw 
conclusions about the Singaporean participants’ true self is, however, problematic. 
If the self is not consistent and is variable in collectivist cultures (English & Chen, 
2007), it could be argued from this, that the collectivists’ true self is whatever is 
appropriate at the time. Moreover, if the member of a collectivist cultures self is 
variable (English & Chen, 2007) and they have a flexible boundary between the 
public and private self (Cross and Madson, 1997), the self varies according to the 
situation.  Further research is required to understand how accuracy is linked to 
different self-images in collectivist cultures, and to further elucidate the meaning 
and relevance of a the true self in collectivist cultures.  The self-presentation score 
also raises similar issues, as for the participant to perceive that they have been 
presenting a more positive image of themselves, they must be aware that they 
possess a self which is not inflated, that they can make this comparison against. 
The issues with these concepts is important as it raises questions of the relevance 
of these measures in this study, but it also raises questions as to the cross-cultural 
validity of many social-psychological theories, such as Self-Discrepancy Theory 
(cf. Higgins, 1987). 
 
Further measures 
The Singaporean participants reported similar levels of enjoyment (M=7.87, 
SD=1.30), and learning (M=5.67, SD=2.13) to the British participants (M=7.40, 
SD=1.40, p=0.77; M=5.93, SD=2.05, p=0.98).  The Singaporean participants also 
reported similar levels of enjoyment (M=7.87, SD=1.30) and learning (M=5.67, 
SD= 2.13) in the projected-mirror condition as they did in the control condition 
(M=7.27, SD=1.28, p=0.77; M=5.00, SD=2.10, p=0.96).  In addition, the 
Singaporeans also reported similar levels of isolation (M=2.73, SD=1.79), 
intimacy (M=2.60, SD=2.06), embarrassment (M=1.80, SD=1.57) and 
accountability (M=4.80, SD=2.76) to the British participants (M=2.13, SD=1.96, 
p=0.92; M=3.93, SD=2.12, p=0.99; M=2.33, SD=0.98, p=0.86; M=3.87, 
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SD=1.77, p=1.00). The Singaporean participants did however report themselves to 
be slightly more sociable (M=7.13, SD=1.56) than the British participants 
(M=6.20, SD=1.52, p=0.41), although this result was not significant.  The 
Singaporeans also reported themselves to view the partner as being equally 
sociable in the projected-mirror condition (M=7.13, SD=1.56) as in the control 
condition (M=7.00, SD=1.56, p=1.00).    The projected-mirror condition was 
reported in Experiment 1 to lead the British participants to pursue more personal 
goals.  The projected-mirror condition increased private whilst reducing public 
self-awareness, which reduced the socialness of the situation. This, in turn, 
increased self-disclosure.  However, this was not occurring in this condition for 
the Singaporeans, who reported the partner to be similarly sociable in both the 
control and the projected-mirror condition. 
 
In the control condition, although the Singaporean participants reported higher 
levels of trust than the British participants, in the projected-mirror condition, the 
Singaporeans reported similar levels of trust (M=5.80, SD=1.52) to the British 
participants (M=5.07, SD=2.05, p=0.84).   The Singaporean participants also 
reported similar levels of trust in the projected-mirror condition (M=5.80, 
SD=1.52) as in the control condition (M=5.80, SD=1.57, p=1.00).   Similar levels 
of trust were yielded in all these conditions and this makes it quite difficulty to 
explain the Singaporeans reporting greater trust in the projected-mirror condition 
than the British participants.  
 
The addition of a projected mirror did not seem to have any effects on the 
Singaporeans’ behaviour.  It was suggested that the projected mirror could remind 
the Singaporean participants of their private self and this could lead to increased 
levels of self-disclosure.  The Singaporean participants were reported to be self-
disclosing highly in the control condition, and these high levels of depth of self-
disclosure continued in the projected-mirror condition, but the projected-mirror 
manipulation did not further enhance them.  It is difficult to make any suggestions 
about whether the goals were personally or socially motivated in the 
Singaporeans’ self-disclosure.  It is unclear whether it was the feedback from the 
other participant, or the rapport that encouraged them, or whether they were 
matching their partner’s intimacy.  Some of these issues will however be explored 
in Experiment 4.  In Goh (2004) it was noted that participants, in their desire to 
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self-disclose and form a relationship, were not distracted by visual cues. Similarly 
in this situation the Singaporeans may have attended less to the manipulation than 
the British participants in order to achieve their goals.  There was, however, no 
support gained that the projected mirror increased private self-awareness for 
Singaporean participants.  The cultural generalisability of this manipulation is, 
therefore, in question.  However, it may be that the task itself already raised the 
Singaporeans’ private self-awareness above and beyond that which is normal, 
therefore the participants in the control and projected-mirror conditions may both 
have had exaggerated private self-awareness scores.  The notion that the 
Singaporeans are less aware of the manipulations by their drive to engage in the 
task can be examined by analysing their behaviour in the door-ajar condition. 
Door-ajar condition 
 
In Experiment 1, the door-ajar condition did not have the effect that was expected, 
and it was concluded that the manipulation was overridden by the British 
participants’ desire to socialise.  There was, however, one significant difference 
that was found in Experiment 1 which was very important.  It was found that the 
British participants were less accurate in their self-disclosures than the 
participants in the control condition.  This finding suggested that the participants 
were actually aware (even if sub-consciously) that the door was ajar, and this 
affected their optimal self-disclosure.  In Experiment 3, it was already evident that 
the Singaporean participants did not seem to be affected by the projected-mirror 
condition, and it is therefore of great interest to examine whether they were 
affected by this second manipulation of leaving the door ajar.  
 
Private and public self-awareness 
There was no significant difference between the Singaporean participants’ private 
self-awareness (M=5.67, SD=1.88), public self-awareness (M=5.20, SD=2.33), or 
ratio of self-awareness (M=1.01, SD=0.50) in the door-ajar condition, when 
compared to the control condition (M=5.73, SD=2.05, p=1.00; M=5.00, SD=2.48, 
p=1, M=0.90, SD=0.40, p=0.99).  These results indicated that the door-ajar 
manipulation did not affect the Singaporean participants’ self-awareness during 
the task.  This was a similar result to the British participants’ results in 
Experiment 1.  The Singaporean participants did report similar levels of private 
self-awareness (M=5.67, SD=1.88) to the British participants (M=5.47, SD=0.99, 
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p=1.00) in the door-ajar condition. The Singaporeans also reported similar levels 
of public self-awareness (M=5.20, SD=2.33) in the door-ajar condition, to the 
British participants (M=4.27, SD=2.05, p=0.87). In addition, the Singaporeans 
reported similar levels of ratio of private self-awareness (M=1.00, SD=0.50) to the 
British participants (M=0.80, SD=0.44, p=0.91) in the door-ajar condition. 
 
Breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
In the door-ajar condition the Singaporeans reported similar levels of breadth 
(M=6.53, SD=1.36) and depth (M=6.13, SD=1.60), to the control condition 
(M=6.13, SD=1.41, p=0.96; M=6.27, SD=1.67, p=0.13).  The Singaporeans 
breadth (M=6.53, SD=1.36) and depth (M=6.13, SD=1.60) were also similar to 
the British participants breadth and depth (M=5.33, SD=1.05, p=0.13; M=4.60, 
SD=1.18, p=0.16) in the door-ajar condition, and H3 was therefore rejected.  
Again the Singaporean participants’ behaviour seemed to be fairly consistent 
across the conditions.  This again supports the work of Bontempo et al. (1990) 
who reported that members of collectivist cultures behaviour is stable across 
private and public situations.   When the results of Study A are also considered, 
where the Singaporeans reported themselves much less likely to self-disclose on 
certain topics than the British participants, it is particularly interesting that the 
Singaporean participants self-disclosed at consistently high levels of depth in the 
control, projected-mirror and door-ajar conditions.  Although the Singaporeans do 
not seem to be affected by the manipulations, in all the conditions there is 
evidence of deep self-disclosure.  This could be argued to illustrate that the 
Singaporeans are interested in exploring their private self, and that their lack of 
private self-knowledge does not inhibit them (cf. Asai and Barnlund, 1998).  It is 
argued that this type of CMC environment could provide an opportunity for the 
Singaporeans to explore their private self. Unfortunately, these results do not 
clearly identify whether it is the changes in self-awareness, the textual channel, 
the encouraging confederate, the task, or the high levels of self-disclosure from 
the confederate being matched to create harmony, that explain this result.  Very 
little cross-cultural research exists that investigates self-disclosure in CMC, and 
more research is required to examine how each of these factors affects the self-
disclosure of members of collectivist cultures.  
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Accuracy and self-presentation 
A clear difference emerged in Experiment 1 between the British door-ajar 
condition and the control condition when examining accuracy of self-disclosure.  
It was seen in Experiment 1 that British participants’ accuracy dropped in the 
door-ajar condition.  This was taken as evidence that the British participants were 
not entering into optimal self-disclosure and were not presenting their true self.  It 
was concluded that the door being ajar disturbed their perception of privacy.  The 
Singaporean participants did, however, not report any difference in accuracy 
(M=8.20, SD=1.15) or self-presentation (M=5.00, SD=1.81) in the door-ajar 
condition, as compared to the control condition (M=8.00, SD=1.13, p=0.99; 
M=4.67, SD=2.23, p=0.99). Unlike the British participants, the accuracy of self-
disclosure seemed to stay relatively stable (M=8.20, SD=1.15) in the door-ajar 
condition and did not drop to the extent of the British participants (M=5.93, 
SD=1.80, p<0.001). H4 was therefore rejected. Again, this showed support for 
Bontempo’s et al.’s (1990) work that members of collectivist culture are stable 
across private and public situations. 
 
Further measures 
The Singaporean participants reported similar levels of enjoyment (M=7.73, 
SD=1.03), and learning (M=5.27, SD= 2.12) in the door-ajar condition to the 
control condition (M=7.27, SD=1.28, p=0.90; M=5.00, SD=2.10, p=0.99).  The 
Singaporean participants also reported similar levels of enjoyment (M=7.73, 
SD=1.30), and learning (M=5.27, SD=2.12) to the British participants (M=6.67, 
SD=1.29, p=0.18.; M=4.47, SD=2.17, p=0.91). The Singaporean participants also 
reported their partner to be as sociable (M=6.80, SD=1.57) as the British 
participants perceived their partner to be (M=7.40, SD=1.05, p=0.83). In the 
control condition, the Singaporean participants reported higher levels of trust than 
the British participants. However, in the door-ajar condition the Singaporeans 
reported similar levels of trust (M=5.53, SD=1.36) as the British participants 
(M=4.27, SD=1.80, p=0.33).   The Singaporean participants also reported similar 
levels of trust in the door-ajar condition (M=5.53, SD=1.36) as in the control 
condition (M=5.80, SD=1.57, p=1). The Singaporeans also reported similar levels 
of intimacy (M=3.40, SD=2.06), accountability (M=4.13, SD=2.44), 
embarrassment (M=2.33, SD=1.88) and isolation (M=2.40, SD=1.30) to the 
British participants (M=3.27, SD=1.83, p=0.92; M=4.40, SD=2.03, p=1.00; 
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M=2.40, SD=0.99, p=1.00; M=2.27, SD=1.39; p=1.00). The Singaporean 
participants were arguably engaging in optimal and intimate self-disclosure across 
all of the conditions. However, the British participants were observed to be much 
more ‘cagey,’ and their accuracy dropped when public self-awareness was raised. 
This study does seem to support the idea that member of collectivist cultures, such 
as Singaporean, have a less complex (cf. Triandis, 1989), less shielded private self 
(Hsu, 1985). The Singaporeans behaviour was also consistent across the 
manipulations that attempted to raise private and public self-awareness, and this 
supports the findings of Bontempo et al. (1990), who reports members of 
collectivist cultures’ behaviour to be consistent across private and public 
conditions.  The Internet is a place where the self can be experimented with 
(Turkle, 1984), and to some extent the anonymity and experience of self-
awareness may release the participants from cultural pressures. For the British, 
this allowed them to be their true self, and for the Singaporeans it seemed to allow 
them to explore their private self.  It is interesting to observe how culture affects 
the goals of self-disclosure, but also the decisions of what to self-disclosure. 
Correlation results  
 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that private self-awareness was related to depth of 
self-disclosure and that public self-awareness was related to accuracy of self-
disclosure.  The first correlation analysis in Experiment 3 focused only upon the 
Singaporean population.  There was a significant correlation between depth of 
self-disclosure and private self-awareness, r(45)=0.38, p<0.05. In a similar way to 
the British participants, the Singaporeans did report that the more access to their 
inner thoughts and feelings they had, the more deeply they self-disclosed.  There 
was also a very strong correlation between breadth and depth of self-disclosure 
r(45)=0.56, p<0.001.  These results suggested that the Singaporean participants 
were experiencing high levels of private self-awareness, and that this increased 
their access to inner thoughts and emotions, which in turn increased their self-
disclosure. The increased private self-awareness in CMC does, therefore, increase 
the Singaporeans depth of self-disclosure. Increased private self-awareness has 
been reported to activate personal motivations (Miller & Read, 1987), and, in this 
case, the Singaporeans may have had their personal motivations of self-disclosure 
activated.  Increased private self-awareness is also reported to increase awareness 
of self-discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1981), and as Singapore is a collectivist 
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culture where deep self-disclosure is not generally encouraged (Barnlund, 1989; 
Miyanaga, 1991; Kito, 2005; Asai and Barnlund, 1998), giving the participants an 
opportunity to self-disclose from their private self did seem to have a positive 
effect upon the Singaporeans’ self-disclosure behaviour.  
 
There was no negative correlation between accuracy and public self-awareness 
r(45)=-0.28, p=0.85.  The British participants’ true self retreated when awareness 
of the external increased; this does not happen to the Singaporean participants, as 
when public self-awareness increased the Singaporeans’ self, that was presented 
in their self-disclosure stayed stable.  For self-disclosure to be optimal, the British 
participants require public self-awareness to be low; this is however not an issue 
for the Singaporeans.  This difference in the reaction to increased public self-
awareness in the British and Singaporean participants supports Bontempo et al’s 
(1990) finding that members of individualistic cultures are more affected by social 
desirability pressures than member of collectivist culture are.  It is argued in this 
thesis that the British have a persona, or mask (cf. Hsu, 1985), to use in public 
situations, and a true self that stays hidden until it is decided by the individual that 
it is safe to be disclosed.  It is argued here that it is the discrepancy between the 
true self and the persona that leads to discrepancies within the self, for the British 
participant.  Some of the consistency in the collectivists' behaviour may therefore 
be explained by their acceptance of inconsistency and their lack of desire of a true 
self. More research is required however to understand these links to the self more 
clearly 
 
General Discussion 
 
The greatest finding in this third experiment was that, despite the results of Study 
A, that suggested that Singaporeans were less likely to self-disclose on certain 
topics than the British participant, and were also less open. When the 
Singaporeans were involved in a CMC interaction they self-disclosed much 
deeper than had been expected.  Moreover, in the control condition, which is 
fairly typical of a ‘real-time’ chat that occurs on the Internet, the Singaporeans 
reported greater levels of depth of self-disclosure than the British participants.  
The reasons why this occurred are not clear, and it may have been that the 
Singaporeans who come from a culture that is not open and where self-disclosure 
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is restrained, rather than encouraged (Barnlund 1989; Miyanaga, 1991; Kito, 
2005; Asai and Barnlund, 1998), may want to self-disclose from the private self, 
but do not have the opportunity.  It was evident, in the present experiment, that 
when the Singaporeans were given the opportunity to self-disclose they self-
disclosed deeply from the private self.  This deep self-disclosure by the 
Singaporean participants could represent a desire that is unrequited within their 
culture. If this is the case, then CMC has important implications for use as a 
medium for Singaporeans to outlet their stress, and work through their problems.  
Suicide is an issue in Singapore, and in the reasons that were given by Chia et al. 
(2008) for suicide, it is evident that they were all problems that could be helped by 
self-disclosing (cf. Rogers, 1951; Pennebaker, 1989). It is possible that CMC 
could provide an important outlet for Singaporeans to explore their private self 
and their problems. In a comments section at the end of the post-test 
questionnaire, several Singaporeans noted how refreshing the experience had 
been, with one participant noting ‘every Singaporean should be made to do this 
study.’  The conditions in the experiment provided an opportunity for the 
Singaporean to explore their private self, in a way that is arguably not 
forthcoming in their culture. 
 
The different motivations for self-disclosure, within different cultures, raise other 
issues within this thesis, as it is possible for example that the task was Western 
orientated.  It is unusual for a member of a collectivist culture to consider the 
private self in this much depth (Asai & Barnlund, 1998).  It was, therefore, an 
unusual situation for the Singaporean to discuss, and even think about some of the 
questions that were raised.  This does however raise the question of whether this 
type of deep, personal self-disclosure, serves any purpose for the collectivist.  
Granted, it may be important to dissolve worry or for the therapeutic situation, but 
Asai and Barnlund indicated that by self-disclosing from the private self the self-
discloser also gains more self-knowledge about the private self, which will 
ultimately result in the private self becoming more complex (Triandis, 1989).  It 
was apparent in Part 1 of the present thesis, that the complex private self of the 
British participants does cause issues within the self.  It is arguably the complexity 
of the private self that leads to discrepancies that arise between the projected self 
and the true self (cf. Higgins, 1987), and the development of the persona (Hsu, 
1985).  The Singaporeans’ depth of self-disclosure was higher than expected in 
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CMC and this is an interesting finding, but more research is required to 
understand the full benefits of self-disclosing from the private self for the 
Singaporean, and the implications this could have for the Singaporean self.  
 
Another interesting finding in Experiment 3 was the consistency in the 
Singaporeans’ behaviour across the conditions.  The Singaporeans remained far 
more consistent across the conditions than the British participants, and this was 
not only within the self-disclosure dimensions, but also in the measurements for 
self-awareness.  This provides support for Bontempo et al., (1990), who also 
noted that collectivists were more consistent across public and private conditions, 
and less compliant to social desirability pressures.  This observation brings 
discussion back to the British participants desiring a stable true self, yet only 
letting this self be revealed in situations that they feel are safe, such as situations 
that are high in private self-awareness, and low in public self-awareness (seen in 
Experiment 3).  Social desirability appears to be less of an issue for the 
Singaporean, who even when they self-disclose deeply are not affected by the 
manipulations.  There were, however, only two manipulations of self-awareness 
presented in the experiments and more manipulations would be necessary to 
substantiate the assertion that Singaporeans are less affected by manipulations of 
self-awareness.  Moreover, more research is required to understand whether the 
Singaporeans’ deep self-disclosure was personally motivated, or whether they 
were matching the confederates’ high levels of self-disclosure.  This is however 
examined in Experiment 4.  
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CHAPTER 6: Experiment 4 
What differences do manipulations of self-
awareness make on Singaporean participants and 
British participants self-disclosing in a socially 
isolated CMC experiment? 
Introduction 
 
It could not be confidently concluded from Experiment 3 that the Singaporeans 
were using the experimental interaction to explore their private, or individual, self. 
It was also possible that the Singaporean participants’ high levels of self-
disclosure occurred in order to match the high self-disclosures of their partner. 
Members of collectivist cultures are driven by the desire to keep harmony 
(Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991), and this type of matching behaviour would not be 
unsurprising.  In Experiment 2, the social pressures of the interaction were 
arguably reduced by eliminating the dyad, and having the participant self-disclose 
into an anonymous e-mail window.  They were told that their responses would not 
be read for six months, and could not be traced back to them.  In this situation 
they had no immediate partner to match, and it was also argued in Experiment 2 
that this situation reduced some of the possibilities of pursuing social motivations 
for self-disclosure. It was possible that the participant could self-disclose in order 
to complete the task, or to do what the experimenter had requested.  It was, 
however, argued in Experiment 2, that these reasons did not explain the deep self-
disclosure that was observed.  It was, therefore, suggested that if deep self-
disclosure was elicited in this situation, it was most likely to be personally 
motivated self-disclosure.  
 
The writing that could occur in this situation was therefore reported to be more 
akin to the type of self-expressive writing that has been reported to be therapeutic 
in research investigating emails (cf. Wright, 2002).  The participant may have 
used the situation to explore their self, their lives and their problems (cf. Wright, 
2002).  It was suggested in the introduction to Part 1, that there is much evidence 
to suggest that this type of self-disclosure is occurring on-line, and this was 
reportedly evidenced by the proliferation of self-help groups on the Internet 
(Salem et al., 1998; Morsund, 1997l; Gackenbach, 2007; Moon, 2000).  In Part 1 
of the thesis, it was suggested that, the heightened private self-awareness in CMC 
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allowed the participant to become aware of their private self, and their inner 
thoughts and feeling (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1980), and that it also activated 
personal motivations (cf. Miller & Read, 1987) and raised self-awareness of self-
discrepancies (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981).  It was also argued that the decreased 
public self-awareness in CMC reduced the interpersonal risk of the interaction 
(Walther, 1996), reduced the social desirability pressures (Bargh et al., 2002), and 
subsequently allowed optimal and intimate self-disclosure to occur.   In self-help 
groups these conditions could be useful as the heightened private self-awareness 
allows the participant to have clear access to their thoughts and feelings, and the 
reduced public self-awareness makes it safe to self-disclose.  These conditions 
may also be useful in relationship formation where the participant may perceive it 
to be safe to present their true self, and self-disclose deeply and intimately, thus 
accelerating the formation of the relationship (Mckenna & Bargh, 2000).  It is 
therefore argued that by replicating Experiment 2 on Singaporean participants, it 
would be possible to gain a greater insight into whether the Singaporeans were 
interested in this personally motivated type of self-disclosure.  Moreover, with the 
‘real-time’ partner removed, it would also be possible to examine whether the 
participants in Experiment 3 were matching the high self-disclosures of their 
partner. 
 
Experiment 2 was, therefore replicated on Singaporean participants, and the 
results were compared with the results from the British participants.  However, 
without a high self-disclosing confederate to match it was unclear whether the 
Singaporeans would continue to use the situation for deep self-disclosure.  The 
methodology in the experiment attempted to encourage deep and intimate self-
disclosure.  It was observed in the door-ajar condition in Experiment 2, that if the 
participant did not want to self-disclose, or was not motivated to self-disclose, 
they would not self-disclose.   In this instance, it would be perfectly reasonable for 
the participant to write one sentence about themselves and then move on.  If the 
Singaporean participants in the following experiment did continue to self-disclose 
deeply, it would be possible to conclude that the motivations were most likely 
personal.  Moreover, it could be concluded that the Singaporeans were interested 
in exploring their private self, through self-disclosure.  This would be an 
interesting finding, as past studies have suggested that members of collectivist 
cultures are less interested in expanding the private self than members of 
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collectivist cultures (Asai & Barnlund, 1998; Triandis, 2001).  Whilst an 
individualistic culture drives a desire for a unique private self (Hsu, 1985; 
Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), and therefore self-disclosure is 
driven by these motives (Kito, 2005; Asai & Barnlund, 1998), a collectivist 
culture views the self as part of a social group (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991) and 
self-disclosure does not tend to be driven by the private self (Asai and Barnlund, 
1998; Kito, 2005).  It would, therefore, be unusual to observe a situation where 
members of collectivist cultures were interested in exploring, and being highly 
motivated to self-disclose from the private self. If the Singaporean participants 
were seen to be interested in exploring their private self, it would also be an 
interesting finding as it could indicate that the Singaporeans have personal 
motivations of self-disclosure that differ from those that are prescribed by their 
culture.  
 
 It was argued in Experiment 2 that the heightened private and reduced public 
self-awareness, allowed the British participants’ true self to emerge.  Whilst the 
true self may be less relevant to the Singaporeans (Hsu, 1985), it is interesting to 
consider whether there would be any evidence of a true self emerging in the 
conditions of the experiment, or whether other selves, or traits, that are less 
exhibited in their everyday life would emerge.  It was also suggested in 
Experiment 2 that the removal of the dyad from the experiment led to the 
manipulations being intensified. It was therefore of interest to see if this was 
replicated in this final study. The hypotheses in Experiment 4 were based on the 
results of Experiment 3, and the positive response from the Singaporeans in the 
comments sections of the questionnaire at the end of Experiment 3. In Experiment 
4 it was possible that the Singaporean participants would continue to self-disclose 
deeply and intimately in the control condition of the socially isolated experiment.  
However, it was also possible that the Singaporeans were self-disclosing to match 
the confederates high levels of self-disclosure in Experiment 3 and that their self-
disclosure would drop in Experiment 4.  The hypothesis that the Singaporean 
participants in Experiment 4 would self-disclose less than the British participants 
in the socially isolated control condition was therefore tested (H1).  It was also 
predicted that the Singaporean participants would self-disclose less than they did 
in the dyadic control conditions (H2). It was also predicted, again based on the 
findings of Experiment 3, that the Singaporeans self-disclosure and self-awareness 
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levels would not be affected by either the projected-mirror, or the door-ajar 
manipulations. In addition, it was predicted that the Singaporean participants’ 
behaviour would stay consistent irrespective of whether the situation was private 
or public (cf. Bontempo et al., 2001).  In Experiment 2, the British participants’ 
self-disclosure dropped in the projected-mirror and the door-ajar conditions, and 
therefore the it was predicted that the Singaporean participants would self-disclose 
at higher levels of depth than their British counterparts. 
 
H 1:  Singaporean participants will self-report lower levels of depth of self-
disclosure than the British participants when asking and answering questions 
of varying intimacy in an anonymous CMC situation (control). 
 
H2: The Singaporean participants in the socially isolated control condition 
will self-disclose lower levels of depth of self-disclosure than the participants 
in the dyadic control condition, when asking and answering questions of 
varying intimacy using CMC. 
 
H3: The Singaporean participants will self-disclose to a greater depth than 
the English participants when an image of themselves is projected upon their 
computer screen, when answering and asking questions of varying intimacy 
in an anonymous socially isolated CMC situation 
 
H4.  The Singaporean participants in the socially isolated projected-mirror 
condition will self-disclose at lower levels of depth than the participants in the 
dyadic projected-mirror condition, when asking and answering questions of 
varying intimacy using CMC. 
 
H5:  Singaporean participants will self-disclose to a greater depth in the 
door-ajar condition, than the British participants, when answering and 
asking questions of varying intimacy in an anonymous door-ajar CMC 
situation 
 
H6: The Singaporean participants in the socially isolated door-ajar condition 
will self-disclose at lower levels of depth than the participants in the dyadic 
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door-ajar condition, when asking and answering questions of varying 
intimacy using CMC. 
 
Method 
 
Overview, design, materials and procedure 
 
Forty-five, British undergraduate psychology students, aged 18-24 (M=21), and 
forty five Singaporean undergraduate students aged 18-22 (M=20) took part in the 
experiment in return for course credits, or for a monetary rewards of five pounds.  
Participants interacted individually in a semi-structured task that required them to 
compose an email to a distant partner, in which they answered questions of 
varying intimacy using CMC.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions that aimed to manipulate private self-awareness: control; door-
ajar; and the projected-mirror condition. The experiment therefore compared: 
culture (British vs. Singaporean); social isolation (socially isolated vs. dyadic); 
and self-awareness (control, projected-mirror or door-ajar). The dependent 
measures were: self-disclosure; self-awareness; and several interpersonal 
measures. The self-awareness manipulations were the same manipulations that 
had been used throughout the experiments in this thesis (for detailed descriptions 
see Experiment 1). Dependent measures were obtained post-interaction through an 
on-line questionnaire, which explored private and public self-awareness, self-
disclosure and several interpersonal variables.  Again this questionnaire was 
explained thoroughly in Experiment 1.  The scales of trust and sociable were 
removed as the task in Experiment 4 did not involve dyadic interaction. The 
measures were therefore exactly the same as they were in Experiment 2, which 
also included the additional measure of word count.  The equipment, materials 
and procedure were exactly the same as those used in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
A MANOVA was conducted over the whole dataset to allow comparison between 
the British and Singaporean participants’ self-disclosure in the socially isolated 
conditions (Experiment 2 x Experiment 4), and between the Singaporeans’ self-
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disclosure in the control condition, in comparison with the projected-mirror and 
door-ajar conditions.  Finally, it would also allow comparisons to be drawn 
between the Singaporean participants’ self-disclosure in the dyadic experiment 
and the socially isolated experiment (Experiment 3 x Experiment 4). The 
experiment was of a 2 x 2 x 3 design comparing culture (British, Singaporean), 
social isolation (socially isolated, dyadic) and self-awareness (control, projected-
mirror or door-ajar) for self-disclosure, self-awareness and several interpersonal 
variables. There was a significant multivariate effect for condition (lambda=0.283 
F(54,116) =1.892 p<0.005) and an interaction between condition x culture 
(lambda=0.160 F(54, 116) = 3.220 p=<0.001).  There was also a significant 
multivariate effect for social isolation (lambda=0.37 F=1.88 (45,343), p=0.005).  
Further analysis involved a series of one-way ANOVAs and Post-hoc TUKEY 
tests to explore the main effects.  There were three main comparisons of interest: 
whether there was a difference between the Singaporean and British participants 
in the isolated conditions; whether there were any differences between the 
Singaporeans within the conditions of the socially isolated experiment; and 
whether there were any differences between the Singaporeans in the isolated and 
the dyadic experiments.  The results of each of these comparisons are given in 
turn within the following sections entitled: control; projected-mirror condition; 
and finally the door-ajar condition.  Within each of these sections the cross-
cultural comparison (Singapore vs British) is given first, followed by the inter-
experiment comparison of the Singaporean’s behaviour in the dyadic experiment 
(Experiment 3) compared to the socially isolated experiment (Experiment 4).  
Finally, a comparison is made of how the Singaporeans’ behaviour changed 
between the conditions of the socially isolated experiment. The main results for 
the Singaporean and British participants in the isolated condition are shown in 
Table 6.1, and the main results for the Singaporean participants in the socially 
isolated experiment (Experiment 3) compared with the dyadic experiments 
(Experiment 4) are shown in Table 6.2.  
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  Control   Projected-
mirror 
  Door-
ajar 
  F 
Value 
Sig 
  British Sing British Sing British Sing     
3.93b 4.07b 4.33 3.40b 6.33a 3.80b p<0.001 Public self-
awareness (2.19) (2.40) (2.23) (1.84) (1.29) (1.74) 
4.11 
 
6.73
 
5.40a 5.80 7.20b 5.07a 6.53 p<0.005 Private self-
awareness (1.16) (1.84) (1.97) (1.47) (1.58) (1.68) 
3.84 
 
7.60a 5.20b 5.67 7.07a 6.07 6.53 p<0.05 Breadth 
 (1.35) (2.18) (2.47) (1.22) (2.09) (2.07) 
3.14 
 
5.13c 5.27dc 4.27ca 7.40b 3.13a 5.87bc p<0.001 Depth 
(1.96) (1.91) (2.55) (1.18) (1.64) (1.68) 
8.98 
 
8.60a 8.00 8.40 8.20 7.53b 7.80 p<0.05 Accuracy 
(0.83) (0.85) (0.74) (0.68) (1.41) (1.01) 
2.56 
 
4.87a 4.73a 3.93a 7.00b 5.00 5.33 p<0.005 Learning 
 (2.07) (1.49) (2.46) (1.00) (2.67) 2.26 
3.95 
 
5.33 3.60a 4.40 5.93b 3.60a 4.40 p<0.05 Accountability 
 (2.29) (1.50) (2.26) (2.05) (2.61) (1.60) 
3.01 
 
7.13cd 5.67b 5.80bc 7.67ad 6.07cb 6.93 p<0.001 Enjoyment 
 (1.13) (1.35) (1.82) (0.98) (1.16) (1.62) 
5.26 
 
2.53ac 5.53b 3.53cd 4.53bd 5.00bd 4.47bd p<0.001 Self-presentation 
(1.06) (1.30) (1.55) (0.92) (1.85) (1.73) 
8.36 
 
3.20 2.47
 
3.53 3.40 5.07
 
4.40
 
p<0.001 Intimacy 
(2.27) (1.36) (2.03) (2.06) (2.60) (1.36) 
6.13 
 
2.47 4.00 3.27 2.93 3.60 3.40 1.46 p<0.21 Embarrassment 
(1.41) (1.25) (1.83) (1.83) (1.88) (1.92)   
3.13 4.33 2.67 6.40 3.00 5.73 2.67 p<0.05 Isolation  
(2.16) (1.95) (1.45) (1.64) (1.31) (2.08)   
517.80bc 397.47cd 449.33 605.47b 295.33da 446.40 5.74 p<0.001 Word count 
 (174.94) (150.71) (201.54) (160.78) (108.91) (205.29)     
0.62
 
1.10
 
0.93
 
0.53b 1.35a 0.66 3.10 p=0.05 Ratio of public to 
private (0.40) (1.26) (0.84) (0.37) (0.41) (0.48)   
Table  6.1:  A summary of the means and (standard deviations) and univariate effects across the 
conditions for the British and Singaporeans participants in the socially isolated experiment 
(Experiment 4). Different subscripts indicate significant differences (Tukey; p<0.05). 
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  Control   Projected-
mirror 
  Door-
ajar 
  F 
value 
Sig 
  Sing 
Dyadic 
Sing 
Isolated 
Sing 
Dyadic 
Sing 
Isolated 
Sing 
Dyadic 
Sing 
Isolated 
    
5.00
 
4.07
 
3.60
 
3.40
 
5.20
 
3.80
 
p<0.005 Public self-
awareness 2.48 2.40 2.80 1.84 2.33 1.74 
4.11 
 
5.73
 
5.40
 
6.27
 
7.20
 
5.67
 
6.53
 
p<0.005 Private self-
awareness 2.05 1.84 1.67 1.47 1.88 1.68 
3.84 
 
6.13
 
5.20a 6.67 7.07b 6.53 6.53 p<0.05 Breadth 
1.41 2.18 1.49 1.22 1.36 2.07 
3.14 
 
6.27
 
5.27a 5.67 7.40b 6.13 5.87 p<0.001 Depth 
1.67 1.91 2.29 1.18 1.60 1.68 
8.98 
 
8.00
 
8.00
 
8.20
 
8.20
 
8.20
 
7.80
 
p<0.05 Accuracy 
1.13 0.85 1.15 0.68 1.15 1.01 
2.56 
 
5.00
 
4.73a 5.67 7.00b 5.27 5.33 p<0.005 Learning 
2.10 1.49 2.13 1.00 2.12 2.26 
3.95 
 
4.87
 
3.60a 4.80 5.93b 4.13 4.40 p<0.05 Accountability 
1.96 1.50 2.76 2.05 2.44 1.60 
3.01 
 
7.27bc 5.67a 7.87bd 7.67bc 7.73cd 6.93ab p<0.001 Enjoyment 
 1.28 1.35 1.30 0.98 1.03 1.62 
5.26 
 
4.67
 
5.53
 
5.33
 
4.53
 
5.00
 
4.47
 
p<0.001 Self-
presentation 2.23 1.30 2.23 0.92 1.81 1.73 
8.36 
 
3.67
 
4.33
 
2.75a 6.40b 2.67a 5.73b p<0.05 Isolation 
 2.16 1.95 1.79 1.64 1.45 2.08 
2.67 
 
3.73
 
6.53
 
2.60
 
3.40
 
3.40
 
5.40
 
p=0.47 Intimacy 
2.46 1.36 2.06 2.06 2.06 1.36 
0.92 
 
2.40 4.00a 2.33 2.93 1.80b 3.40 1.46 p=0.21 Embarrassment 
1.45 1.25 1.88 1.83 1.56 1.92   
0.90
 
1.10
 
0.70
 
0.53
 
1.00
 
0.66
 
1.53 P=0.19 Ratio of Public 
to Private  (0.40) (1.26) (0.71) (0.37) (0.50) (0.48)   
Table 6.2: A summary of the means and univariate effects across the conditions for the 
Singaporean participants in the socially isolated (Experiment 4) and the dyadic experiments 
(Experiment 3). Different subscripts indicate significant differences (Tukey; p<0.05). 
 
 
 
The control condition 
 
Singaporean socially isolated vs. British socially isolated 
 
Throughout this thesis private self-awareness has been a good indicator of depth 
of self-disclosure, and the results in the control condition of Experiment 4, 
revealed the British participants to report slightly higher levels of private self-
awareness (M=6.73, SD=1.16) than the Singaporean participants (M=5.40, 
SD=1.84, p=0.24), although not significantly.  The British participants also 
reported similar levels of public self-awareness (M=3.93, SD=2.19) and ratio of 
public to private self-awareness (M=0.62, SD=0.40) to the Singaporean 
participants (M=4.07, SD=2.40, p=1.00; M=1.10, SD=1.26, p=0.42).  The control 
condition was reported in the previous British experiment (Experiment 2) to 
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promote high levels of private self-awareness and to reduce levels of public self-
awareness, which was followed by high levels of self-disclosure. This also 
appeared to be the same for the Singaporeans in the socially isolated condition 
when compared to the British participants in the socially isolated conditions.  The 
Singaporeans (M=5.27, SD=1.91) self-disclosed to a similar level of depth of self-
disclosure as the British participants (M=5.13, SD=1.96, p=1.00).  H1 was 
therefore rejected.  The British participants (M=7.60, SD=1.35) did, however, 
report higher levels of breadth than the Singaporean participants (M=5.20, 
SD=2.18, p<0.001).  The Singaporean participants also typed fewer words 
(M=397.47, SD=150.71) than their British counterparts (M=517.80, SD=174.94, 
p=0.39), although this was not significant.  
 
These measures suggested that the British participants talked more widely about 
themselves, but the British and Singaporean participants were equal in their depth 
of self-disclosure.  Notably, compared to the past self-disclosure scores it is no 
surprise that the British participants self-disclosed deeply. However, particularly 
in a situation, which arguably encouraged more personally motivated self-
disclosure, and where the Singaporean had no participant to match, the 
Singaporeans self-disclosed as deeply as the British participant.  This provides 
evidence that the Singaporeans were interested in exploring their private self 
through self-disclosure.  The findings do therefore refute the notion that members 
of collectivist cultures have less private self-knowledge and therefore less to self-
disclose (Asai and Barnlund, 1998).  Although they may have less complex 
private selves (Triandis, 1989) they do seem keen to explore and extend the 
complexity of their private self in this condition.  Moreover, the results challenged 
past research that suggests that members of collectivist cultures are restrained, 
formal and cautious, in their self-disclosure (Barnlund 1989; Miyanaga, 1991; 
Kito, 2005; Asai and Barnlund, 1998).  The result reported here highlighted that 
the level of self-disclosure depends on the circumstances under which the self-
disclosure is measured.  From the self-reported scores of self-disclosure in the 
control condition the Singaporeans’ self-disclosure did not reflect restrained, 
formal or cautious behaviour. 
 
The British participants reported themselves to enjoy the experience (M=7.13, 
SD= 1.13) more than the Singaporean participants (M=5.67, SD=1.35, p<0.001).  
This is consistent with the suggestion that whilst British participants are more 
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used to self-disclosing intimately in their culture, members of collectivist cultures, 
such as Singapore, are not (Gudykunst et al., 1987; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991; 
Kito, 2005). The Singaporeans may thus have found the process less enjoyable.  
There was however no difference in the Singaporean participants (M=4.00, 
SD=1.25) levels of embarrassment, or intimacy (M=2.47, SD=1.36) compared to 
the British participants (M=2.47, SD=1.41, p=0.15; M=3.20, SD=2.27),The 
British participants may be more accustomed to this type of interaction, and also 
of discussing these types of topics, but this is only reflected in the score for 
enjoyment. These differences are summarised in Figure 6.1. 
 
Notably, despite the Singaporeans enjoying the process slightly less and finding it 
more intimate, they still self-disclosed as deeply as the British participants. 
Clearly the Singaporean participants felt the subjective utility to be higher than the 
subjective risk in the situation.  The results clearly illustrated that the 
Singaporeans do have something to gain from self-disclosing deeply in the task, 
and both the Singaporeans (M=4.73, SD=1.49) and British participants reported 
similar levels of learning (M=4.87, SD=2.07, p=1.00).  It is argued here that the 
British and Singaporean participants used the condition to engage in personally 
motivated self-disclosure.  They may have used the task to explore the self, and 
may have engaged in self-expressive writing (cf. Wright, 2002) where they may 
have explored their private self, their problems and issues in their lives. The 
Singaporeans (M=4.33. SD=1.95) also reported similar levels of isolation to the 
British participants (M=3,13, SD=2.16, p=0.50), and reported themselves to be 
slightly less accountable, although not significantly, for what they said during the 
interaction (M=3.60, SD=1.50), than the British participants (M=5.33, SD=2.29, 
p=0.51).   
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Figure 6.1:  An illustration that although the Singaporean and British participants’ depth of self-
disclosure is similar in Experiment 4, it elicits different feelings and behaviour from the 
Singaporean and British participants 
 
Interestingly, the Singaporeans also reported that although they were self-
disclosing intimately and deeply, they also reported that they presented a more 
positive image of themselves in the condition (M=5.53, SD=1.30), than the British 
participants (M=2.53, SD 1.06, p<0.001; Figure 6.1).  Whilst their self-
presentation was more positive than their British counterparts, they did also report 
that their self-disclosures were as accurate (M=8.00, SD=0.85) as the British 
participants (M=8.60, SD=0.83, p=0.51).  This comes as a surprise as it was the 
British participants who were thought to have the more complex private self (cf. 
Triandis, 1989).  The Singaporeans did, however, in this safe and unthreatening 
situation, where there was no immediate partner to impress or match, present a 
more positive image.  The question is therefore raised, of who this positive image 
was benefiting for in this control condition?  It could have been for the benefit of 
the experimenter, or for the distant reader of their self-disclosures. However, it is 
also possible that it may have been for the Singaporean participants.   
 
Hsu (1985) suggests that members of collectivist cultures do not have a true self, 
and that the true self is not relevant in collectivist cultures. Furthermore, Spencer-
Rodgers et al., (2009) also report that members of East-Asian cultures do not 
desire a consistent self.  It is argued here, that the true self is hidden in the British 
participants and that when public self-awareness is reduced the true self can 
emerge. If the British participant presents a more positive image of themselves, 
then this is thought to lead to a discrepancy between the true self and the ideal self 
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(Higgins, 1987).  However, if a true self is not relevant to a Singaporean, and the 
self can change depending on the situation, questions remain as to whether the 
distinctions between a true and ideal self are relevant for the Singaporean.  In this 
condition, the Singaporean was socially isolated and anonymous, yet they still 
presented a more positive image of themselves, and this self may, therefore, be 
true for them in this situation. If the true self is defined, as the self that the 
participant feels to be ‘not me,’ as opposed to ‘is me,’ as it has been 
operationalised in past studies (cf. Markhus, 1977; Bargh et al., 2002), it might be 
that, if the Singaporean felt a positive image of the self ‘is me’ then, this may 
represent their true self.  Given this, more research is required to understand the 
meaning of the true self in Singaporean culture, and whether the idealised self is 
synonymous with the true self.  
 
Singapore dyadic vs. isolated 
 
The high levels of depth of self-disclosure observed in the control condition did 
indicate that the Singaporeans’ self-disclosures were representing personally 
motivated self-disclosure, and not just matching the high self-disclosing 
confederate in Experiment 3. The Singaporean participants self-disclosed as 
deeply, broadly and accurately in the socially isolated control condition (M=5.27, 
SD=1.91; M=5.20; SD=2.18, M=8.00, SD=0.85) as they did in the dyadic 
conditions (M=6.27, SD=1.67, p=0.62; M=6.13, SD=1.41, p=0.62; M=8.00, 
SD=1.13, p=0.52). H2 was therefore rejected. It was confirmed that in the 
absence of a dyad the Singaporeans did wish to explore their personal self.  Again 
this supports the idea that the Singaporeans were interested in expanding their 
private self, but as their culture is less open (Barnlund, 1975; Miyanaga, 1991; 
Asai & Barnlund, 1998; Kito, 2005) they have fewer opportunities to do so.  This 
was also evidence of the importance of the private, or individual, self for the 
Singaporean participants, despite them being from a collectivist culture.  Some 
researchers have argued for the primacy of the collective self in collectivist 
cultures (Kashima & Kashima, 1988) and there are many reports that collectivist 
cultures promote the relational self, rather than the individual, or private, self (cf. 
Triandis, 1989; Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991; Asai & Barnlund, 1998).  It is argued 
here that, as Sedikides and Gaertner (2001, p.19) suggests, the individual self is 
the ‘homebase’ of the self, and the private self is important for the Singaporeans. 
This was clearly evident in this experiment, where the opportunity was given to 
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the Singaporeans to explore their private self, in a situation that was arguably set 
apart from social and cultural norms, and they used it to explore the self deeply.   
 
The Singaporeans in the socially isolated experiment reported similar levels of 
private self-awareness (M=5.40 SD=1.84) and public self-awareness (M=4.07, 
SD=2.40), and ratio of public self-awareness to private self-awareness (M=1.10, 
SD=1.26), as the participants in the dyadic experiment (M=5.73 SD=2.05, 
p=0.24; M=5.00, SD=2.48, p=1.00; M=0.90, SD=0.40, p=1.00).  They also 
reported similar levels of learning (M=4.73, SD=1.49), self-presentation (M=5.53, 
SD=1.30), isolation (M=4.33, SD=1.80), intimacy (M=2.47, SD=1.36), 
embarrassment (M=4.00, SD=1.25) and accountability (M=3.60, SD=1.50), to the 
participants in the dyadic experiment for learning (M=5.00, SD=2.10, p=1.00), 
self-presentation (M=4.67, SD=2.23, p=0.001 ), intimacy (M=3.73, SD=2.46, 
p=0.91), isolation (M=3.13, SD=2.17, p=0.45), embarrassment (M=2.40, 
SD=1.45, p=0.15) and accountability (M=4.87, SD=1.96, p=0.22).  The only 
significant difference between the Singaporeans dyadic and isolated data comes 
from the enjoyment score. The Singaporeans reported that they enjoyed the dyadic 
interaction (M=7.27, SD= 1.28) more than the isolated interaction (M=5.67, 
SD=1.35, p<0.05).  This enjoyment of the dyadic situation for the Singaporeans, 
could suggest that they were enjoying some of the social benefits of interacting 
with the other participants, whereas when there was no partner in the isolated 
condition, they continued to self-disclose highly and broadly, in this instance, the 
motivation was less likely to be social, which may be perceived by the 
Singaporeans as less enjoyable.  It has been reported in previous experiments by 
Goh (2004) that enjoyment is more associated with self-disclosure in social 
situations.  In socially isolated conditions, the process of self-disclosure is 
personally motivated, and the participants may be exploring the private self, or 
dissolving worry. This type of self-disclosure can be considered, therefore, to be 
more serious, and may perhaps be less associated with enjoyment.  
Projected-mirror condition 
 
Singaporean socially isolated vs. British socially isolated 
 
In Experiment 1, the projected-mirror condition seemed to increase the British 
participants’ private self-awareness and reduce their public self-awareness, which 
resulted in increased depth of self-disclosure.  It also yielded a low score for how 
social they considered their partner to be, which supported the assertion that 
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increased private self-awareness increases personal motivations (Miller and Read, 
1987), which, in this case, was argued to be personally motivated self-disclosure.  
In contrast, when the manipulation was examined in the British isolated 
experiment (Experiment 2) it did not have the same effect.  It was concluded that 
the manipulation intensified in Experiment 2, due to there being less attentional 
demands on the participant, who was no longer managing an interaction.  It was 
reported that in this situation, as more attention could be paid to the manipulation 
of the projected-mirror image, that the manipulation may have become more like 
the previously used large mirror manipulation.  In the large mirror manipulation, it 
has been seen that the mirror could lead to similar effects as anticipated further 
meeting of a partner (Snyder & Monson, 1975; Webb et al., 1989). In Experiment 
3, the projected-mirror had little effect upon the Singaporean participant and this 
was taken as evidence that the Singaporean is typical of a member of a collectivist 
culture, who is consistent in public and private situations (cf., Bontempo et al., 
1990).  It was, however, predicted that the Singaporean participants’ increased 
levels of self-disclosure were possibly due to them matching the confederate in 
Experiment 3. Therefore, it was predicted that they would self-disclose at lower 
levels than the British participants in the projected-mirror condition, and also 
lower than they had in the dyadic experiment (Experiment 3).    
 
The Singaporeans reported greater levels of private self-awareness (M=7.20, 
SD=1.47) than their British counterparts (M=5.80, SD=1.97, p<0.001), and 
slightly lower levels of public self-awareness (M=3.40, SD=1.84) than their 
British counterparts (M=4.33, SD=2.23, p=0.80), although this was not 
significant.   The ratio of public to private self-awareness for the Singaporeans 
(M=0.53, SD=0.37), compared to the British (M=0.93, SD=0.84, p=0.63), was 
also not significant in the projected-mirror condition. Increased private self-
awareness was confirmed to be associated with depth of self-disclosure in the 
previous experiments reported within this thesis.  This trend was followed here, 
where the Singaporeans’ greater private self-awareness led them to also report 
greater levels of depth (M=7.40, SD=1.18) than the British participants (M=4.27, 
SD=2.55, p<0.001).  H3 was therefore accepted. The Singaporean participants 
also reported more breadth of self-disclosure in this projected-mirror condition 
(M=7.40, SD=1.18), than the British participants (M=5.67, SD=2.47, p=0.37), 
although this was not significant.  They did, however, also type similar amounts 
of words (M=605.47, SD=160.78) as the British participants (M=449.33, 
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SD=201.54, p=0.38).  The Singapore participants did, therefore, seem to self-
disclose more deeply, on a similarly broad range of topics to the British 
participants, and these results are illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Public self-
awareness
Private self-
awareness
Breadth Depth
Variation in self-disclosure and self-awareness
Sc
al
e 
fro
m
 
qu
es
tio
n
n
ai
re
Projected-mirror British
Projected-mirror Sing
 
Figure 6.2:  An illustration of the surprise effects of the projected-mirror manipulation in the 
socially isolated experiment (Experiment 4) 
 
It was concluded that the increased private self-awareness in the projected-mirror 
manipulation, encouraged the Singaporean participants to self-disclose more 
deeply on less topics that the British participants.  Again, this supported the 
projected-mirror manipulation as a way of increasing private self-awareness in 
experiments, which supported Joinson (2001) and Yao & Flanagin (2006). 
However, it should also be noted that the manipulation did not consistently 
produce this effect over all of the experiments.  It also finds support for the 
assertion that increasing private self-awareness increases self-disclosure (Joinson, 
2001), and this could be important in understanding heightened self-disclosure in 
CMC. Again, the Singaporean participants seem to use this opportunity, to 
explore themselves intimately, using the process of self-disclosure.  This again 
refutes the premise that members of collectivist cultures have less private self-
knowledge, and will therefore self-disclose less than members of individualistic 
cultures (Asai and Barnlund, 1998), and supports the notion that members of 
collectivist cultures are interested in their private self, but live in a culture which 
does not promote the gaining of this type of self-disclosure associated with the 
private self.  It was, however, also suggested, based on the work of Bontempo et 
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al. (1990) and English and Chen (2007), that the Singaporeans would be 
consistent across all the conditions in their behaviour.  The results of this isolated 
projected-mirror condition did not continue this finding of consistency.  It is worth 
noting, however, that Bontempo et al.’s study did find that it was the British 
participants who reacted differently when a situation was public, as it activated 
social desirability pressures.  Members of collectivist cultures may, therefore, be 
consistent across situations, which are high or low in public self-awareness. This 
was also confirmed by their being no correlation between accuracy and public 
self-awareness in Experiment 3. No studies have, however, been conducted to 
examine whether members of collectivist cultures are consistent in their self-
disclosure in situations where private self-awareness is raised.  This was tested in 
the present experiment, which illustrated that increased private self-awareness in 
Singaporeans, greatly increased their depth of self-disclosure. 
 
In this condition the Singaporean participants also reported greater learning 
(M=7.00, SD=1.00) than their British counterparts (M=3.93, SD=2.46, p<0.005).  
This greater learning could be expected as the Singaporeans did appear to engage 
with the task more, using it to self-disclose deeply and learning more about their 
personal self.  The Singaporean participants also reported themselves to present a 
similarly positive image of themselves (M=4.53, SD=0.92) to the British 
participants (M=3.53, SD=1.55, p=0.41).  There were however, no differences in 
how intimate (M=5.60, SD=2.06), embarrassing (M=2.93, SD=1.83), or how 
accountable (M=5.93, SD=2.06) the Singaporean participants felt they were, in 
comparison to the British participants (M=5.47, SD=2.03, p=1.00; M=3.27, 
SD=1.83, p=0.99; M=4.40, SD=2.26, p=0.99). There were also no differences in 
how isolating the Singaporeans reported the condition to be (M=6.40 SD=1.64), 
compared to the British participants (M=2.67, SD=1.45, p=0.23).   In this 
condition, the Singaporean participants also reported greater enjoyment (M=7.67, 
SD=0.98) than the British participants (M=5.80, SD=1.82, p<0.01). This finding 
is interesting as in the dyadic experiment (Experiment 3), the Singaporean 
participants did not seem to enjoy self-disclosing deeply, but their self-disclosure 
and learning increased in this heightened private self-awareness condition. It is 
possible, therefore, that Singaporeans can only enjoy this deep type of self-
disclosure in this type of isolated situation. The projected-mirror manipulation 
appeared to have a marked effect upon the Singaporean participants in the socially 
isolated experiment (Experiment 4), but this was not the case in the dyadic 
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experiment (Experiment, 3). In Experiment 2, the social isolation seemed to 
intensify the manipulations for the British participants, and it was possible that a 
similar phenomenon was occurring here.  It is possible to compare the data for the 
Singaporean dyadic and the Singaporean isolated experiments to explore this 
further.   
 
Singaporean dyadic vs. Singaporean isolated 
 
There were no significant differences in the levels of private self-awareness 
(M=7.20, SD=1.47), breadth of self-disclosure (M=7.07, SD=1.22) and depth of 
self-disclosure (M=7.40 SD=1.18) for the Singaporeans in the socially isolated 
experiment (Experiment 4) compared to the dyadic experiment (Experiment 3) 
(M=6.27, SD=1.67, p=0.18, M=6.67, SD=1.49, p=0.95; M=5.67, SD=2.29, 
p=0.36).  The participants also did not report any differences in public self-
awareness (M=3.40, SD=1.84) or ratio (M=0.53, SD=0.37) in the socially isolated 
experiment, compared to the dyadic experiment (M=0.70, SD=0.71, p=0.76) 
(M=3.60, SD=2.80, p=1.00).  H4 was therefore therefore rejected, noting that the 
Singaporean participants’ self-disclosure was no longer consistent.  There were 
also no significant differences between the Singaporeans self-reported accuracy of 
self-disclosure (M=8.20, SD=0.68), or their scores of self-presentation (M=4.53, 
SD=0.92), in the socially isolated experiment, when compared to the dyadic 
experiment (M=8.20, SD=1.15, p=1.00; M=5.33, SD=2.23, p=0.83). Nor did the 
Singaporeans in the socially isolated experiment report any differences in their  
enjoyment (M=7.67 SD=0.98), intimacy (M=3.53., SD=2.03), learning (M=7.00, 
SD=1.00), embarrassment (M=2.93, SD=1.83), or their accountability (M=5.93, 
SD=2.05), in comparison with their Singaporean counterparts in the dyadic 
experiment for enjoyment, (M=7.87, SD=1.30, p=1.00), intimacy (M=2.60, 
SD=2.06, p=0.94); learning (M=5.67, SD=2.13, p=0.36), embarrassment 
(M=1.80, SD=1.56, p=0.18), or accountability (M=4.80, SD=2.76, p=1.00).  
Compared with the British participants in the projected-mirror condition the 
manipulation had a far greater effect upon the Singaporean participants.  
However, the Singaporeans were fairly consistent in the dyadic and isolated 
experiments, indicating again that the Singaporean participants may not have been 
matching the confederate’s high self-disclosure.  When the Singaporean 
participants were isolated, they continued exploring the self deeply. Again, this 
provided support for the argument that the Singaporeans were interested in 
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exploring their private self, but that in their culture there are less opportunities to 
do so.   
 
Singaporean control vs.  projected-mirror condition 
 
The conclusion that the projected-mirror manipulation had a marked effect on the 
Singaporeans was confirmed when the data comparing the control and projected-
mirror condition in this socially isolated experiment were compared.  The 
Singaporean participants self-disclosed to a significantly greater breadth (M=7.07, 
SD=1.22) and greater depth (M=7.40, SD=1.18) in the projected-mirror condition, 
as compared with their breadth (M=5.20, SD=2.18 p<0.05), or depth (M=5.27 
SD=1.91, p<0.001), in the control condition.  From these results, it was clear that 
there was something about seeing a projected image of the self reflected on the 
screen, which led the Singaporeans to explore their self more broadly and deeply.  
This image had the reverse effect on the British participants whose projected-
mirror image reduced how broadly they self-disclosed and had no effect on how 
deeply they explored their self, in the socially isolated condition. This difference 
could be due to the manipulations instigating different levels of private and public 
self-awareness in the Singaporeans and the British.  This was supported by the 
Singaporean participants reporting significantly higher levels of private self-
awareness (M=7.20, SD=1.47) in the projected-mirror condition, as compared to 
the control condition (M=5.40, SD=1.84, p<0.05).  The Singaporean participants 
also reported lower levels of public self-awareness (M=3.40, SD=1.84) than in the 
control condition (M=4.07, SD=2.40, p=0.94), although this was not significant. 
The significantly higher levels of private self-awareness and self-disclosure for 
the Singaporeans, in the projected mirror condition, compared with the control 
condition, are illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
 
In line with the scores for depth of self-disclosure, the Singaporeans reported that 
they found the task more intimate (M=5.60, SD=2.06) than participants in the 
control condition (M=2.47, SD=1.36, p<0.005).  They also typed more words in 
the projected-mirror condition (M=605.47, SD=160.78), than in the control 
condition (M=397.47, SD=150.71, p<0.05).  The Singaporeans also reported that 
they learnt (M=7.00, SD=1.00) more in the projected-mirror condition than they 
did in the control condition (M=4.73, SD=1.49, p<0.05), and again this was likely 
to be related to them self-disclosing to a greater breadth and depth.  Other 
significant findings were that the Singaporean participants reported that they 
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enjoyed (M=7.67, SD=0.98) the projected-mirror condition more than the control 
condition (M=5.67, SD=1.35, p<0.005).  They also felt more accountable in the 
projected-mirror condition (M=5.93, SD=2.05), as compared to the control 
condition (M=3.60, SD=1.50, p<0.05), but they felt equally as isolated in the 
projected-mirror condition (M=6.40, SD=1.64), as they did in the control  
condition (M=4.33, SD=1.95, p=0.61). There was however no significant 
difference between the self-presentation scores, for the Singaporeans in the 
control (M=5.53, SD=1.30), or the accuracy scores (M=8.00. SD=0.85) and the 
projected-mirror condition (M=4.53, SD=0.92, p=0.41; M=8.20, SD=0.68, 
p=0.99), although it was reported earlier that the Singaporeans’ self that they are 
presenting in both conditions was a more positive image than the British 
participants. 
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Figure 6.3: Illustration of the greater scores of private self-awareness and self-disclosure the 
Singaporeans had in the projected-condition compared to the control 
Door-ajar condition  
 
Singapore socially isolated vs. British socially isolated 
 
The Singaporean participants in the door-ajar condition reported lower levels of 
public self-awareness (M=3.80, SD=1.74), than the British participants (M=6.33, 
SD=1.29, p<0.001).  They also reported slightly higher levels of private self-
awareness (M=6.33, SD=1.68) than their British counterparts (M=5.07, SD=1.58, 
p=0.24), although this was significant.  Nor was the ratio of public to private self-
awareness for the Singaporeans (M=0.66, SD=0.48) compared to the British 
(M=1.35, SD=0.41, p=0.09) significant.  These results suggest that the British 
participants were far more distracted by the door-ajar manipulation that the 
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Singaporean participants.  The Singaporeans also reported significantly higher 
depth (M=5.87, SD=1.68) than the British participants (M=3.13, SD=1.64, 
p<0.001), although the Singaporean participants reported similar levels of breadth 
of self-disclosure (M=6.53, SD=2.07) to the British participants (M=6.07, 
SD=2.09, p=0.99). They also typed more words (M=446.40, SD=205.29) during 
the task than the British participants (M=295.33, SD=108.91, p=0.16), although 
this was not significant. H5 was therefore accepted, as the Singaporean 
participants did self-disclose to a greater depth than the British participants in the 
socially isolated door-ajar condition.  These differences can clearly be seen in 
Figure 6.4, where the British participant levels of public self-awareness are higher 
than the Singaporeans, and their levels of private self-awareness are lower than 
the Singaporeans, which lead them to self-disclose less deeply than the 
Singaporean participants.  The door-ajar manipulation was clearly not having the 
same negative effect on the Singaporeans’ self-disclosure. 
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Figure 6.4:  Illustration of the negative effect the door-ajar condition had upon the British 
participants’ self-awareness and self-disclosure, compared to the Singaporeans participants 
 
These were however the only significant findings.  The Singaporean participants 
reported their self-disclosure to be of similar accuracy (M=7.80, SD=1.01) to the 
British participants (M=7.53, SD=1.41, p=0.97), and  they reported their level of 
self-presentation (M=4.47, SD=1.73) to be similar to the British participants 
(M=5.00, SD=1.85, p=0.91), although, returning to the results of Experiment 2, it 
was clear that the British participants were presenting a more positive image of 
themselves than in their control condition.  Throughout the results, it was 
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emerging that the Singaporeans consistently presented a more positive image.  
The Singaporean participants also reported similar levels of accountability 
(M=4.40, SD=1.60) to the British participants (M=3.60, SD=2.61, 0.97), and a 
similar amount of learning (M=5.33, SD=2.26) to the British participants 
(M=5.00, SD=2.67, p=0.99).  The Singaporeans also reported similar levels of 
isolation (M=5.73, SD=2.08) and intimacy (M=5.07, SD=2.60) to the British 
participants (M=3.00, SD=1.31, p=0.37; M=3.93, SD=2.60, p=0.71).  Finally, 
they reported similar levels of enjoyment (M=6.93, SD=1.62) and embarrassment 
(M=3.40, SD=1.92) to the British participants (M=6.07, SD=1.16, p=0.52; 
M=3.60, SD=1.88, p=1.00).  
 
Singapore door- ajar isolated vs. dyadic 
The differences between the British and Singaporean participants were mainly 
explained by the British participants’ reaction to the condition, rather than 
anything particularly notable in the Singaporeans’ self-reported behaviour.  The 
door-ajar condition was seen to make very little difference to the Singaporeans in 
the dyadic condition (Experiment 3), and these results were replicated in the 
isolated experiment (Experiment 4).  For the British participants the effect of the 
door-ajar was greatly intensified in Experiment 2, by the social isolation.  
However, the door-ajar manipulation had a similar effect on public (M= 5.20, 
SD=2.33) and private self-awareness (M=5.67, SD=1.88) and ratio of self-
awareness (M=1.00, SD=0.50) in the dyadic door-ajar condition, as compared to 
the isolated door-ajar condition (M=3.80, SD=1.74, p=1.00; M=6.53, SD=1.68, 
p=1.00; M=0.66, SD=0.48, p=0.76).  The breadth (M= 6.53, SD=1.36) and depth 
(M= 6.13, SD=1.60) of self-disclosure, were also similar in the dyadic door-ajar 
condition, as compared to the isolated door-ajar condition (M=6.53, SD=2.07, 
p=1.00; M=5.87, SD=1.68, p=1.00).  H6 was therefore rejected, as the 
Singaporean participants’ self-disclosures were consistent across the door-ajar 
isolated and dyadic conditions. 
 
There were also no differences between the levels of self-presentation (M= 5.00, 
SD=1.81), or accuracy (M= 8.20, SD=1.15), in the dyadic door-ajar condition, in 
comparison to the isolated door-ajar condition (M=4.47, SD=1.73, p=0.76; 
M=7.80, SD=1.01, p=0.89).  Finally, there were no differences in the scores for 
intimacy (M= 3.40, SD=2.06), enjoyment (M= 7.73, SD=1.03), learning (M= 
5.27, SD=2.12), embarrassment (M= 2.33, SD=1.88) and accountability (M= 
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4.13, SD=2.44), between the dyadic door-ajar condition and the isolated door-ajar 
condition for intimacy (M=4.60, SD=1.36, p=0.71), enjoyment (M= 6.93, 
SD=1.62, p=0.35), learning (M=5.33, SD=2.26, p=1.00), embarrassment 
(M=3.40, SD=1.92, p=0.50), and accountability (M=4.40, SD=1.60, p=0.99).  
Again, these results found support for Bontempo et al. (1990), who suggested that 
members of collectivist cultures are consistent across public and private situations.  
The self-disclosure of the Singaporean participants was consistent, whether they 
had a partner or not. Significantly Bontempo et al. reported that members of 
individualistic cultures were more affected by social desirability pressures than 
members of collectivist cultures.  This was supported here, where the British 
participants reported themselves to be less accurate in their self-disclosure and of 
presenting a more positive image of their self in the door-ajar condition, whilst the 
Singaporeans stayed more consistent. These results also supported the notion that 
the Singaporeans were not just matching their partner’s high self-disclosures in 
Experiment 4, but rather they were interested in exploring their private self by 
using CMC.  Singaporeans, who under the umbrella term of being collectivists, 
would usually be expected to follow goals in a relationship, which maintain 
connectedness or harmony, were arguably pursuing more personally motivated 
goals of self-disclosure. In CMC, and particularly in the absence of a partner, the 
Singaporean was still highly motivated to self-disclose. 
 
In Experiment 4, when the partner was removed, the Singaporean participants 
self-disclosed to similar level as they did in the dyadic condition.  Moreover, the 
only significant finding between the dyadic and isolated data, was in the score for 
isolation, with participants in the dyadic experiment reporting lower levels of 
isolation (M=9-2.40, SD= 1.30) than participants in the dyadic condition (M=9-
5.73, SD=2.09, p<0.001). Therefore, even if the self-disclosure in Experiment 3 
was socially motivated and was to match their partner, in Experiment 4, this 
isolation made the social motivations less accessible.  It is argued, therefore, that 
the motivation to self-disclose in Experiment 4 is personally motivated, and that 
the Singaporean uses the CMC situation to self-disclose more deeply than they do 
in their everyday life.  The CMC situation does, therefore, have great implications 
for the Singaporeans, as it allows them the freedom to pursue more individual 
goals, rather than the group or partner based goals suggested by Cross and 
Madson (1997). The Singaporean participants’ self-disclosure far outweighed 
their reported past self-disclosure (Study A), and this again is evidence that the 
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Singaporeans did want to self-disclose from their private or individual self, but 
their culture is not one which is open to this type of behaviour (cf. Markhus and 
Kitiyama, 1991).   
 
Singapore door-ajar vs. control  
The door-ajar condition had quite a marked effect on the British participants.  
Compared with the control condition, their breadth, depth and accuracy of self-
disclosure was significantly reduced.  Again, this could be linked to self-
awareness, where their private self-awareness was significantly reduced and their 
public self-awareness was significantly increased.  They also typed far less words, 
and did not feel accountable for what they discussed, and they also reported 
themselves to present a more positive image of them selves.  They also reported 
less intimacy in this task, than their counterparts in the control condition, and 
enjoyed the task less.  It was, therefore, apparent that the differences between the 
British and Singaporean participants in the door-ajar condition were due to the 
great effect this condition had upon the British, compared with the little effect it 
had for the Singaporean participants. This was confirmed when the door-ajar 
condition was compared with the control condition just for the Singaporeans.  The 
Singaporean participants self-disclosed similar levels of breadth (M=6.53, 
SD=2.07) and depth (M=5.87, SD=1.68) in the door-ajar condition, compared to 
the control condition (M=5.20, SD=2.18, p=0.95; M=5.27 SD=1.91, p=0.99). 
They also typed a similar amount of words in the door-ajar (M=446.40, 
SD=205.29) and control conditions (M=397.47, SD=150.71, p=0.97), and they 
also reported similar scores for private (M=6.53, SD=1.68) and public self-
awareness (M=3.80, SD=1.74) to the control condition (M=5.40, SD=1.84, 
p=0.41, M=4.07, SD=2.40, p=0.99). 
 
Moreover, the Singaporeans also reported similar scores for accuracy (M=7.80, 
SD=1.01) and self-presentation (M=4.47, SD=1.73) to the control condition 
(M=8.00, SD=0.85, p=0.99, M=5.53, SD=1.30, p=0.34). Similarly, there were no 
differences in the scores for enjoyment (M=6.93, SD=1.62) and learning (M=5.33, 
SD=2.26) when compared to the control condition (M=5.67, SD=1.35, p=0.13, 
M=4.73, SD=1.49, p=0.96).  Nor were there any differences for embarrassment 
(M=3.40, SD=1.92), accountability (M=4.40, SD=1.60) or isolation (M=5.73, 
SD=2.08), when compared to the control condition (M=4.00, SD=1.25, p=0.93; 
M=3.60, SD=1.50, p=0.90, M=4.33 SD=1.95, p=0.76).  The only significant 
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result found was for intimacy, with the participants in the door-ajar condition 
(M=4.60, SD=1.36) reporting lower levels of intimacy than in the control 
condition (M=2.47, SD=1.36, p<0.05). 
 
The only difference found between the door-ajar condition and the control 
condition, for the Singaporeans was for intimacy.  It was possible that the 
Singaporeans may have noticed the door being open and therefore viewed their 
self-disclosures as less intimate. It did not, however, affect how deeply they self-
disclosed, and this again supports the findings that members of collectivist 
cultures are more consistent across public and private situation than members of 
individualistic cultures (cf. Bontempo et al., 1990; Experiment 3). The only 
similarity between the Singaporeans and the British came in the score for self-
presentation, as the Singaporean participants also presented a more positive 
image.  However, whilst the British participant presented a more positive image of 
themselves, due to the increased public self-awareness of the door-ajar condition, 
the Singaporean consistently presented a more positive image across all the 
conditions of the experiment. Again, this provides some support for the notion 
that the Singaporeans are consistent in their presentations of the self and, in this 
case, were consistent in their presentation of a more positive image of themselves.   
 
Correlation results  
 
A Pearson correlation coefficient analysis was conducted over the combined 
Singaporean dyadic and isolated data, to look for trends that were specific to the 
Singaporean population. The strong correlation, that had been found across both 
cultures between private self-awareness and depth, was again confirmed 
r(90)=0.46, p<0.001.  There was also a strong correlation between breadth and 
private self-awareness r(90)=0.29, p<0.01, and also between breadth and depth 
r(90)=0.60, p<0.001.  Surprisingly, there was a slight negative association 
between public self-awareness and accuracy for the Singaporeans r(90)=-0.31, 
p<0.05, although it was not as strong as the negative association observed for the 
British participants.  This was quite a surprise finding as it was reported 
throughout Experiments 3 and 4 that the results indicated that the Singaporean 
participants were not as affected by public self-awareness as the British 
participants, which was consistent with the results of Bontempo et al.’s study 
(1990).  It was, however, possible that public self-awareness, or accuracy, is only 
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an issue when the private self is salient, and it is possible that when private self-
awareness is raised, awareness of such discrepancies are also raised (cf. Carver & 
Scheier, 1981).  As this appears to be the first experiment which raises the private 
self-awareness of Singaporean participants, and as a consequence elicits deep and 
accurate self-disclosure, it is possible that this is a side of the Singaporean not 
really seen in research.  If the true self comes into existence only when private 
self-awareness is raised, it may be possible that what was occurring in the 
experiment was an unusual view of the self for the Singaporeans.   
 
General Discussion 
 
The experiments within this thesis were designed to try and elicit intimate self-
disclosure in an experimental situation.  This was deemed important as it was 
argued, throughout this thesis, that what was particularly interesting about the 
self-disclosure which is being observed on-line is that it is intimate and optimal, 
and that it is also open and accurate. Moreover, many of the health benefits of 
self-disclosure (Pennebaker, 1989) require that the self-disclosure should be 
optimal, and often intimate. In the reported experiments, an intimate task, and 
high self-disclosing confederate were provided in an anonymous situation 
(Experiment 1 and 3), and this resulted in high levels of self-disclosure.  However, 
it was difficult to conclude form Experiments 1 and 3, that what was being elicited 
was the type of personally motivated self-disclosure that was of interest in this 
thesis.  This was particularly problematic in understanding the Singaporeans’ self-
disclosure, since they are from a collectivist culture, which encourages harmony 
(Markhus and Kitiyama, 1991).  It was possible, therefore, that their high self-
disclosure in Experiment 3 was due to them matching their partner’s self-
disclosure rather than engaging in deep personally motivated self-disclosure. 
However, in Experiment 4, although the dyad was removed and the participants 
were socially isolated, the Singaporean participants continued to self-disclose as 
deeply, broadly and accurately as they did in the dyadic experiment.   
 
It is, therefore, argued that the Singaporeans must have had personal motivation to 
pursue in Experiment 4. Returning to the DDM (Omarzu, 2000) it was noted that 
if there are weak goals self-disclosure will not occur.  However, self-disclosure 
was strong in Experiment 4 and, therefore there must have been clear and strong 
motivations for self-disclosure. It is further argued that the Singaporean 
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participants used the CMC interaction to gain more self-knowledge about their 
personal self, or to work through problems and dissolve worry, and to further 
clarify their personal identity. Although this was not reported in the results, it 
would be possible to explore this further using a qualitative analysis. It was also 
noted that the Singaporean culture is less open, than British culture (Study A), and 
there are less opportunities for this type of personal self-disclosure to occur, 
particularly to stranger.  It is, therefore, an interesting finding that in the CMC 
conditions and, particularly when private self-awareness is high, that the 
Singaporeans relish the opportunity to explore their private or individual self. The 
results of Experiment 4 also, therefore, provide strong evidence that the 
Singaporeans are interested in their private self, and do have much to self-
disclose, and refutes the assertion that members of collectivist cultures have less 
to self-disclose, as they have less private self-knowledge (Asai and Barnlund, 
1998).   
 
Finally, the results of Experiment 4 allowed some insight into what it was about 
the CMC interactions that allowed the participants to self-disclose deeply.  The 
Singaporeans self-disclosed more deeply than has been reported in any past 
studies (cf. Goodwin & Lee, 1994), or that they had indicated they would (Study 
A)  Evidence for the role of private self-awareness, in deep self-disclosure, was 
highlighted in the projected-mirror condition in Experiment 4.  Increased private 
self-awareness is reported to increase private goals (Miller and Read, 1987), and 
may have increased private goals of self-disclosure in the experiments.  Increased 
private self-awareness is also reported to increase access to inner thoughts and 
feelings (Scheier & Carver, 1980; Scheier & Carver, 1977).  It is possible in 
Experiment 4, that this increased private self-awareness encouraged the 
Singaporean participants to view themselves from their private self.  Although, 
usually in collectivist cultures the self is viewed as part of the social group, in 
Experiment 4 the projected mirror may have encouraged the Singaporeans to view 
the self as being distinct. Indeed, Singaporeans did report in the comments section 
of the questionnaire that they found that task to be quite a revelation, and this may 
have been due to the lack of encouragement for this type of introspection in their 
culture.  Increased private self-awareness was therefore linked to both depth and 
breadth of self-disclosure in Experiment 4.   
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For the British participants optimal and intimate self-disclosure depends upon 
heightened private self-awareness and reduced public self-awareness, and 
heightened public self-awareness has a very negative effect upon self-disclosure.  
Bontempo et al. (1990) reported that members of collectivist cultures to be more 
consistent throughout public and private situations, and this was supported in this 
experiment.  The Singaporeans were not affected by the door-ajar manipulation, 
and it is therefore suggested that Singaporeans are less affected by manipulations 
of public self-awareness than British participants.  Bontempo et al. reported that 
members of individualistic cultures are more susceptible to social desirability 
pressures, and they are also reported to be more driven by the need for a true and 
unique self (Hsu, 1985).  This experiment also supports these suggestions, as the 
Singaporeans were consistent and public self-awareness was difficult to increase 
effectively.  Having reported this, there was, however, a slight negative 
correlation between accuracy and public self-awareness in the final correlations, 
which suggests that the Singaporeans did adjust their behaviour when others were 
around, but not to the extent that the British participants did.  It did appear that 
increasing private self-awareness had the greatest effect on the self-disclosure of 
members of collectivist culture’s self-disclosure, as it arguably placed a lens on 
the more inhibited parts of the self.  In contrast, it appeared that increasing public 
self-awareness had the greatest effect on the self-disclosures of the members of 
the individualistic cultures, as it arguably placed a lens upon their more hidden 
aspects of the self, with the potential to expose a discrepancy between their true 
and projected self.  
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CHAPTER 7: Final Discussion 
 
 
The simple statement that self-disclosure is increased in CMC was explored in the 
present thesis. However this simple statement proved to be a springboard for 
many important discussions and topics to emerge.  In this final discussion, the 
main points that were raised in the thesis will be discussed, and during these 
discussions various limitations of the present research, and avenues for future 
research, will also be raised. The findings of the experiments provide evidence 
that contribute to three main areas within the literature, and these will be 
discussed in turn.  First, the findings will be discussed purely in terms of CMC 
and how they contribute to the CMC literature.  Second, this will be extended to a 
discussion of culture and CMC. Finally, the findings will be discussed in terms of 
what they can contribute to wider discussions of the cultural self.  A summary of 
the significant data collected across all four experiments is also presented in Table 
7.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1:  A summary of the significant differences in means between groups (***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05)  
 Experiment 1 
(dyadic) 
Experiment 2 
(socially isolated) 
Experiment 3 
(dyadic) 
Experiment 4 
(isolated) 
British condition 
 
 
Control vs Projected mirror Breadth**, 
depth***, 
sociable**, ratio* 
 
Breadth*, enjoyment*,   
Control vs. Door ajar Accuracy* 
 
Public self-awareness*, private 
self-awareness**, depth*, word-
count*, accuracy*, self-
presentation**, ratio* 
  
Singapore condition  
 
Control vs Projected mirror   no significant results Breadth*, depth***, private 
self-awareness* word-count*, 
learning* enjoyment** 
accountable* 
Control vs. Door ajar   no significant results  
Intimacy* 
British vs. Singapore 
condition 
 
 
Control  
 
 Depth**, trust* Breadth***, enjoyment***, 
self-presentation***,  
Projected-mirror  
 
 
no significant results Private*** self-awareness, 
depth***, word-count*, 
learning***, enjoyment** 
Door-ajar  
 
 
no significant results Public self-awareness***, 
depth*** 
Computer-Mediated Communication 
 
The experiments in Part 1 of the thesis were successful in their aims.  They aimed 
to investigate the role of self-awareness on deep self-disclosure in CMC.  Only 
one study had previously examined self-disclosure in CMC, in a self-awareness 
context, and it had focused only on breadth of self-disclosure (Joinson, 2001).  It 
was, however, noted in the introduction to Part 1, that what was particularly 
interesting about the self-disclosure that was occurring on-line was that, in some 
instances, it was surprisingly deep and open.  This was evidenced by deep self-
disclosure in self-help-groups (Salem, et al., 1998; Moon, 2000), instances of 
deep self-disclosure in relationship formation (Lea & Spears; 1995; Mckenna & 
Bargh, 2000) and in comparisons of forms being filled in by pen, FTF or by CMC 
(Greist et al., 1973).  The experiments in Part 1 successfully elicited  deep self-
disclosure, and the results of the experiments clearly illustrated that it was not just 
anonymity, but a combination of heightened private self-awareness, and reduced 
public self-awareness, that were attributable to the deep and optimal self-
disclosure reported in CMC. 
 
It was further suggested, from the results of the experiments in Part 1, that the 
experiences of public and private self-awareness in CMC combine to create quite 
a unique situation for self-disclosure to ensue.  In particular, the increased private 
self-awareness in CMC allowed the participants clear access to their thoughts and  
feelings (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1980), and also raised their awareness of their self-
discrepancies (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981).  When trying to deeply self-disclose it 
is useful for the self-discloser to have a clear view of their thoughts, and this 
awareness of self-discrepancies could also be partially used to explain the self-
disclosure from the true self, that was elicited in some conditions of the 
experiments.  However, for this accurate and deep self-disclosure to take place, 
this awareness of the thoughts that occurred in the participants ‘private realm’ had 
to be conveyed in the public realm.  Anonymous CMC interaction is particularly 
conducive to this process as it also reduces public self-awareness (Matheson & 
Zanna, 1998), and this makes it ‘safe’ for the participant to self-disclose this 
information.  This finding was also important as it highlighted the importance of 
the accuracy of the self-disclosure, particularly as accuracy of self-disclosure is 
generally not given much consideration in the literature.  It is not considered in the 
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Disclosure-Decision Model (Omarzu, 2000), nor has it been considered in recent 
research in CMC.  It is, however, argued here that CMC encourages the 
presentation of the true self in self-disclosure, and that this is an important finding.   
 
It is argued in this thesis that CMC provides the potential for being high in private 
self-awareness, whilst also being low in public self-awareness, and that this was 
particularly important for optimal and intimate self-disclosure to occur in the 
experiments.  Moreover, it is also suggested that the breadth, depth, accuracy and 
the motivation of self-disclosure are determined by an interaction between various 
activators of public and private self-awareness.  Consider a situation where a 
person is alone, and writing in a secret diary, and are engaged in a process of self-
expression (cf. Wright, 2002).  In this situation they have little threat or 
disturbance, and they are low in public self-awareness and high in private self-
awareness.  It is argued here that CMC can provide a situation where the 
awareness of the ‘other’ reduces (cf. Weisband & Reining, 1985; Bargh et al., 
2002), and the awareness of the self increases (cf. Kiesler et al., 1984).  CMC can, 
therefore, be compared to this diary situation, where the participant has clarity of 
thought, and the freedom and time to explore themselves (Wright, 2002), with few 
interpersonal risks (Walther, 1996). It is further argued that in this type of CMC 
situation, the reduced public self-awareness lessens the desire to pursue social, or 
relational, motivations.  Moreover, the increase in private self-awareness leads the 
individuals’ motives to become more personal (cf. Miller & Read, 1987).  It is for 
this reason that it was also argued in Part 1, that CMC may blur the boundaries of 
the individual and relational self (cf. Sedikides & Brewer, 2001).  More 
specifically, the increased private self-awareness may increase motives that are 
associated with the private self, such as protecting and enhancing the self 
psychologically (cf. Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001).  The present experiments 
investigated self-disclosure and self-awareness.  Future research could, however, 
focus more specifically on how private and public self-awareness affects the 
salience of different representations of the self. A task similar to that used by 
Bargh et al., (2002), which tested how readily the true self was accessed in CMC, 
could be used to test the participants’ access to the individual and relational self in 
CMC interactions. 
 
The experiments in Part 1 did try and explore the link between self-awareness and 
self-disclosure in CMC, by manipulating self-awareness. Two manipulations were 
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used and their effects were examined on self-disclosure.  Although the 
manipulations allowed for variations in private and public self-awareness to be 
attributed to depth and accuracy of self-disclosure in CMC, the results also clearly 
illustrated that great care must be taken when using manipulations of self-
awareness in CMC.  The levels of self-awareness that the participants experienced 
in the manipulations were not just tied to the manipulation, but also to their 
partner, the task, and what was going on around the participant at the time.  It was 
argued in the discussion of Part 1 that each of these different stimuli lead to 
different levels of private and public self-awareness, which ultimately affect the 
decision of how broadly, accurately and deeply the participant self-disclosed.  
This was raised in the introduction to Part 1 as a limitation of the present 
experiments. It was suggested that the measurements of self-awareness that were 
employed, did not account for these many possible activators of private and public 
self-awareness, and that further research was necessary using more specific scales.  
The experiments in Part 1 also gave no consideration of how the participants 
usually managed their levels of self-awareness.  Various links between self-
consciousness, self-monitoring and self-disclosure have been previously reported 
(Shaffer et al., 1982; Shaffer & Tomarelli, 1989), and it would have been useful to 
predefine the participants’ dispositional levels of self-awareness and then examine 
how high/low private and public self-monitors, or participants considered to be 
high/low in public/private self-consciousness, would respond to the 
manipulations.  This would be interesting in terms understanding the links 
between the more temporary and situational activators of self-awareness and their 
relation to dispositional factors (cf. Markhus & Wurf, 1986).  This was, however, 
recognised, in some respects in Part 2 of the thesis, where it was acknowledged 
that culture could drive the way in which the private and public self are managed, 
and that there could be cultural differences in the way the participants self-
disclosed in CMC and reacted to the manipulations.  
 
CMC and Culture 
 
Moving into Part 2 of the thesis, where a cultural perspective was added, many 
interesting points were raised. The Singaporean and British participants were 
similar in that they all self-disclosed deeply in the control conditions of the 
experiment.  The control condition provided an anonymous situation where the 
participant was alone in a cubicle using CMC.  This situation had been previously 
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reported to be high in private and low in public self-awareness (Matheson & 
Zanna, 1988; Joinson, 2001).  Although it was expected from the past literature, 
and from Study A, that the British participants would self-disclose deeply in this 
CMC situation, in contrast it was predicted that the Singaporeans would not self-
disclose deeply.  This prediction was based upon previous reports that in 
collectivist cultures self-disclosure is restrained (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991), and 
that members of collectivist cultures are driven by cultural aims to maintain 
harmony and save ‘face’ (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988), which often results 
in non intimate self-disclosure (Goodwin & Lee, 1994)  In contrast, members of 
individualistic cultures have been reported to be open and free in their self-
disclosures (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991), and to be driven by cultural aims that 
bolster their uniqueness, which often results in open self-disclosure (Goodwin & 
Lee, 1994).  The results of the experiments in Part 2 of the present thesis did 
therefore come as surprise. 
 
The Singaporean participants self-disclosed higher than expected, throughout 
Experiments 3 and 4. In the control condition of Experiment 3, they even reported 
themselves to self-disclose to a greater depth than the British participants.  It was 
argued that this illustrates that, given the correct circumstances, Singaporeans will 
report themselves to self-disclose, at similar levels, and sometimes even more than 
British participants.  It was reported in a previous cross-cultural study of self-
disclosure that members of collectivist culture self-disclose less from the private 
self, and as a consequence have less private self-knowledge, and conversely 
members of individualistic cultures self-disclose more from their private self and, 
therefore, have more private self-knowledge (Asai & Barnlund, 1998).  Asai and 
Barnlund used this to argue that members of collectivist cultures have less private 
self-knowledge and therefore have less to self-disclose from the private self. The 
results of the present study challenge this argument. Members of collectivist 
cultures may have a less complex private self (Triandis, 1989), but it is argued 
that this may only be indicative of them having less opportunity to explore their 
private self within their culture.  When the participants were given the opportunity 
to explore the private self in the presented experiments, the members of 
collectivist cultures explored the private self deeply.  This provides strong support 
for Sedikides and Gaertner’s (2001) claim that the individual self is primary and 
prevalent in collectivist cultures.   
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Concerns had been previously been raised by Asai and Barnlund (1998) that self-
disclosure tasks, like the ones that were used in the present experiments, could 
favour members of individualistic cultures.  There was also evidence reported that 
suggested that certain social-psychological behaviours within cultures are tactical 
(Sedikides et al., 2003).  There have been several studies investigating self-
enhancement, for instance, which indicate that members of individualistic cultures 
self-enhance the personal or unique aspects of the self, whilst members of 
collectivist culture self-enhance aspects of the self that are more beneficial to the 
group (Sedikides et al., 2003).  Concerns were raised in the introduction to Part 2, 
that the self-disclosure task would be more inline with tactics associated with 
members of individualistic cultures.  Conversely, the presentation of a task, which 
arguably primed and encouraged self-disclosure from the private self, was 
however a strength of the experiment.  It was argued that if the Singaporeans were 
not interested in exploring the private self then the self-disclosure rates would 
have been low.  The Singaporeans were, however, clearly interested in exploring 
the private self.   
 
 It is, therefore, argued that CMC relieves some of the pressure of FTF 
communication to adopt social and cultural norms.  It is argued that in CMC the 
participant is free to explore more personal desires (cf. Bargh et al., 2002), and in 
the present experiments the Singaporeans’ personal desires to explore the private 
self were revealed. CMC does, therefore, provide a unique situation for both the 
participant to explore personal desires, but also for the research to investigate the 
participants’ personal desires. This finding also challenges arguments that claim 
that the individual self is primary only in individualistic cultures (Kashima & 
Kashima, 1997; Heine & Lehman, 1999).  In contrast, the results of the reported 
experiments suggest that, just because collectivist cultures drive interdependent 
ideals, this does not mean that members of the collectivist culture do not possess 
personal desires that differ from the cultural norms.  In addition to providing 
strong support for Sedikides and Gaertner’s (2001) argument for the primacy of 
the individual, or private self, in collectivist cultures, this finding raises many 
interesting avenues for future research. 
 
It would be interesting, for instance, to run a longitudinal study of self-disclosure 
employing the methodology used in the reported experiments.  Although the 
reported studies have shown that CMC, and certain manipulations, can increase 
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self-disclosure during the task, further questions can be asked, regarding the long 
terms effects of self-disclosure.  Self-disclosure is reciprocally related to self-
knowledge, it is therefore very interesting to consider what the more enduring and 
long-term effects could be for participants in CMC, and more specifically what 
implications changes in self-disclosure could have upon the participant’s self-
construal. In the experiments reported in Part 2, the Singaporeans appeared to be 
self-disclosing deeply from their private self, which is a fairly unusual occurrence 
according to the literature (cf. Barnlund, 1975; Miyanaga, 1991; Asai and 
Barnlund, 1998; Kito 2005) it would be useful to repeat this experiment several 
times within a six-month period and assess whether the task has any effects upon 
their everyday self-disclosure behaviour, and to also measure the more enduring 
effects of this self-disclosure upon their self-construal. 
 
 Ideally, various measures could be retrieved in a pre-experiment questionnaire, to 
investigate the participants’ levels of self-consciousness or self-monitoring and 
past self-disclosure behaviour. They could also be assessed as to how much their 
characteristics are in-line with the individualism and collectivism dimensions.  
These measures could then be repeated at various points within the six months to 
allow a clearer picture of how the Singaporeans self-disclosure within the 
experiments was affecting their self-construal, and their self-disclosure behaviour.  
It would also be interesting to examine whether the Singaporeans continued to 
self-disclose deeply, or whether their self-disclosure would change over time.  
This would allow more insight into the long-term implications of increased self-
disclosure, and also how changes in self-disclosure can affect aspects of the self. 
The interests in a longitudinal study do not lie just with the Singaporean 
participants.  It would also be useful to compare the long-term self-disclosure 
behaviour of the Singaporeans to the British participants, and try and relate any 
differences that are found to the culture, and cultural differences in the self-
construal 
 
The finding that Singaporeans do have a private self they wish to explore and do 
exhibit high levels of deep self-disclosure in CMC is an important finding.   
Reports of high levels of self-disclosure by members of collectivist cultures are 
unusual in the literature, where members of collectivist culture and individualist 
cultures are consistently reported to disclose less (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 
1988; Goodwin & Lee, 1994; Kito, 2005).  This finding could, therefore, have 
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important implications for help seeking and for on-line counseling for members of 
collectivist cultures.  It does appear from the experiments that Singaporeans do 
respond well to discussing the private self in CMC.  Returning to the Singaporean 
suicide letters which were analysed by Chia et al., (2008), many of the reasons 
given for suicide were personal and private issues that could potentially be 
resolved by exploring and self-disclosing from the private self. There is much 
research to suggest that discussing problems can help dissolve worry (cf. Rogers, 
1951; Pennebaker, 1989). If Singaporean culture is less open than the British 
culture, it is possible that CMC could provide this outlet for this type of 
discussion.  Although the reported experiments did allow some insight into how 
private and public self-awareness affected the Singaporeans’ self-disclosure, the 
role of the textual channel, the encouraging task and the anonymity are not clearly 
understood. Further research is, therefore, required to examine each of these 
aspects in isolation, to be able to understand their independent effects. 
 
The Cultural Self 
 
The past reports that CMC increases private self-awareness and reduces public 
self-awareness (Matheson & Zanna, 1989) which, in turn, increases levels of self-
disclosure (Joinson, 2001) were confirmed in the experiments in this thesis. In 
terms of the cultural self, what was, however, particularly interesting is that the 
increased private self-awareness and reduced public self-awareness appeared to be 
particularly conducive to deep and optimal self-disclosure for the British 
participants.  However, it was the increased private self-awareness, rather than the 
reduced public self-awareness, that appeared to be important for the Singaporean 
participants.  It is argued here that these findings are consistent with past literature 
that describes the differences between the public and private selves of members of 
collectivist and individualistic cultures (cf. Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991).  More 
specifically, the finding that British participants are more affected by 
manipulations of public self-awareness, than the Singaporean participants, is 
consistent with the individualistic self that is described in the literature and in the 
introduction to Part 2 in the present thesis.  Moreover, the Singaporean 
participants being more affected by the manipulations of private self-awareness 
than the British is consistent with the collectivist self that is described in the 
literature and in the introduction to Part 2 of this thesis. 
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For example, the individualistic individual is reported to desire a true (Hsu, 1985), 
stable self (English & Chen, 2007), but is also greatly affected by social 
desirability pressures (Bontempo et al., 1990).  It is suggested here that these 
factors lead to the member of an individualistic culture developing a tension 
between their desire to be true to their self (cf. Higgins, 1973), and a desire to be 
compliant and socially desirable (cf. Bontempo et al,. 1990).  To mediate between 
these two desires it is suggested here that they develop the persona, or mask (cf. 
Hsu, 1985), that reinforces their social desirability.  The problems for the 
individualistic individual are accentuated by the philosophical underpinning of 
their culture, which desires logic and consistency (Boucher et al., 2009).  When a 
gap appears between their personality/public self and their private self, they 
arguably feel they are in possession of inconsistent selves (Higgins, 1973). This 
inconsistency, or discrepancy, between what they consider to be their true self and 
their projected self leads to negative emotion (cf. Higgins, 1973), and they desire 
to resolve this discrepancy (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1980).  These descriptions of 
the tensions within the independent self-construal were supported in the 
experiments reported in this thesis.  The reported experiments illustrated the 
desire the British participant has to express their true self (when public self-
awareness was low and private self-awareness was high), and also illustrated that 
when public self-awareness was raised, that their accuracy of self-disclosure 
dropped. 
 
This was particularly evident in Experiment 2, when the attentional demands of 
the experimental task were reduced, and the manipulation was reported to 
intensify.  Using Asai and Barnlund’s depictions (2001; Figure 1.1), and based on 
the literature and the results of the reported experiments, the effect of the door-
ajar condition, in comparison with the control condition is illustrated in Figure 
7.1.  In Figure 7.1 the British self is presented with the thick black circle around 
the private self representing the persona, or mask (cf. Hsu, 1985).  The figure on 
the left represents the British participants, in the control condition, when no public 
or private self-awareness manipulations are present. The depiction on the right 
illustrates what appeared to happen to the British participant when public self-
awareness was increased.  It can be seen in Figure 7.1 that as public self-
awareness increased in the door-ajar condition, the persona took over, and the 
private, or what in the West could be considered the true self (cf. Bargh et al., 
2002), became obscured.  It could also be argued that the thickness of the segment 
 199 
which represents the persona, or mask, also marks the discrepancy between the 
private and public self.  Arguably the thicker, or the larger, this discrepancy is, the 
more room there is for discomfort (cf. Higgins, 1987), and perhaps someone 
praised for ‘really being themselves,’ would have a thinner, or perhaps weaker 
boundary between the public and private self.  More research would is, however, 
required to substantiate these assertions. 
 
 
Figure 7.1:  Depiction of the British participants’ public and private self in the control condition 
(left) and the door ajar condition (right) 
 
In contrast, members of collectivist cultures are reported not to be driven by a 
need to find a true self (cf. Hsu, 1985). They are able to hold inconsistent views of 
the self (Boucher et al., 2009), and are driven by the group rather than the 
individual (Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991).  The member of a collectivist cultures is 
therefore arguably less selfish, possessive and protective over their private self 
than the member of the individualistic culture (cf. Triandis, 1989), and the self is 
less variable (English & Chen, 2007).  They do not possess a persona, or mask, 
and the true self, as it exists in Western culture, is less relevant to them (Hsu, 
1985).  It is argued in this thesis that the Singaporean participants were less 
affected by raised public self-awareness, as they accept that the self is variable 
(Boucher et al., 2009), and were less concerned with inconsistency in the self 
(Boucher et al., 2009). In Experiments 3 and 4, the Singaporeans consistently self-
disclosed a more positive image of themselves, than the British participants.  It is 
argued here that the Singaporean does not view social desirability pressures as a 
threat to the true self, as the British participants do.  In the reported experiments 
they were not, therefore, affected by the increased public self-awareness in the 
door-ajar condition, in the way that the British participants were. 
 
 The Singaporeans do, however, live in a culture where intimate self-disclosure 
and focus on the private self is not encouraged (Goodwin & Lee, 1994).  They do, 
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therefore, possess less self-knowledge about the private self (Asai & Barnlund, 
1998) and a less complex private self (Triandis, 1989).  Given this, it was the 
increase in private self-awareness, particularly in Experiment 4, which caused the 
greatest behavioural change in the Singaporean participants.  Increased private 
self-awareness is reported to: increase personal motivations (Miller & Read, 
1987), increase awareness of self-discrepancies (Carver & Scheier, 1980); and 
lead the individual to be more attentive to their thoughts and feelings (Scheier et 
al., 1978).  It is argued here that the increased private self-awareness in the 
socially isolated projected-mirror condition, gave the Singaporean participants 
greater access to their true self than they experience in their FTF communications.  
In Figure 7.2 the Singaporean self in the control condition is depicted with a 
smaller less complex private self (cf. Triandis, 1989) than the British participant, 
but with a larger public or collective self.  Instead of a thick black shell around the 
private self, the boundary between the private and public self is dashed, to 
represent the changeable and porous nature of this boundary, between the private 
and public self (cf. Cross & Madson, 1997). The porous nature of the boundary 
also indicates that the private self is an extension of the public self (cf. Triandis, 
1989).  The second illustration in Figure 7.2 demonstrates what may happen to the 
Singaporean participant in the projected-mirror condition in Experiment 4. The 
Singaporean participant’s private self-awareness was raised, thus increasing their 
attentional focus on the private self.  This led to the Singaporean participants’ 
private self expanding and coming more to the forefront of their attention.  This is 
depicted in Figure 7.2 where the private self is drawn larger.  These diagrams and 
these descriptions of the cultural self of the British and Singaporean participants 
(Figure 7.1 and 7.2) are fairly crude but they do aid conceptualisation, and could 
invoke interesting discussions about the boundaries of the cultural self. 
 
 
Figure 7.2:  Depiction of the Singaporean participants’ public and private self in the control 
condition (left) and the projected mirror condition (right) 
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It is an interesting finding that the Singaporean and British participants both use 
the change of attentional focus within the manipulations to gain a different 
perspective upon the self. More specifically, the British participants respond most 
to the reduced public self-awareness, and the Singaporeans to the increased 
private self-awareness manipulations.  It could be argued, that these different 
perspectives highlight and allow aspects of the self that are normally hidden or 
repressed to emerge. The greatest behavioural changes came in the socially 
isolated conditions for members of both cultures, and it was suggested in 
Experiments 2 and 4 that the manipulations were intensified.  In Experiments 2 
and 4 the amount of social motivations that the participants could pursue were 
reduced, and the participants, rather like in asynchronous CMC (cf. Wright, 
2002), had time to explore the parts of the self that they desired. Arguably, this 
type of self-disclosure, where social pressures are reduced, may reflect personal 
and individual desires, rather than social or cultural desires.  In some of the 
conditions, in the reported experiments, there was arguably some evidence of the 
participants exploring parts of the private self that they are less likely to reveal in 
FTF communication.  It was argued in the introduction to Part 1, that as 
technology and concomitant methods of communication develop, the ways in 
which the self can be explored change and this will ultimately affect the 
construction and managements of the self.  Experiments such as the ones 
presented here can possibly give some insight into how technology can lead to 
these changes. 
 
Shen (1984, p12) championed the need for research that could be considered an 
‘upgraded form of multiculturalism.’ In other words, Shen believed that 
comparative research could be mutually enriching for the compared cultures.  In 
some respects, the present thesis has been fairly successful in achieving this.  The 
experiments highlighted some cultural differences in how private and public self-
awareness affect self-disclosure, and possibly the gaining of self-knowledge, in 
both the cultures. In terms of mutual enrichment, it could be a revelation to a 
British person to find that the true self, they struggle to come to know, is a cultural 
construction, and that they are, perhaps, debilitated by their persona (cf. Hsu, 
1985). It could similarly be a revelation to a Singaporean to find that they could 
increase the complexity of, and develop, their private self, and recognise 
themselves as a unique individual.  Moreover, the research also indicates where 
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the issues and problems could lie in both self-construals.  The problems for the 
individualistic individual may, for instance, reside in their tension between the 
private and public self, which is mediated by personality. Problems for the 
collectivist could lie in their underdeveloped private self.   
 
These assertions are speculative, but more research might be fruitful in 
understanding these associations more clearly.  Whilst further research could 
explore these problems, it could also examine how the tensions could be resolved. 
For a member of an individualistic culture, observing the collectivist 
interdependent view of the self could be useful.  The pressures of being a unique 
individual could, for example, be released by encouraging community and 
harmony (cf. Markhus & Kitiyama, 1991), in order to reconnect the independent 
self-construal to the public and the other.  Similarly, it could be useful for the 
member of the collectivist culture to learn from the individualistic individual and 
explore their private self in more detail.  Most likely, what would be useful for 
members of both cultures is an understanding of how to achieve a balance and 
harmony between the different aspects of the self.  It is argued here that research 
investigating and manipulating attentional focus could be key to exploring these 
issues, and in the process could accomplish Shen’s (2003) vision.  It was 
discussed in the very beginning of this thesis that technology could have a 
profound effect upon the self, and certainly there is within CMC, the tools for 
these types of changes to occur. It could be argued, that the cultural self that is 
presented in this final discussion, is a rather idealistic and simplistic view of the 
self, and there is no doubt that it is much more complex.   The positive view of 
CMC, and the concomitant shift in attention that it provides, could also be 
criticised as too idealistic.   It is convenient to suggest that CMC could bring these 
positive changes, and significantly even in the few years that span the beginning 
of the empirical work within the thesis and the writing up, there have been many 
advances in technology.  Moreover, the popularity of CMC has continued to grow.  
However, although the Internet and CMC provide a plethora of opportunities for 
socialising (Joinson, 2002), experimenting with the self (Turkle, 1984), and 
gaining self-knowledge, this thesis has also explored only one small part of this 
huge communication revolution.   
 
Furthermore, the sample used in the experiments was small and this is another 
limitation of the study.  Only fifteen participants were used in each condition, 
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which could have affected the power of the statistical tests.  There were many 
non-significant trends in the predicted directions that did not reach the 
significance levels and this is some concern, and it is possible that a larger sample 
could be studied in the future.  The experiment sample also consisted of British 
and Singaporean female student participants and the results are therefore based on 
a select population, yet the Internet is a global phenomenon.  There are reports of 
gender differences in the use of CMC (Herring, 1994), and the investigation of 
culture could also be expanded out to other countries and cultures. Another 
limitation of the present study was the umbrella use of the terms individualistic 
and collectivist, it is reported that there are differences within cultures as to how 
much the individuals fit theses descriptions.  This has led to a distinction between 
allocentric and idiocentric individuals within a culture (cf. Bontempo et al., 1990).  
In hindsight, it would have been useful to have pre-tested the participants in the 
experiment as to how allocentric or idiocentric they were, or to have measured the 
extend to which they fitted the individualistic or collectivist dimensions.  Having 
said this, with a small sample tested, quite convincing results were obtained, that 
allowed for the aims of the studies to be met.  
 
Although this thesis examined self-disclosure in CMC, the results have clear 
implications for health.  In this thesis a distinction was made between personally 
motivated self-disclosure and socially motivated self-disclosure, and both types of 
self-disclosure have long-term health implications. It is well documented, for 
instance, that self-disclosure is linked to good health (Jourard, 1961; Pennebaker, 
1989; 1995), and conversely, that not self-disclosing can have a negative effect 
upon health (Pennebaker, 1989; 1995).  Part of the possible health benefits of 
increased self-disclosure in CMC, comes from the anonymity, increased private 
self-awareness and reduced public self-awareness, allowing the participants to 
self-disclose whilst being free from social pressures (cf. Bargh et al., 2002).  This 
type of behaviour is clearly evident in the growing number of self-help groups (cf. 
Morsund, 1997; Salem, Bogat, & Reid, 1998; Moon, 2000), where this type of 
cathartic type activity, or ‘getting something off the chest’ appears to take place 
frequently.  The anonymity, increased private and reduced public self-awareness 
in CMC, allows the participants to self-disclose personal information which may 
otherwise be suppressed or concealed.  Moreover, this type of suppression has 
been demonstrated to lead to both physical and psychological problems 
(Carpenter, 1987; Cooper & Leda, 1997). Jourard (1971) described a healthy 
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personality as being one where self-disclosure from the true self takes place, and 
arguably CMC can facilitate this happening.  The advent of CMC, and the 
concomitant changes in attentional focus that it facilitates, could therefore have 
long-term health benefits for its users, as a forum in which ‘healthy’ self-
disclosure can take place. 
 
Self-disclosure is however not just important for personal reasons, self-disclosure 
plays a central part in most relationships, and is therefore important for social 
reasons.   In Social-Penetration Theory, Altman and Taylor (1973) describe how 
self-disclosure is used to maintain and develop relationships.  The partners may 
enter into mutual disclosure and reciprocate personal information in order to form 
and give impressions and also to possibly increase intimacy.  This type of self-
disclosure, which could be described as being more socially motivated, can also 
be linked to health. Veltman (2005) suggests that self-disclosure aids people in not 
feeling alone in the world, and this involves showing and sharing an ‘inner core’ 
with other people (Baumeister, 1999; Swann, 1990).  Moreover, it has been 
illustrated that healthy relationships are important for well-being and happiness 
(cf. Lane, 2000; Layard, 2005).  The research presented within this thesis 
demonstrated, particularly in Part 1, that an important part of what may be 
occurring on-line is that the increased private, and reduced public self-awareness, 
allows the participants to self-disclose from their ‘true’ self.  This increased 
likelihood of presenting the true self in CMC, has been attributed to the 
acceleration of relationships in CMC (Mckenna & Bargh, 2000), which may also 
have implications for health.  A healthy personality is one where the self-
discloser, self-discloses from their true self (Jourard, 1971), therefore it could be 
argued that CMC relationships are encouraging healthy personalities and healthy 
relationships.  The increased self-disclosure observed within the reported 
experiments, and particularly the self-disclosure that is deep and authentic, do 
therefore have clear implications for health.  
 
 Whilst this positive view of self-disclosure in CMC is relevant at this time of 
writing, it is also reasonable to predict that as CMC becomes increasingly part of 
everyday life, and of daily interactions, the levels of self-awareness within the 
medium may change for the individual. The desire to impress anonymous on-line 
friends will inevitably rise and the social desirability pressures will heighten. 
Social networking sites are already filled with people presenting more positive 
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and sometime unrealistic selves (Walther, et al., 2008). How this will affect 
discrepancies within the self is yet to be seen.  Discrepancies may even become 
more complicated, with discrepancies emerging not just between the ideal, ought 
and real self, but between the on-line true and real-life true, the on-line ideal and 
the real-life ideal and the on-line ought and the real-life ought.  Research in CMC 
is important to document some of these changes, but it also important as it 
provides interesting tools for manipulating attentional focus.  Mediating 
communication is in itself interesting as it allows the facilitator to add and reduce 
certain aspects of the communication, and manipulate the levels of self-awareness.  
This could be useful in many areas, for instance, in marital guidance, where it may 
be useful to increase private self-awareness and reduce public self-awareness for 
angry couples.  It could also have interesting implications for people with social 
phobias (cf. George & Stopa, 2008), where aspects of the social could be removed 
and gradually added over time, to minimise the stress of the interaction. CMC has 
therefore great potential for future research, both as a focus for research about the 
self, but also to use as a tool.  This thesis was ambitious in its aims. It combined 
the complex subject areas of culture, CMC, self-disclosure and self-awareness, 
which led to a challenging study.  However, through a few simple experiments, 
that may have had their limitations, deep and philosophical questions about the 
nature of the cultural self were explored  
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APPENDIX 1: Questions of varying intimacy 
 
LIST OF QUESTIONS 
 
1.   W h a t  a r e  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  s t r a i n  a n d  d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h i n  
y o u r  f a m i l y ?    
2.   W h a t  a r e  y o u r  p r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  d i s l i k e s  i n  m u s i c  ?   
3.   W h o  a r e  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s  i n  y o u r  l i f e  y o u  m o s t  r e s e n t ,  a n d  w h y ?   
4.   W h a t  a r e  y o u  g u i l t i e s t  s e c r e t s ?   
5.   W h a t  a r e  y o u r  p e r s o n a l  r e l i g i o u s  v i e w s  a n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
y o u r  r e l i g i o u s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  i f  a n y ?    
6.   D o  y o u  f i n d  i t  e a s y  t o  t a l k  t o  o t h e r  p e o p l e  a b o u t  p e r s o n a l  
m a t t e r s  o r  d o  y o u  l i k e  t o  k e e p  y o u r s e l f  h i d d e n ?    
7.   W h a t  w e r e  t h e  o c c a s i o n s  i n  y o u r  l i f e  w h e n  y o u  w e r e  m o s t  
h a p p y ?   
8.   W h a t  a r e  t h e  w a y s  i n  w h i c h  y o u  f e e l  m o s t  m a l a d j u s t e d  o r  
i m m a t u r e ?   
9.   W h a t  a r e  t h e  a c t i o n s  y o u  h a v e  m o s t  r e g r e t t e d  i n  y o u r  l i f e  
a n d  w h y ?    
10 .   W h a t  u s u a l l y  c a u s e s  y o u  t o  f e e l  d e p r e s s e d  o r  u n s a t i s f i e d  
a n d  w h o  i f  a n y o n e  w o u l d  y o u  t a l k  t o  a b o u t  y o u r  f e e l i n g s ?   
11.   W h a t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  y o u r s e l f  g i v e  y o u  c a u s e  f o r  p r i d e  
a n d  s a t i s f a c t i o n ?   
12.   W h a t  w e r e  t h e  u n h a p p i e s t  m o m e n t s  o f  y o u r  l i f e  a n d  w h y ?   
13.   W h a t  m a k e s  y o u  u n h a p p y  a b o u t  b e i n g  f r o m  
B r i t a i n / S i n g a p o r e ?   
14.   W h a t  m a k e s  y o u  p r o u d  a b o u t  b e i n g  S i n g a p o r e a n / B r i t i s h ?  
15.   W h a t  a r e  y o u r  p e r s o n a l  g o a l s  f o r  t h e  n e x t  10  y e a r s ?   
16.   D o  y o u  f e e l  t h a t  a s  a  p e r s o n  y o u  h a v e  m u c h  p r e s s u r e  o n  y o u  
a n d  w h a t  d i r e c t i o n  d o e s  t h e  p r e s s u r e  c o m e  f r o m  ?   
17.   H o w  w o u l d  y o u  d e s c r i b e  y o u r s e l f ?   
18.   D e s c r i b e  a  s i t u a t i o n  w h e n  y o u  f e l t  y o u  l e t  y o u r s e l f  o r  y o u r  
f a m i l y  d o w n ?   
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APPENDIX 2: Paper instructions for dyadic 
participants 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANT X 
 
You are anonymous during this interaction.  Your partner is another student from 
a British University but you will never meet them. Your answers to the list of 
questions can not be linked back to you in anyway.   
 
Please answer the questions in as much detail as you can but try not to use slang 
or short forms of words, such as ‘OMG.’ 
 
During the interaction 
please do not ask extra questions, just stick to the questions on the sheet .  You 
can ask any question from the list and you DO NOT NEED TO ANSWER THE 
QUESTIONS IN ORDER, NOR DO YOU HAVE TO ANSWER THEM ALL.  
You may like to spend more time on just a few questions. 
 
Enjoy chatting! 
 
• Y o u  a r e  g o i n g  t o  t a l k  u s e  a  ‘ r e a l -t i m e ’  c h a t  p r o g r a m  
• H a v e  a  r e a d  o f  t h e  l i s t  o f  22 q u e s t i o n s  a n d  t h e  p r a c t i c e  q u e s t i o n s  
• Y o u  a n d  y o u r  p a r t n e r  a r e  t o  t a k e  i n  t u r n s  a n s w e r i n g  a n d  a s k i n g  q u e s t i o n s  
f r o m  t h e  l i s t .   A l l  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  y o u  a s k  y o u  w i l l  b e  a s k e d  t o  a n s w e r  a s  w e l l .   
Y o u r  a n s w e r  c a n  h o w e v e r  b e  “ I  d o  n o t  w a n t  t o  a n s w e r  t h i s  q u e s t i o n . ”  
• Y o u r  p a r t n e r  i s  w a i t i n g  f o r  y o u  t o  s a y  “ h e l l o ”  s o  please type “hello” i n  t h e  
b o x  a n d  t h e n  h i t  “r etu r n ” 
• O n c e  t h e y  h a v e  r e p l i e d  t h e y  h a v e  b e e n  a s k e d  t o  a s k  y o u  p r a c t i c e  q u e s t i o n  A .   
T h e y  w i l l  d o  t h i s  b y  t y p i n g  “ A sk  A ” 
• P l e a s e  c o u l d  y o u  a n s w e r  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  b y  t y p i n g  o n  t h e  s c r e e n  a n d  t h e n  
h i t t i n g  “r etu r n ” 
• N e x t  i t  i s  y o u r  t u r n  t o  a s k  a  q u e s t i o n ,  p i c k  o n e  o f f  t h e  l i s t  a n d  t y p e  “ A sk  X ”  
w h e r e  X  i s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  n u m b e r ,  o r  y o u  c a n  t y p e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o u t  
• Y o u  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  s e e  a t  t h e  b o t t o m  o f  t h e  s c r e e n  i f  t h e y  a r e  t y p i n g  a n d  
t h e n  t h e i r  a n s w e r  w i l l  a p p e a r  o n  y o u r  s c r e e n .  
• T h e y  w i l l  a s k  y o u  t h e  q u e s t i o n  b a c k  b y  t y p i n g  “ A n d  you ? ”  
• O n c e  y o u  h a v e  a n s w e r e d  t h i s  i t  i s  t h e n  t h e i r  t u r n  t o  a s k  y o u  a  q u e s t i o n ,  t h e y  
w i l l  t y p e  “ A sk  X ”  a n d  y o u  w i l l  a n s w e r  
• O n c e  y o u  h a v e  a n s w e r e d  y o u  a s k  t h e  q u e s t i o n  b a c k  b y  t y p i n g  “ A n d  you ? ” 
• C o n t i n u e  t a k i n g  t u r n s  a s k i n g  q u e s t i o n s  
• Y o u  w i l l  h e a r  a n  a l a r m  a f t e r  25 m i n u t e s ,  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  y o u  c a n  f i l l  i n  t h e  
q u e s t i o n n a i r e  t h a t  y o u  w e r e  s h o w n  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  t a s k  
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APPENDIX 3: Confederate script 
 
Script for confederate 
 
1. You will wait for your partner to say hello  
2. Type back hello 
3. If they try and start a conversation say hmm is it you or me that asks the 
first question, oh its me.  Ok I will ask practice question A 
4. They will answer with how they are today, they may ask the question 
back, but if they don’t prompt them by saying  
5. I’m not bad at all, I’ve been quite busy but that’s what being a student 
is about I suppose 
6. They are now supposed to ask you a question from the list, if they don’t 
prompt them with.  Right, what are we supposed to do next, oh I see 
you have to choose any question to ask me 
7. The participant will choose a question to ask and this will set off the 
intimacy level of the interaction.  You will always choose the question of 
the next level of intimacy to the one that the participant has asked.  You 
will answer the question and then you will ask the question back to them.  
When they have answered you will choose a question and they will ask 
you back. 
8. At the end of the interaction say Good to meet you, take care  
 
Things to note 
 
Always type exactly what is in the box below, if they ask you extra questions 
about your answer, either answer agreeing with them, or apologise and remind 
them that you are not allowed to ask more questions. 
 
Write the question you want to ask out in full.  When they ask a question to you, 
you ask them it back.  Instead of writing the question write… 
 
- How about you? 
- What about you? 
 
If they answer the question with information that is very personal or needs some 
reply you can answer the following.  If you use any extra phrases note them 
 
Positive 
- that sounds like fun 
-  sounds like you are really lucky 
-  that’s great 
-  that’s funny 
- fair enough 
- good for you 
- sounds good 
- I agree 
 
Negative 
- that must have been hard 
- thanks for sharing that with me 
- sounds like you deal with that well 
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Even though it is tempting to start chatting and asking questions, especially if you 
are interested do keep to the questions and answers all the time 
 
 
1.   W h a t  a r e  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  s t r a i n  a n d  d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h i n  y o u r  f a m i l y ?  
One source of strain in my family is that my auntie does not like my sister’s 
b oyfriend at all.   W hen w e are all tog ether there are alw ays fig hts b etw een 
the tw o of them.   M y father also is v ery strict and my w hole family are q uite 
scared of him.    
 
 
2.   W h a t  a r e  y o u r  p r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  d i s l i k e s  i n  m u s i c ?    
I  don’t hav e a p articular p reference I  like all sorts of music,  j ust any sort 
that stir up  your emotions.   I  ev en like w eird J ap anese song s 
 
 
 
3.   W h o  a r e  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s  i n  y o u r  l i f e  y o u  m o s t  r e s e n t ,  a n d  w h y ?   
I  think to resent someone is really tiring  and w e need to learn to forg iv e so 
no I  don’t resent anyone… … . at most I  j ust simp ly dislike and if I  dislike 
someone I  w ill not try to associate w ith them often.   A t the moment I  dislike 
p eop le w ho are nice in front of you and then b itch b ehind your b ack.   
 
 
4 . .  W h a t  a r e  y o u  g u i l t i e s t  s e c r e t s ?   
H mm… … … that’s hard to p inp oint once I  b roke an ex p ensiv e p ot and nev er 
ow ned up  to it,  that is ag ainst w hat I  b eliev e b ut sometimes I  act as a 
hyp ocrite in a sense that I  don’t p ractice w hat I  p reach… … … . . sometimes I  
hate myself for not b eing  strong  enoug h in my b eliefs.  
 
 
5.   W h a t  a r e  y o u r  p e r s o n a l  r e l i g i o u s  v i e w s  a n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  y o u r  r e l i g i o u s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  i f  a n y ?    
I  think there is no one relig ion sup erior that the others… … . . I  am how ev er 
relig ious there hav e b een ev ents in my life w hich hav e affirmed my b elief in 
relig ion.  
 
 
 
 
6.  D o  y o u  f i n d  i t  e a s y  t o  t a l k  t o  o t h e r  p e o p l e  a b o u t  p e r s o n a l  m a t t e r s  o r  d o  
y o u  l i k e  t o  k e e p  y o u r s e l f  h i d d e n ?    
I  am q uite op en and find it q uite easy to talk to others ab t p ersonal matters 
if I  don’t I  feel constip ated like I  mig ht b urst so I  don’t hav e a choice really.   
S ometimes it is g ood to keep  a p art of yourself hidden as you can ap p ear 
more mysterious!  
 
 
7.   W h a t  w e r e  t h e  o c c a s i o n s  i n  y o u r  l i f e  w h e n  y o u  w e r e  m o s t  h a p p y ?   
I  am mayb e hap p iest at the moment.   I  am w orking  hard at the moment I  
hav e a b oyfriend w ho I  am hap p y w ith.   M y family are all w ell.   I  am older 
than I  w as last year and hop efully w iser 
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8.   W h a t  a r e  t h e  w a y s  i n  w h i c h  y o u  f e e l  m o s t  m a l a d j u s t e d  o r  i m m a t u r e ?   
S ometimes I  w orry that I  am a j ealous p erson.   I  look at thing s other p eop le 
hav e g ot and w ant them myself.   I  am not b ad b ecause I  nev er w ish that they 
did not hav e these “ g ood”  thing s b ut sometimes it can make me sad that I  
don’t hav e that too.   I ts q uite silly really b ecause I  am hap p y w ith ev erything  
I  hav e g ot b ut it is easy to w ant more sometimes.   M ayb e this “ w ant”  is g ood 
for me b ecause it keep s me motiv ated!  
 
 
9.   W h a t  a r e  t h e  a c t i o n s  y o u  h a v e  m o s t  r e g r e t t e d  i n  y o u r  l i f e  a n d  w h y ?    
I  reg ret not w orking  harder for my maths ex amines as my life w ould b e 
easier now .  I  also reg ret falling  out w ith a friend of mine a few  years ag o 
ov er nothing  really.   I t makes me sound q uite b ad b ut she j ust started to 
annoy me and I  stop p ed seeing  her and now  w hen I  see her I  w onder w hat 
that w as all ab out.   Oh w ell life g oes on… … … … . !  
 
 
10 .   W h a t  u s u a l l y  c a u s e s  y o u  t o  f e e l  d e p r e s s e d  o r  u n s a t i s f i e d  a n d  w h o  i f  
a n y o n e  w o u l d  y o u  t a l k  t o  a b o u t  y o u r  f e e l i n g s ?   
i g et dep ressed w hen i try hard to achiev e something  and the end result aint 
w hat i ex p ect it to b e.   I  feel dep ressed w hen thing s in life don' t g o my w ay 
and unsatisfied w hen my b oyfriend does not do as i say i usually talk to my 
dad,  my b oyfriend or friends 
 
 
11.   W h a t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  y o u r s e l f  g i v e  y o u  c a u s e  f o r  p r i d e  a n d  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ?   
I  am p roud that I  am a hard w orker.   I  am p roud that I  am a v ery caring  and 
thoug htful p erson.   I  look after memb ers of my family and am a strong  
p erson.   I  am also p roud that I  g et thing s done I  don’t sit around w asting  my 
life.  Or at least I  hop e I  don’t!  
 
 
12.   W h a t  w e r e  t h e  u n h a p p i e s t  m o m e n t s  o f  y o u r  l i f e  a n d  w h y ?   
the unhap p iest moments of my life all surround w hen someone i lov e is in p ain 
either p hysical or mental,  that makes me v ery unhap p y.    
 
 
13.   W h a t  m a k e s  y o u  u n h a p p y  a b o u t  b e i n g  f r o m  B r i t a i n / S i n g a p o r e ?   
S ing ap ore is too small w ith too few  p laces to hang  out at the w eekend.   I  am 
also unhap p y ab out the stereotyp ing  of S ing ap ore and also that althoug h it is 
dev elop ed in its structure and technolog y the p eop le need to imp rov e their 
attitudes to the p oorer nations.  
 
B ritain is too small yet thinks that it is so b ig .   I  g et unhap p y as w ell that 
B ritain althoug h it is dev elop ed in its structure and technolog y the p eop le 
need to imp rov e their attitudes tow ard issues such as the env ironment and 
community.  
14 .   W h a t  m a k e s  y o u  p r o u d  a b o u t  b e i n g  S i n g a p o r e a n / B r i t i s h ?  
T he fact that B ritain is democratic and cosmop olitan,  I  really like the B ritish 
p eop le,  it is a stereotyp e b ut they do hav e a g reat sense of humour.  
 225 
 
T he fact that S ing ap ore is so multi-cultural,  and has a g ood w ork ethic.   
S ing ap orean is v ery successful and I  there are many op p ortunities 
 
15.   W h a t  a r e  y o u r  p e r s o n a l  g o a l s  f o r  t h e  n e x t  10  y e a r s ?  
T o b e successful in b usiness.   I  am either taking  ov er and ex p anding  my 
family b usiness or setting  up  my ow n b usiness I  hav e sev eral ideas that I  am 
looking  at.   I  also w ant b e of sup p ort to my husb and ( w hen I  g et married)  and 
start a family   
 
 
16.   D o  y o u  f e e l  t h a t  a s  a  p e r s o n  y o u  h a v e  m u c h  p r e s s u r e  o n  y o u  a n d  w h a t  
d i r e c t i o n  d o e s  t h e  p r e s s u r e  c o m e  f r o m ?   
a lot of the p ressure on me comes from myself.   I  set hig h standards and 
then hav e to liv e up  to them then I  look and w onder w hether this need to 
achiev e is j ust an illusion.   . . . i think i hav e hig h ex p ectations of myself.  w hen i 
w as young er. . the p ressure came from my mum. .  
 
 
17.   h o w  w o u l d  y o u  d e s c r i b e  y o u r s e l f ?  
H onest,  caring ,  lov ing ,  funny,  sharp  and modest!  Oh and v ery g ood looking  ha 
ha not really.  
 
 
 
18.  D e s c r i b e  a  s i t u a t i o n  w h e n  y o u  f e l t  y o u  l e t  y o u r s e l f  o r  y o u r  f a m i l y  
d o w n ?   
I  think I  said this b efore actually I  let myself dow n b y not studying  as hard 
as I  should hav e for my math ex am.  I  did not do as w ell as ev eryone 
ex p ected.   M y father is v ery g ood at maths and g av e me ex tra tuition and I  
felt I  let him dow n 
 
  
 
 
1.   I n  y o u r  l i f e  w h a t  g i v e s  y o u  r e a s o n s  f o r  p r i d e  a n d  s a t i s f a c t i o n   
I  am p roud of my family b ecause w e are a solid sup p ortiv e unit.   I t is fun to b e a 
memb er of my family it is often hilarious and w e are a force to reckoned w ith if 
anyone crosses us!  
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APPENDIX 4: Cronbach and items 
 
Questionnaire items 
 
The cronbach alpha reliability statistic was calculated across the whole 
population.  There were no notable differences between the Singaporeans and 
British participants’ reliability across the items.  Reverse scored items are marked 
with a **. 
 
Private Self-awareness Cronbach 
alpha 
I’ve generally been very aware of myself, my own perspective and 
attitudes 
 
Rather than thinking about myself in this interaction, I have been 
distracted by what is going on around me 
0.90 
Public self-awareness 
 
 
I have wondered about the way I have responded and presented 
myself in comparison to others, who are the same type of orientation 
to me 
 
I have thought about how my partner might be responding to my 
answers when they read them 
0.63 
Learning  
I felt I learnt something about myself in the interaction’  
** I didn’t learn anything about myself in this interaction 
 
0.82 
Sociable  
 
 
My partner is the type of person who enjoys socialising with people  
**I don’t think my partner is a sociable person 
 
0.87 
Enjoyment  
I enjoyed the interaction  
** I didn’t enjoy interacting in this way 
 
0.88 
Self-presentation   
I presented a more positive image of myself in the interaction  
I could feel myself focusing on the more positive aspects of me and 
my 
0.76 
Intimacy   
The interaction was intimate at points  
I felt that the interaction was quite personal  0.66 
Accountable  
I felt in this experiment that I could say anything and not feel 
accountable for it 
 
I did feel accountable for what I said during the interaction 0.92 
Embarrassment   
I felt embarrassed during the interaction  
**I do not feel embarrassment interacting in this way 0.83 
Isolation  
I found the experience isolating 0.63 
I felt alone when I was interacting this way  
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APPENDIX 5: Paper instructions for isolated 
participants 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANT X 
 
You are anonymous during this interaction.  Your partner is another student from 
a British University but you will never meet them. Your answers to the list of 
questions can not be linked back to you in anyway.   
 
Please answer the questions in as much detail as you can but try not to use slang 
or short forms of words, such as ‘OMG.’ 
 
During the task: 
You can ask any question from the list  
YOU DO NOT NEED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS IN ORDER, NOR DO 
YOU HAVE TO ANSWER THEM ALL.   
You may like to spend more time on just a few questions. 
 
 
 
 
You will never meet your partner and they will not read your answers to the 
questions for 6 months, they will never know who you are and your answers will 
just be used as a guide for them to answer some questions.   
 
Spend some time reading the questions now. 
 
Decide on which question you would like to answer first and then just write the 
number of the question and then start writing your answer. 
 
Take your time answering the questions and an alarm will sound after fifteen 
minutes and at that point please fill in the questionnaire 
